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ABSTRACT
Education in Germany has historically been a matter for 
the individual states rather than the central government.
In Prussia in the 1920s, elementary education was segre­
gated by religious denomination, while the upper grades 
were divided according to occupational specialty. The 
Social Democratic Party was the only party which proposed 
to change the system, calling for the secularization and 
integration of the schools. When it unexpectedly found 
itself in power in November 191B, the party's commitment to 
its program was tested. While the leadership continued to 
affirm its support for educational reform throughout the 
1920s, it did little to introduce any changes.
Admittedly, the Social Democrats did not rule alone; 
they had to share power with middle-class parties. Main­
taining good relations with its coalition partners natur­
ally entailed compromise. A greater obstacle to educa­
tional reform, however, was the lack of consensus within 
the party. Intra-party disagreement did not concern merely 
peripheral details, but reveals profoundly different views 
on the proper role of religion in modern society and the 
place of the individual.
Since party platforms tell us little about actual 
socialist attitudes towards education, we must turn to 
educators in the party. Kurt Lowenstein believed that 
religion was an anachronism in the modern age; he called
for the complete secularization of education by completely 
excluding religion from the schools. Another educator in 
the party, Paul Qestreich, focussed on the problem of inte­
grating the post-elementary schools in order to ensure that 
all students Mere afforded equal opportunities. Not all 
socialists, however, either rejected religion or insisted 
on the complete uniformity in the upper levels of the 
schools. Adolf Grimme represents this group of more mode­
rate socialists. All three reformers developed arguments 
to support their positions.
The leadership of the party declined to choose among 
these very different programs. Lack of coordination by the 
party's leadership meant that nothing Mas done to reform 
Prussian schools, Mhich remained essentially as they had 
been in Imperial Germany. Inactivity in educational reform 
is an indication of Weimar Social Democracy's inability to 




Marxist ideology is commonly viewed as one which re­
stricts the freedom of the individual in favor of advancing 
the interests of the group. Certainly there is much evi­
dence to support this contention. Marx's theories centered 
around the struggle of socio-economic classes; according 
to him, individuals merely represented their class. Fur—  
thermore, Marx insisted that class struggle, not the deeds 
of great individuals, was the driving force of history. 
Without doubt, Marx was hostile to individualism as the 
concept is generally understood.
It is also commonly believed that Marxist ideology is 
hostile to religion. There is Marx's famous and oft-quoted 
statement that "[religion] is the opium of the people".A 
According to him, religion was merely a tool used by capi­
talist oppressors to buttress their power and keep the 
masses docile and obedient. Marx's criticism of religion 
was certainly harsh. But although his ideology is 
essentially hostile to religion and restrictive of the 
freedom of the individual, one cannot automatically apply 
these judgments to Marx's followers.
AKarl Marx, "Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's 
Philosophy of Right; Introduction", The Marx-Engels 
Reader. ed. Robert C. Tucker (New York: W. W. Norton, 2d
ed. 1978), p . 53.
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Marxist ideology Mas an expression of opposition to the 
existing system in general. Its applicability to specific 
practical problems of the day Mas untested until the middle 
to late nineteenth century and the advent of socialist po­
litical parties which professed adherence to Marx's prin­
ciples of scientific socialism. Once Marxists entered the 
political arena, they were confronted with the difficulties 
encountered in any attempt to translate a theory into prac­
tice. As long as the fledgling parties were excluded from 
political power, abstract considerations concerning the 
place of religion and the role of the individual in modern 
society became secondary issues, of only theoretical inter­
est. More pressing was the immediate problem of deter­
mining the proper attitude to adopt towards the state. The 
debate within the movement on the issue of collaboration 
illustrates the problem of trying to unite theory with 
practice.
Before the First World War European socialists were 
divided on the question of whether Marxist parties should 
remain in apposition to their respective governments or 
whether they should collaborate with them whenever pos­
sible, in order to advance the interests of the workers.2 
The strongest Marxist party at this time was the Social 
Democratic Party of Germany (Sozialdemokratische Partei
“James Joll, The Second International. 18B9-1914 (New 
York: Praeger, 1956), pp. 77, B2, B5-105.
Deutschlands or SPD). While German socialists did not go 
so far as to advocate revolution, they did insist that 
Marxists must remain in opposition to their respective 
governments, thus maintaining ideological purity. Never­
theless, several historians have pointed out that the SPD 
was less hostile to the state than its belligerent rhetoric 
seemed to indicate.
The anomaly can be accounted for by the increasing 
importance of German trade unions, which steadily grew in 
membership around the turn of the century.3 Union leaders 
were more interested in pragmatic problems concerning wages 
and hours than in abstract theoretical debates about 
Marxist ideology. The strength of the unions vis-a-vis the 
SPD was demonstrated in August 1914, when union leaders, 
without consulting the party leadership, reached an agree­
ment with the Imperial government to support the war 
effort.* For union leaders, preservation of their organi­
zations' apparatus and treasury was more important than 
trying to follow Marx's abstract prescriptions for revolu­
tion .
Despite these changes, most party theoreticians refused 
to acknowledge the widening gap between Marxist ideology
3John A. Moses, Trade Unionism in Germany from Bis­
marck to Hitler 1869-1935. vol. 1, 1B69-191B (London:
George Prior Publishers, 1982).
*Richard N. Hunt, German Social Democracy 191B-I933 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), pp. 159, 180.
and the SPD's behavior. While party programs and official 
statements continued to express animosity for the existing 
system, the party's leadership was, in fact, more accommo­
dating and amendable to compromise. Ideological purists 
had persuaded the majority at the 1903 party conference to 
pass a resolution condemning the ideas of the revisionist 
Eduard Bernstein.5' Bernstein had attempted to close the 
gap between the theory and practice of socialism by re­
vising the theory to correspond more closely to the 
reality. Nevertheless, despite the party's repudiation of 
revisionism and its insistence on maintaining a confronta­
tional attitude towards the state, the SPD hesitated only 
briefly before following the unions' lead and supporting 
the war effort in 1914.
Revisions to the ideology were acceptable only when 
circumstances seemed to refute the validity of Marxist 
theories. The workers' patriotic enthusiasm for the 
nation's war effort is a case in point. Marx's expectation 
that the workers of the world would unite and refuse to 
fight one another if war broke out was disappointed.A 
Class solidarity proved ephemeral ; nationalism was the 
more patent force. German socialist theoreticians insisted
“‘Peter Gay, The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1952), p. 266.
^TRoman Szporluk, Communism and Nationalism. Karl Marx 
Versus Friederich List (New York: Oxford University Press,
19B8), p. 4.
that worker support for this war of defense was compatible 
with Marxist ideology. By focussing on the Russian enemy, 
socialists could claim that Marxism would only suffer an 
irreversible set-back if the tsarist authoritarian state 
triumphed.
This argument became less persuasive as the war dragged 
on. Initial solidarity in the workers' movement evaporated 
and tensions in the SPD mounted. A vocal minority rejected 
continued col 1aboration with the government. These members 
insisted that the party should revert to its true nature— a 
party of opposition. The positions of the two factions 
were irreconci1iable, eventually leading to a split in the 
party."7. On the eve of German defeat and the birth of the 
Weimar Republic, when unity was most needed, the largest 
and strongest party in the nation divided.
By New Year's Day 1919, there were three Marxist 
parties in Germany. Although the SPD was the strongest 
party in the land, it was unable to lead the nation in its 
hour of need primarily because the party had difficulty 
conceiving of itself as the ruler of the nation instead of 
the opposition. The issue of whether to collaborate with
’'C.E. Schorske, German Social Democracy 1905-1917 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1955). Schorske
maintained that the war only brought the conflict between 
reformists and the opposition out into the open; the 
controversy had been brewing long before the war. See 
Arthur Rosenberg, The Birth of the German Republic 1871- 
191B (New York: Oxford University Press, 1931) for the
opposing viewpoint.
the state, a problem that had plagued the movement from the 
time of its inception, became acute when the socialists 
found that they were the state.® Marxist ideology provided 
no guidance in this unprecedented situation. Nevertheless, 
the leadership of the SPD was unable to consider the possi­
bility that the creed that had long given its members hope 
and comfort in their times of tribulation no longer offered 
any answers,
Russian Communists were untroubled by these problems—  
they had always opposed the tsar's authoritarian state.
When they assumed power in 1917, they immediately set about 
the task of translating Marxist theory into practice; 
violence was an inevitable part of the process.
German socialists shrank in horror before Bolshevik 
excesses. Having already proven its readiness during the
®See Schorske and Hunt; also Evelyn Anderson, Hammer 
or Anvil, the Story of the German Working Class Movement 
(New York: Oriole Editions, 1945); Joseph A. Berlau,
German Social Democracy 1914-1921 (New York: Octogan
Books, 1949); and Franz Borkenau, World Communism. A 
History of the Communist International (Ann Arbor: Univ­
ersity of Michigan Press, 193B). Although not an historian 
specifically of the socialist movement, the foremost expert 
on the Weimar Republic, Karl Dietrich Bracher, held a 
similar view of the SPD. See his book Die Auflosuna der 
Weimarer Republik: Eine Studie zum Problem des Machtvei—
falls in der Demokratie (Villingen: Ring Verlag, 1955)
These works are all classics. For a more recent work that 
focusses on SPD shortcomomings see Donna Harsch, German 
Social Democracy and .the Rise of Nazism (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1993). Harsch 
criticized the party for shirking its responsibility by 
merely reacting to events, rather than exerting the 
leadership that the nation needed.
war to collaborate with liberals and Catholics, the SPD did 
not hesitate to continue to do so in 1919 in order to 
create a new form of government for Germany. The result: 
the Weimar Republic, famous for its political instability. 
In the brief fourteen years of the Republic's existence, 
twenty different cabinets, with an average life span of 
eight and a half months, attempted to rule the nation.9 
Although it had helped to create the Republic, the SPD 
joined national cabinets only sporadically throughout this 
period. Lack of positive and pragmatic programs made oppo­
sition more agreeable than being in power.
The situation was different in Prussia, the nation's 
largest state. Prussian governments were more stable be­
cause the SPD was willing to participate in its governments 
throughout the period from the November Revolution of 1918 
to July 1932, when Reich Chancellor Franz von Papen dis­
solved the state's government. Since the Social Democrats 
did not command a majority alone, they were obligated to 
share power with liberals and Catholics. The American 
historian Dietrich Orlow maintained that the commitment of 
these three groups to the successful realization of dem­
ocracy in Prussia made that state the "rock of democracy",
9Bracher, p. 75.
a model for the federal level to e m u l a t e . I n  his view, 
the three groups' commitment to democracy was a positive 
achievement.
Now that the issue of collaboration was settled, 
socialists needed to define mare precisely their position 
on issues that went beyond the immediate interests of its 
constituency of blue-collar workers. One of these areas 
was education. Although pre-war party platforms had called 
for sweeping educational reform, the SPD's willingness to 
implement its programs had not been tested. Elementary 
schools were segregated by religious denomination and 
included religious instruction in the curricula, while 
post-elementary schools were segregated according to 
occupational speciality. Now that the SPD was in power, 
socialist educators were eager to implement changes.
Around the turn of the century, the Prussian educa­
tional system was not very different from those of other 
European states. Although British and French governments 
steadily curtailed the power of the established churches 
over education throughout the nineteenth century, religion
i0Dietrich Orlow, Weimar Prussia 191B-1925. The 
Unlikely Rock of Democracy (Pittsburgh: University of
Pittsburgh Press, 1986); vol. 2, Weimar Prussia 1925-1933. 
The Illusion of Strength (Pittsburgh: University of
Pittsburgh Press, 1991).
A coalition of the SPD, Democrats, and the Catholic 
Center was in power from 1919 to 1921, and then again from 
1925 to 1932. From 1921 to 1925, the coalition was joined 
by another liberal party, the German People’s Party.
was not entirely excluded from the schools; in England, a 
non-denominational religious instruction became standard, 
while in France, parents who favored religious education 
could send their children to private parochial schools. 
Regarding the upper levels, both states made attempts 
following the First World War to open the middle and high 
schools to less privileged children by providing financial 
assistance. Fiscal instability of the post-war period, 
however, limited these measures.11
Until 1917, education in Russia resembled the pattern 
in the West. The Communists instituted sweeping changes, 
determined to eliminate all vestiges of tsarist authoritar 
ianism. The nation's new leaders believed that a radicall 
restructured educational system could serve to educate the 
new generation in values more appropriate for a modern 
socialist society. In order to accomplish this goal sev­
eral measures were implemented: religious instruction,
which had been used to teach obedience to the tsar, was 
banned; church schools were closed; grades, entrance 
examinations, and corporal punishment were all abolished; 
students were given equality with teachers; and practical 
rather than theoretical studies were emphasized.
“ Gerald L. Gutek, A History of the Western 
Educational Experience (Prospect Heights, Illinois: 
Waveland Press 1972, 1987), pp. 290-314.
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By the end of the 1920s, undisciplined and poorly- 
educated students led to a reconsideration of these 
innovations; the goals of Stalin's ambitious five-year 
plans could not be met unless workers, technicians, and 
scientists were properly trained. In 1927 university 
entrance examinations were re-introduced and in 1932 the 
teachers' authority to award grades was restored. Profes­
sions of loyalty to the new regime and its ideology were 
now prerequisites F̂or advancement. 12
Prussian socialists declined to follow the Russian 
example. Dedicated to the implementation of democracy, 
socialists in Prussia continued to share power with the 
Catholics and liberals. Two German historians of educa­
tion, Wolfgang Wittwer and Christoph Fiihr, argued that the 
Social Democrats declined to aggressively pursue educa­
tional reform because the issue threatened relations 
between the coalition partners.13 Keeping the coalition 
intact was the socialists' priority. This argument 
emphasizes obstacles external to the SPD which inhibited
1=Gutek, pp. 336-350.
13Wolfgang W. Wittwer, Die sozialdemokratische 
Schulpolitik in der Weimarer Republik. Ein Beitrao zur 
politischen Schu1oeschichte im Reich und in PreuBen 
(Berlin: Colloquium Oerlag, 1980) and Christoph Fiihr, Zur
Schulpolitik der Weimarer Republik: die Zusammenarbeit von
Reich und Landern im Reichsschu1ausschuB (1919-1923) und im 
Ausschu(3 fiir Unterrichtswesen (1924-1933): Darstel lung und 
Que11en. (Weinheim: Beltz Verlag, 2d ed. 1972).
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the party from trying to enact its program. The unspoken 
assumption is that the party had a program.
The SPD's party programs and its press gave the impres­
sion that the party desire implementation of a secular and 
integrated school system. Such repeated public affirma­
tions only antagonized its coalition partners, especially 
the Catholics, and bred mistrust that threatened the sta­
bility of the coalition. If the SPD truly had no intention 
of pursuing school reform legislation, what purpose could 
it serve to assert that it did? Two German historians of 
socialism, Susanne Miller and Heinrich Potthoff, shifted 
the focus of the debate away from coalition politics 
towards the problem of electoral po1itics.x* They argued 
that even though the SPD collaborated with middle-class 
parties, it could not forego use of the Marxist language of 
opposition without losing its working-c1ass voters to the 
Communist Party.
Applied to the sphere of education, this thesis results 
in the argument that the SPD continued to avow its support 
for a secular, integrated school system because the party 
believed that this was what its voters wanted. The avail­
able evidence indicates, however, that the majority of 
parents, including those in the working class, did not
14Susanne Miller and Heinrich Potthoff, ft History of 
German Social Democracy From 1B48 to the Present, trans. 
J.A. Underwood (Leamington Spa: Berg Publishers, 1986).
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support the secularization of education; most were unsure 
what integration meant.10 This dissertation cannot under­
take to explore parents' motives in depth; the problem is 
primarily to explain the puzzling behavior of the party 
leadership. Why would the SPD continue to call for far—  
reaching educational reform that had little appeal for its 
voters and strained relations with the Center? Was the 
leadership of the SPD so poor that it was unaware of the 
wishes of its own electorate?
A more likely reason for its ostensibly inexplicable 
behavior is that the leadership was too distracted by more 
pressing problems to give educational reform serious con­
sideration. Adhering to party slogans, the party leader­
ship either did not notice or did not care that it lacked a 
clearly defined program. Educators in the party were fru­
strated that the party gave educational reform such scant 
attention. They sought to develop specific educational 
programs which reflected Marxist ideology as they under—
10Most children, including those of working class 
families, were enrolled in denominational (Catholic or 
Protestant) schools. PreuBische Statistik (Amtliches 
Quellenwerk) 272. Das Schulwesen in PreuBen 1921 im 
Staate. in den Provinzen und Reaierunqsbezirken. ed. 
PreuBischen Statistischen Landesamte in Berlin. (Berlin: 
Verlag des PreuBischen Statistischen Landesamtes, 1924), 
p. B. In 1921 there were only fifty-five secular schools 
enrolling 0.5 percent of all Prussian school children. An 
updated study showed that by 1929 there were 256 secular 
schools (which by this time were referred to as "collection 
schools", for technical reasons) with 0.76 percent of all 
school children. Although an increase is indicated, it was 
still less than one percent.
13
stood it. The issues of religion and individualism which 
had previously been abstract theoretical questions now 
resurfaced as concrete practical problems that needed to be 
addressed.
Cultural critics from all points on the political 
spectrum were agitated by these problems. Conservative 
academics and apolitical left-leaning intellectuals have 
both received the attention of scholars.16 These groups 
ridiculed the spectacle of Weimar politics; they believed 
that the realms of politics and culture were mutually 
exclusive. Politica11y-active cultural critics in the SPD, 
however, have attracted less notice.
Socialist cultural critics shared the contemporary 
belief that Germany’s glorious cultural heritage was endan­
gered in the modern world. They differed from those who 
scorned politics, however, in that they believed, that the 
revival of culture depended on economic recovery and polit­
ical reform. Since formal education is central in the 
transmission of culture to youth, reform of the schools was 
mandatory for cultural rejuvenation and national revival.
itFritz K. Ringer, The Decline of the German 
Mandarins. The German Academic Community. 1870-1933
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969) deals with
right-wing academics; Peter Gay, Weimar Culture. The 
Outsider as Insider (New York: Harper and Row, 1968) and
Walter Laqueur, Weimar, ft Cultural History 1918-1933
(London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1974) deal with
apolitical left-wing intellectuals.
14
Three prominent Social Democratic reformers— Kurt 
Lowenstein, Paul Oestreich, and Adolf Grimme— concentrated 
on different aspects of education. Although they borrowed 
from current pedagogical theory, they did not participate 
in academic debate and research on education. 17 They were 
more likely to refer to theologians, sociologists, and 
philosophers than to other educators in their arguments.
The experience of the war had politicized all three of 
them— they felt it was their civic duty to participate 
actively in public life and share in solving the nation’s 
problems. They believed that the application of Marxist 
principles to the practical problem of educational reform 
was the key to creating a new society.
Kurt Lowenstein tirelessly pursued realization of the 
party plank calling for the secu1arization of education.
By this he meant not only the integration of Catholic and 
Protestant elementary schools, but removal of religious 
instruction and all references to religion— prayers, reli­
gious songs, and Biblical reading passages— from the 
schools. Only the complete secularization of education, he 
thought, could eliminate the public power of the estab­
lished churches, a prerequisite for German recovery.
17For more information on educational theory see 
Jurgen Qelkers, Reformoadaaoaik. Eine Kritische Do q- 
menaeschichte (Munich: Juventa Verlag, 1989) and Wolfgang
Scheibe, Die Reformoagaaoaische Beweouno 1900-1932. Eine 
einfiihrende Darstelluna (Weinheim: Verlag Julius Beltz,
1969).
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Lowenstein's position supports the prevailing view that 
both Marxist ideology and its proponents were hostile to 
religion.
Paul Oestreich attempted to clearly define the 
socialist position on integration. He strove for nothing 
less than the complete integration of the numerous post- 
elementary schools— the people's school, the middle school, 
and the numerous high schools— into one common school for 
all. A flexible curriculum offering electives would allow 
some freedom of choice. Students deemed to be "gifted", 
however, would not be segregated from other students. 
Instead, by educating all the nation's youth together, the 
whole society would benefit, rather than merely promoting 
the rise of favored individuals. Oestreich's emphasis on 
the collective reinforces the view that Marxist ideology 
and its adherents were more solicitious of group welfare 
than of individual freedom.
Adolf Grimme, a religious socialist, viewed the sec­
ularization and integration of education very differently 
from Lowenstein and Oestreich. Although Grimme ostensibly 
supported the secular school type, he believed that a 
religion purified of corruption had a place in the schools. 
As education minister at the end of the period (1930-1932), 
he criticized the increasing competition among the differ—  
ent types of schools for special privileges for their 
graduates. He did not, however, contemplate integration on
16
the lines Oestreich had s u g g e s t e d . G r i m m e ' s  interpreta­
tion of religion and the role of the individual shows that 
Marxist ideology is not necessarily incompatible with 
religion or individualism.
The leadership of the SPD, already limited by the 
necessity of conducting coalition politics, was unable to 
choose among these profoundly different school reform 
plans. Lacking a unified vision, the party drifted. The 
reluctance of the Social Democratic leadership to decide on 
a common educational reform plan reflected the party's 
inability to define its attitudes towards religion and the 
place of the individual in modern society. The SPD failed 
to offer a positive program because it could not surrender 
its identity as an opposition party.
Chapters two and three will examine the politics of 
educational reform. The following three chapters will deal 
with the theoretical arguments that Lowenstein, Oestreich, 
and Grimme constructed to lend substance to the socialist 
educational ideals of secu1arization and integration. The 
final chapter will return to political issues, in order to 
assess the impact the Social Democrats had on the schools.
iSThe special "privileges" they wanted were simply 
jobs, which were becoming scarce with the onset of the 
Great Depression. With rising unemployment, they hoped to 
reserve certain positions for their graduates.
CHAPTER TWO 
THE POLITICS OF EDUCATIONAL REFORM 
IN IMPERIAL GERMANY
In order to understand the politics of educational 
reform in Weimar Prussia, we need to understand the origins 
of the confessional segregation of elementary education and 
the occupational segregation of secondary schools. The 
state became more active in educational issues in the early 
part of the 1800s; as the century progressed, education 
became an increasingly important political issue.
This chapter will address the following questions: How
did the state's elementary schools come to be divided by 
religion? How did the secondary schools come to be divided 
by occupational preparation? What were the positions of 
the middle-class political parties on education? What was 
the Social Democrats' attitude toward the public schools? 
Toward the state?
The issues of the proper relationship between the es­
tablished churches and the schools and the role of religion 
in the elementary schools were debated by politicians in 
the Wilhelmian period. Concern with post-elementary 
education was restricted primarily to professional 
educators, although there were political aspects as well. 
This chapter will deal with both problems up to the time of 
the fall of the Hohenzollerns and the assumption by the SPD 
of the reins of power.
17
IB
RELIGIOUS SEGREGATION OF PRUSSIAN ELEMENTARY EDUCATION TO 
1871.
Prussia'5 Civil Code of 1794 defined education as a 
duty of the state. The state found it convenient, however, 
to delegate daily administrative tasks to the churches, 
both Catholic and Protestant. The natural result was a 
confessionally segregated school system.1 The churches 
controlled not only religious education, but also handled 
non-religious aspects of elementary education as well.
These tasks included the inspection of school buildings and 
property, as well as the hiring and supervision of 
teachers. This informal agreement between throne and 
altar(s) benefitted both parties; the churches wielded 
considerable power over elementary education, while the 
state was spared the cost of establishing an educational 
bureaucracy.=
The state, however, did not completely relinquish its 
control over educational matters to the churches. To cor­
rect the problem of poorly trained teachers, the state
xSince Catholic and Protestant populations before -1871 
tended to be segregated regionally, segregation of the 
schools posed few problems. Marjorie Lamberti, State. 
Society, and the Elementary School in Imperial Germany (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 21.
\amberti, pp. 16, 37; Thomas Alexander, The 
Prussian Elementary Schools (New York: MacMillan, 1918),
pp. 24-26; Anthony J. La Vopa, Prussian Schoo1teachers. 
Profession and Office. 1763-1848 (Chapel Hill: University
of North Carolina Press, 1980), p. 36.
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opened the first teachers' training institute or Seminar in 
1806. This measure was followed in 1B26 by a ministerial 
decree requiring prospective teachers to take a state 
licensing examination, a test based on training in the 
Seminar, before assuming teaching duties.3 These initia­
tives had the effect of markedly improving the quality of 
elementary teachers. The Seminaren, like the elementary 
schools, were confessionally segregated.4
There was an unexpected consequence of these reform 
measures. Since teachers now received professional 
training, they became more conscious and protective of 
their identity as a distinct occupational group. They 
began to resent supervision by clergymen who had not shared 
their pedagogical training.5 Although pastors were gen­
erally well-educated, often university trained, teachers 
felt that a pastor’s qualifications were inapplicable to 
the supervision of education.6 Teachers were not opposed 
to religion or the inclusion of religious instruction in 
the curriculumj their desire to be free of church control 
was based strictly on professional interests.
Tla Vopa, pp. 53-54.
4Wittwer, p. 175.
“Lamberti, pp. 16, 27; La Vopa, pp. 58, 101-104.
*La Vopa, p. 101.
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The reform era from 1806 to 1B19 might have been an 
auspicious time for teachers to agitate for abolition of 
church domination of education. The teachers' sense of 
professional solidarity and common purpose had not yet 
sufficiently developed at this time, however. By 1819, the 
beginning of the era of reaction, the state had jDecome hos­
tile to any perceived attack on the established churches—  
the churches were now viewed as indispensable partners in 
the attempt to return Prussia to pre-Napo1eonic days.7 The 
state ignored teachers' pleas for the professionalization 
of educational administration.
In the Revolution of 1848, elementary teachers, like 
other professional groups, formulated a program stating 
their grievances. One of their chief demands was for the 
abolition of church inspection and supervision of the 
schools.® They repeated their position that professional 
qualifications, not confessional orientation, should be the 
decisive factor in appointing school officials. When the 
revolution collapsed, the teachers' wishes were ignored. 
While the Constitution of 1B50 affirmed state authority 
over education, it also provided that confessional rela­
tionships would be taken into account in establishing
^Gordon A. Craig, Europe. 1815-1914 (Hinsdale, 
Illinois: Dryden Press, third edition, 1972), p. 48.
eLamberti, p. 27.
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elementary schools.*1’ Prussian elementary education 
continued to be divided by denomination and dominated by 
the established churches. Failing to win the support of 
the state, teachers who strove for an end to church control 
of education would have to find another champion for their 
interests.
OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALIZATION OF PRUSSIAN SECONDARY SCHOOLS 
TO 1871
Prussia's defeat by Napoleon at Jena in 1806 initiated 
a period of intense self-criticism on the part of the 
state. Perhaps if outmoded institutions were reformed, the 
potential strength of the nation's individuals could be 
actualized. This would increase the power of the state so 
that the French occupiers could be repelled. The renowned 
philosopher Johann Gottlieb Fichte gave eloquent expression 
to these ideas in his Addresses to the German Nation, 
delivered in Berlin in the winter of 1B07-1B08.
In the Addresses Fichte blamed Prussia's defeat on the 
state's failure to educate all of its members.10 Fichte 
believed that by allowing church domination of the schools
**1 bid . , p. 13.
10 J . G. Fichte, Werke. Funfter Band (Leipzig: Fritz
Eckardt Verlag, 1910), p. 3B5. While Frederick the Great 
had encouraged the spread of religiously-oriented education 
in order to produce moral, orderly, and obedient subjects, 
he did not want the masses to receive too much education 
because they might then aspire to rise above their assigned 
station in life.
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the state had neglected to instill a sense of patriotism in
m
youth.11 The nation would be invigorated, Fichte insisted, 
by a well-educated citizenry; individual freedom and ser­
vice to the state could harmoniously co-exist because the 
interests of the individual complemented those of the 
state.1=
Fichte borrowed extensively from the ideas of a contem­
porary, the Swiss educational reformer Johann Heinrich 
Pestalozzi. Pestalozzi criticized the contemporary educa­
tional practice of emphasizing the development of one skill 
to the neglect of other subjects. An all-around cultiva­
tion of intelligence, morality, and physical fitness pro­
vided a better education, he thought.13, Fichte linked 
Pestalozzian principles of education to the national ideal 
of Prussian rejuvenation.14
Wilhelm von Humboldt, Minister of Education and Reli­
gion, was receptive to these ideas. He introduced the 
classical curriculum into the Gymnasium; practical career 
preparation would take place after the student completed
11Gutek, pp. 187-1B8.
1=?John S. Brubacher, A History of the Problems of 
Education (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1947, 1966), pp. 58-61.
13F.H. Hayward, The Educational Ideas of Pestalozzi 
and Frobel (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1904,
1979), p. 18.
14Gutek, pp. 200, 213.
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his studies. 1SI Originally intended to educate all of the 
nation'5 youth, the curriculum of the nine year Gymnasium 
proved to be so rigorous that only those with leisure could 
invest the amount of time necessary to master the demanding 
subjects. Not only did attendance at a Gymnasium necessi­
tate a great expenditure of the student's time; it also 
cost money— tuition was charged at private preparatory 
schools, as well as the Gymnasium. The high fees prevented 
workers' children from attending.
When middle schools appeared later in the century, the 
result was a three-tiered system of education, which 
roughly corresponded to separate schools for the lower, 
middle and upper classes.14’ The majority of the population 
received only a basic education in the eight-year 
"people's" schools, which were the only schools that were 
free. Changing from one track to another was almost impos­
sible, given that the Gymnasium emphasized the study of 
Latin and Greek.
The division of students was matched by a division of 
the teaching profession. While elementary teachers were
lsJames C. Albisetti, Secondary School Reform in 
Imperial Germany (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1983), p. 19.
14,Di f f erent educational tracks originated in the 
Middle Ages when clergy received an abstract, other-wor1d1y 
training in a university, the aristocracy trained to fight 
and be chivalrous, and craftsmen learned the practical 
skills of their trade in the guild system. Gutek, pp. 69, 
298-309.
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trained in state-controlled Seminars, secondary school 
teachers attended a university where their preparation 
consisted of thorough mastery of three academic fields. 
Secondary school teachers liked to think of themselves more 
as scholars than educators.17
In the Seminaren, which were separate from the univer­
sities, elementary teachers received a less theoretical, 
more practica1ly-oriented course of study. Elementary 
teachers aspired to obtain equal pay and status with 
secondary school teachers. To this end, they called for 
the attachment of the Seminaren to the universities. 
Secondary school teachers resisted this proposal— they 
wanted to maintain their sense of exc lusivity. In
addition, they argued, since few university graduates would 
voluntarily choose to teach at the elementary level, the 
profession would be impoverished. This problem could be 
avoided by denying elementary teachers admission to univer­
sities, precluding the possibility of changing their career 
tracks.
As long as the teaching profession was segregated, the 
state's schools would necessarily remain segregated too.
17Konrad Jarausch, The Ltnfree Professions. German 
Lawyers. Teachers, and Engineers. 1900-1950 (New York: 




During the Revolution of 1848, elementary teachers called 
for vertical integration of the educational system, com­
bining all grades from the elementary school through the 
upper grades and leading to the university.30 If the 
schools Mere integrated, then teacher training would have 
to be unified as well; elementary teachers would then 
enjoy the benefits of a university education. Their hopes 
were dashed when the Constitution of 1850 retained the 
standard practice of segregated schools for both students 
and teachers.
PRUSSIAN POLITICS BEFORE THE FIRST WORLD WAR— LIBERALS AND 
CATHOLICS ON EDUCATION
Elementary teachers found a champion for their inter­
ests in the two liberal parties, the Progressives and the 
National Liberals. These two parties differed on specific 
issues but shared a common set of principles. Among these 
was an insistence on separation of church and state and 
removal of church domination of the schools.31 Instead of 
confessionally segregated elementary schools, the liberals 
proposed that a mixed confessional school was more appro­
priate in the modern industrialized and urbanized age.®3
^Lamberti, p. 27.
=1Bruce B. Frye, Liberal Democrats in the Weimar 
Republic. The History of the German Democratic Party and 
the German State Party (Carbondale: Southern Illinois
University Press, 1985), p. 10.
Lamberti, p. 215.
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While liberals criticized the churches in general, they 
were especially hostile to the Catholic Church.
Despite the liberals' opposition to religious segrega­
tion, neither party was hostile to religion itself. 
Religious instruction was essential, liberals believed, 
because Christianity was such an integral part of Berman 
culture. The nation's youth could not properly appreciate 
the great German classics of literature and art without an 
understanding of the Christian religion. Although they 
wanted to abolish church control of the schools, liberals 
believed that religion could nevertheless be retained.
Programs of the two parties illustrate the liberals' 
desire to check the power of the churches while retaining a 
positive attitude towards religion. The 1878 program of 
the Progressive Party called for "independence of the 
school from the church" but added the proviso "without 
prejudice to the regulation of religious education".=3 The 
latter clause indicated that the churches would be allowed 
to supervise religious instruction but not other school 
affairs. The program of the National Liberals (1881) 
emphasized the rights of the state and its precedence over 
the churches, but also stated that, "[the state] very well 
appreciates the great importance of the churches for our
■"“’Wolfgang Treue, Deutsche Parteiprogramme 1861-1961 
(Gottingen: Musterschmidt-Verlag, 1954), "Programm der
Deutschen Freisinnigen Partei", 5. Marz 1B84, p. 75.
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people."3* They also called for "peaceful relations 
between state and church".35 The party just wanted to 
ensure the supremacy of the state. These rights were not 
precisely defined nor was the issue of religious instruc­
tion in the schools raised.
The liberals did not adopt the elementary teachers' 
desire for integration of the different levels of schools 
(vertical integration). The liberals, however, did 
champion national standardization of all schools in the 
different states of Germany (horizontal integration). They 
were disappointed when education remained under state con­
trol after unification. Until the nation's schools were 
integrated, they believed, national unification would 
remain incomplete.2i Bismarck thought unification was 
incomplete too, as long as the Catholics competed with the 
state far authority.27 In an attempt to eradicate the 
public power of the Catholic Church, he instituted the May 
Laws, effective from 1873 to 1878. This period is known as
^Ibid., "Programm der Nationalliberalen Partei", 29. 
Mai 1881, p. 72.
3=>I bid. , p. 71.
S6Lamberti, p. 63.
^The Papal Doctrine of Infallibility of 1870 made 
Bismarck wonder whether German Catholics would pledge their 
first allegiance to the Kaiser or the pope. Lamberti, p.
41.
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the Kulturkampf. The liberals .supported the state against 
the Catholics.
The Catholics had established their own party, the 
Center, in response to the exclusion of Catholic Austria 
from unified Germany. The kleindeutsch solution to the 
problem of German unification had resulted in a Reich with 
a sizeable Catholic minority. Comprising about one-third 
of Germany's population, Catholics feared for the survival 
of their religion not only in a predominantly Protestant 
Reich, but in the rapidly changing modern world. To this 
end, the Center vociferously defended the traditional prac­
tice of confessional segregation and church control of 
elementary schools.20
The May Laws restricted the public activity of the 
Catholic Church and asserted state authority over clerical 
training and appointments. 29 The Church's control of 
schools in Polish districts and the Rhineland was curtailed 
by replacing clerical school inspectors with professional 
educators. A lack of money for new state civil servants, 
however, prevented the wholesale dismissal of Catholic 
inspectors. Bismarck's primary intention was not to 
promote the professionalization of education— Protestant 
supervisors were not removed from their posts— but to
^Treue, "Programm des Zentrums", 30. Juni 1870, pp. 
60-61.
^Craig, p. 344; Lamberti, p. 50.
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eliminate the Catholic Church as a political and social
* V ipower.*■
When Bismarck called off the persecution in 1878, 
clerics who had been dismissed from the schools resumed 
their old positions.*1 The chancellor now wanted to return 
to the old church-state partnership, in the interest of 
upholding the traditional authority of both in the face of 
a new threat— the growing socialist movement. An alliance 
of Catholics and conservative Protestants would be useful 
in checking the spread of revolutionary ideas. The Center 
Party, for its part, was eager to demonstrate that 
Catholics were loyal citizens.
During the Kul turk<ampf, Protestant clergymen had 
opposed the persecution of the Catholics, fearing that the 
state might curtail their own privileges as well. In 1876 
the Conservative Party, representative of the Protestant 
rural population, publicly stated its opposition to the May 
Laws.*3 These statements facilitated an alliance between 
Protestant Conservatives and the Catholic Center. In the 
matter of education, the positions of the two parties were 
identical. Conservatives regarded the "confessional, 
Christian Volksschu]e . . . [as] the most important
“ Lamberti, pp. 47-48, 86-B7.
311 bid., p. 107.
“ Treue, "Grundungsaufruf der Deutsch-Konservativen 
Partei", 7. Juni 1876, p. 65.
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guarantee against the increasing unruliness of the masses 
and the progressive deterioration of all social ties."33 
Socialism threatened the existing order; Conservatives 
were ready to close ranks with both the Catholic Church and 
the state in battling this pernicious evil.
In 1892 the two parties introduced a bill that legally 
established the customary practice of confessional segrega­
tion. The National Liberals and Progressives managed to 
defeat the bill. But in 1906, the same proposal became law 
when the National Liberals abandoned the Progressives and 
abstained from the vote, allowing the bill to become law. 
The custom of confessional segregation of the school system 
now enjoyed legal sanction.34
Although the Catholics found it beneficial to co­
operate with Protestant Conservatives on religious and 
educational issues, the Catholics and liberals shared some 
common interests as well. As a party defined by religious 
membership, the Center consisted of members of all social 
classes, including workers. The party promoted socio­
economic reforms that Conservatives resisted. While the 
anti-clericalism of the liberals presented an obstacle to 
1ibera1-Cathdic cooperation, the two groups could unite on 
occasion. The rapid growth of the socialist movement
331 b i d .
3*Lamberti, p. 215.
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altered the political scene. Before considering this new 
political force, however, we need to consider developments 
in post-elementary education.
The role of religion and the churches in elementary 
education was a political issue because of the existence of 
the Center Party. The problem of post-elementary educa­
tion, however, was largely restricted to professional 
educators, although the issue did have political dimen­
sions. As Germany became industrialized, educational 
reformers increasingly criticized as impractical the 
humanistic Gymnasium that emphasized study of Greek and 
Latin.3® In the second half of the 19th century, 
specialization in education increased. New educational 
institutions emerged to train professionals in technical 
subjects excluded from the Gymnasium curriculum. Two new 
types of secondary schools— the Rea 1 gymnasium (.which 
emphasized mathematics and science) and the Oberrea1schule 
(which concentrated on German studies)— challenged the 
supremacy of the Gymnasium.
Gymnasium students were accorded special privileges; 
they received an exemption from compulsory military service 
and were the only graduates admitted to the universities. 
Advocates of the new secondary schools demanded equal 
rights for their students. They won an influential
3®Oelkers, p. 2 6.
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supporter in the person of Kaiser Wilhelm II. Following 
the school conferences of 1890 and 1900, the two new types 
of school were awarded parity with the Gymnasium. 361 
Wilhelm was especially enthusiastic about the 
Oberrealschule with its focus on German language, history, 
and literature.37 The Kaiser believed that religious 
instruction in the ele-mentary schools and a greater 
emphasis on German studies in some secondary schools could 
aid in checking the spread of socialist ideas.3®
What position did the Social Democrats take on the 
churches, the state, and the educational system?
GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN OPPOSITION, 1869-1917
The industrialization that rapidly proceeded after 
Bismarck's unification of the Reich led to a rapid increase 
in numbers of the urban working class, with significant 
consequences for the nation's political life. Originally 
organized into educational societies under the tutelage of 
the Progressives, workers soon recognized that their 
interests fundamentally conflicted with those of property
“ Ringer, pp. 50-51.
37Gutek, p. 32B.
^Alexander, p. 398; Albisetti, pp. 180-182.
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owning liberals.3^ The association of the Progressives 
with the authoritarian government also led workers to 
distrust the liberals.*0 In increasing numbers, workers 
joined organizations devoted specifically to advancing 
their interests.
□ne of these organizations was the Social Democratic 
Workers’ Party (Sozialdemokratische Arbeiterpartei or 
SDAP), established at Eisenach on August 0, 1B69. It was
led by Wilhelm Liebknecht and August Bebel, men close to 
Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, theoreticians and would-be 
politicians-revolutionaries.41 The new party's program 
reflected its dual heritage— both its liberal progressive 
patrimony and the scathing critique of that patrimony, 
Marxist ideology. The program began with a statement of 
its general principles, including several radical-sounding 
phrases such as "the abolition of all class rule" and
T,,?Frye maintained that differences between liberalism 
and socialism (in Imperial Germany, the Weimar Republic, 
and even today) were greater than their similarities; the 
ideologies of the two were fundamentally irreconci1iable, 
even if the two parties could compromise on particular 
issues. For the opposite point of view, see Beverly 
Heckart, From Bassermann to Bebel. The Grand Bloc's Quest 
for Reform in the Kaiserreich. 1900-1914 (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1974).
*°Miller and Potthoff, p. 24.
I am referring to Marx ' s and Engels' activities in 
the International Workingmen's Association. Known as the 
First International, it was established in 1864. During 
the International's brief existence, the SDAP was affili­
ated with it; it was dissolved in 1876 because of fac­
tional in-fighting.
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"abolition of the existing means of production"; affilia­
tion with the International was a further indication of the 
party's radical inclinations.42
Other provisions of the program, however, could have 
easily been written by a Progressive. For example, the 
fourth principle stated that economic liberation of the 
workers "is possible only in a democratic state". The 
program also demanded "universal, equal, direct, and secret 
vote to all males over 20 years of age".43 These planks 
illustrate that Germany's first socialists were committed 
democrats. In educational matters, the party called for 
"separation of church and state and separation of education 
from the church", and "compulsory education in primary 
elementary schools and free instruction in all public 
educational institutions."44
In 1875, the SDAP merged with another socialist 
group,43 to create the Socialist Workers' Party of Germany 
(Sozialistische Arbeiterpartei Deutschlands, or SAPD). The 
program of the new party, written at its founding congress 
in Gotha, resembled the SDAP's earlier program in its
42Treue, "Programm der Sozialdemokratischen Arbeiter—  
partei", Eisenach, 8. August 1869, p. 59.
431 b i d .
441 bid., p. 60.
45Ferdinand Lassalle's General German Workers' Associ­
ation .
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emphasis on demands for democracy— the secret ballot, univ­
ersal suffrage, civil liberties, and freedom of associa­
tion.^ The issues of religion and education were com­
bined; the program called for "universal and equal educa­
tion of the people through the state. Universal compulsory 
education. Free instruction in all educational institu­
tions. Declaration that religion is a private matter."47 
This plank emphasized four points: that education was a 
responsibility of the state and that education must be 
equal, free, and secular. These demands were intended as 
statements of principle; the party had no prospect of 
implementing its program, or even of influencing the state 
to implement these changes.
As a matter of fact, socialists soon viewed the state 
with hostility when Bismarck introduced anti-socialist 
legislation in 187B. Until they expired in 1890, these 
laws severely restricted the activity of the party. The 
SPD's press was banned, its leaders were harrassed, and 
public meetings were prohibited. Despite these limita­
tions, however, every Reichstag election throughout the 
period saw a steady increase in votes for the SAPD. 
Persecution by the state only increased the party's
46Treue, "Programm der Sozialdemokratischen Arbeiter- 
partei”, Botha, Mai 1875, pp. 66-67.
Ibid., p. 67.
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attraction for workers. 1,0 The 1B90 Reichstag election 
showed the largest gains yet for the socialist party. 
Bismarck's plan to eradicate the workers' movement failed. 
When Wilhelm came to the throne in 1B8B, Bismarck's days 
were numbered; the Iron Chancellor resigned in 1B90. The 
new Kaiser then made efforts to conciliate the working 
class by letting the anti-socialist law lapse and by 
extending social insurance measures first introduced by 
Bismarck . ***
A legal party again, it adopted a new name at the 1B91 
Erfurt Congress. The term "worker" was dropped from the 
name of the party--it was now called the Social Democratic 
Party of Germany (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands 
or SPD). The delegates adopted a new program as well. It 
contained the usual Marxist statements on the inevitable 
demise of capitalism and the certain triumph of the prole­
tariat, phrases that property-owning liberals naturally 
perceived as radical. The leadership of the SPD, however, 
recognized the psychological appeal of Marxist rhetoric for
ASGary P. Steenson, "Not One Man1. Not One Penny1." 
German Social Democracy. 1865-1914 (Pittsburgh: University
of Pittsburgh Press, 1981), p. xiv, passim.
4s,These measures included health, accident, disabil­
ity, and old-age insurance, passed by the Reichstag 18B3- 
1889. Germany was a pioneer in providing state assistance 
for the working class.
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working class voters and employed it to effective electoral 
advantage. ®°
One cannot question the sincerity of the party leadei—  
ship's belief in Marxist theory; to be a Social Democrat 
in Imperial Germany entailed real hardship, including 
harassment by the authorities and ostracism by mainstream 
society. Naturally, committed socialists were gratified 
when their message attracted increasing support at the 
polls. The growing popularity of Marxian socialism seemed 
to validate the correctness of the theory. Success 
emboldened the party's leaders, encouraging them in their 
belief that socialism was the inevitable wave of the 
future. They envisioned successively increasing victories
at the polls. Democracy would sweep them to powei history
would vindicate their sacrifices. Although socialism 
remained the final goal, democracy seemed to offer the 
winning strategy. Without openly repudiating revolution, 
the party was steadily becoming a party of reform.91
The program's treatment of religion and education 
showed the party's preference for the language of opposi­
tion. Point six called for "affirmation of religion as a 
private matter. Abolition of all use of public means on
^ ‘Miller and Potthoff, p. 36.
s:LThe revision of Marxist theory in these years has 
received much attention from scholars. The most important 
works are Gay, The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism and 
Schorske (see chapter one).
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church or religious goals. Church and religious 
communities are to be considered as private organiza­
tions. " 93 Point seven addressed the issue of education:
Secularization of the school. Compulsory attendance at 
public primary schools. No charges to be made for 
instruction, school supplies, and maintenance in public 
primary schools, nor in the higher educational institu­
tions for those male and female students whose capabi­
lities for further training are deemed suitable.33
These planks expressed the SPD's dissatisfaction with
the existing school system. Socialist theorists believed
that education should serve to raise the consciousness of
the workers to the necessity of their historical mission,
as outlined by Karl Marx.94 Religious instruction and
cultivation of patriotism in the schools presented
obstacles to this mission. Because the schools did not
serve its purposes, and because it had no power to change
the situation, the leadership of the SPD tended to be
indifferent to public education.33 Since the schools were
hostile to the socialist movement, the party developed its
own organizations— clubs for extracurricular activities as
B2Treue, "Programm der Sozialdemokratischen Partei", 
Erfurt, 21. Qktober 1B91, p. 76.
331b i d . , pp. 76-77.
34Gutek, pp. 248-249.
” Lamberti, p. 198; Albisetti, p. 61.
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well as educational study groups.86 These clubs often had 
links with their middle class counterparts, however; seg­
regation of workers from the rest of German society was 
never total. 97 Cetainly workers' children continued to be 
educated in the public schools. Because the SPD had no 
power to change the system, discussion of educational 
issues was mostly confined to educators in the party.
The leadership of the SPD believed in Marx's prophesy 
of the inevitable triumph of the proletariat. But it 
thought that it would be a long time before this came to 
pass. Socialist leaders were surprised to find themselves 
in power in November 1918. How would they attempt to 
implement their party programs? Would they reform the 
sc hoo1s?
^W.L. Gutsman, Workers' Culture in Imperial Germany. 
Between Tradition and Commitment (New York: Berg Pub-
1ishers, 1990).
87Vernon L. Lidtke, The Alternative Culture. Socialist 
Labor in Imperial Germany (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1985). Lidtke's book was a refutation of the thesis 
of negative integration asserted in Guenther Roth's book, 
The Social Democrats in Imperial Germany (Totowa, New 
Jersey, 1963).
CHAPTER THREE 
THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY AND EDUCATIONAL 
REFORM, NOVEMBER 191B TO AUGUST 1919
When the Kaiser abdicated in November 1910, the 
socialists had a unique opportunity to implement their 
programs. In the early days of the Revolution, Prussian 
education was secularized by decree. Intent on adhering to 
democratic procedure, however, SPD leaders soon rescinded 
these decrees. While the new constitution adopted in 
August 1919 partially realized some of the socialists' 
objectives, the constitutional clauses which dealt with 
education proved to be difficult to implement. Events 
during the Revolution and immediately afterwards merit 
detailed consideration, because decisions made at this time 
limited the actions of reformers throughout the 1920s.
THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATS IN POWER, NOVEMBER 1918-FEBRUARY 1919
In October 1918, as the World War was drawing to a 
close, the SPD joined the Imperial government. The mili­
tary authorities acknowledged that Germany had lost the 
war; an immediate armistice was necessary. The military 
leadership hoped that a government that included the Social 
Democrats might receive more moderate peace terms than 
would the old authoritarian government. Wilson's Fourteen 
Points gave them reason to think so. Accordingly, the SPD 
was invited to join a government which included members of 
both the Center and the Progressive Party. It was also
40
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expected that socialist participation in the cabinet would 
mollify the increasingly restive working class and prevent 
revolution.
It soon became apparent that not even inclusion of the 
SPD in the government could prevent the fall of the monai—  
chy. On November 9, 1918, the last imperial chancellor,
Prince Max of Baden, announced the abdication of the 
Kaiser. Prince Max then transferred the powers of his 
office to Friedrich Ebert, leader of the SPD. For the 
first time in its history, the party found itself in 
power.1
By this time, however, there were two socialist 
parties. During the War, many party members had begun to 
believe that it was time to abandon col 1aboration with the 
state. When the leadership refused, opposition members 
meeting at Gotha on April 6, 1917 formed a new socialist
party, the Independent Social Democratic Party (Unabhangige
lFor a general history of the revolution see Rudolf 
Coper, Failure of a Revolution. Germany in 1918—1919 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1955).
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Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, or USPD).= The 
SPD and USPD shared the same goal— realization of a 
socialist economy and society. They differed, however, on 
how to pursue this objective. Relations between the two 
parties were good at first. Early in November, Ebert 
replaced the Progressive and Center cabinet ministers he 
had inherited from Prince Max with USPD representatives.
Although formation of an a 11-socia1ist government 
appeared to herald great social and economic changes, 
Ebert's intentions were anything but radical. He intended 
that his government would serve merely to maintain order 
until the nation could elect a national assembly to write a 
constitution.3 The Independent ministers had other ideas; 
they wanted to use the powers of the state to implement
=Qnce the USPD broke away from the parent party, the 
correct term for the original party was "Majority Social 
Democratic Party" or MSPD. When the MSPD and USPD reunited 
in 1922, the party was briefly referred to as the United 
Social Democratic Party or VSPD (Vereinigte or United).
Soon afterwards, however, the "V" was dropped and the party 
was once again called the SPD. In the interest of simpli­
city, I will only use the acronyms SPD and USPD. Also see 
David Morgan, The Socialist Left and the German Revolution: 
A History of the German Independent Social Democratic Party 
1917-1922 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1975).
3"Ebert Liber die Aufgaben der neuen Regierung", Vor- 
wart5. January 1, 1919. Even though this article appeared 
over a month later, it illustrates Ebert's unwavering atti­
tude towards the Revolution and the National Assembly.
Ebert was also worried that the Allies would make good on 
their threat to occupy Germany if the govern- ment could 
not keep order. On this point see "Entente gegen deutschen 
Bo1 schewismus", Vorwarts. January 3, 1919. Use of the term
Bolshevism indicates that the Russian example was uppermost 
in everyone's mind.
basic economic and social reforms immediately. They felt 
that the socialists would never again have such a favorable 
opportunity to implement their program. The differences in 
approach made the disintegration of SRD-USPD cooperation 
inevi table.
A socialist government also took power in Prussia. The 
Independent Social Democrat, Adolph "Ten Commandments" 
Hoffmann,'1 along with the Majority Social Democrat, Konrad 
Haenisch, assumed control of Prussia's Ministry for Spirit­
ual and Instructional Affairs. Giving an indication of 
things to come, they promptly renamed the ministry; it was 
now known as the "Ministry of Science, Art, and Educa­
tion" .5 In accordance with USPD intentions, Hoffmann 
proceeded to enact immediately the socialist plank calling 
for secularization of education. On November 27 church 
supervision of the schools was abolished.^ Two days later
“Vlittwer, pp. 25, 79. Hoffmann served in the Prussian 
state legislature from 1910 to 1918. He was notorious as 
the author of atheistic pamphlets; one such tract which 
appeared in 1891 lampooned the Ten Commandments, earning 
Hoffmann his nickname. His ascent to power seemed ominous 
to pious citizens.
BI will use the terms "Ministry of Education" and 
"Education Minister" throughout the rest of the disserta- 
ti on .
^Die deutsche Revolution 1918-1919— Dokumente, ed. 
Gerhard A. Ritter and Susanne Miller (Frankfurt: Fischer
Bucherei, 1968), "Verfugung des Preu[3ischen Ministeriums
fur Wissenschaf t, Kunst und Volksbildung Liber die Aufhebung 
der Geistlichen Ortschu1aufsicht vom 27. 11. 1918", p. 254.
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the same fate befell compulsory religious instruction.7.
The custom of opening and closing the school day with a 
prayer was also abolished. Prohibiting prayer in the 
schools was aimed at protecting the rights of dissidents 
(those who had dropped church membership), who had suffered 
discrimination before and during the World War.®
Intoxicated by the sudden possession of power, Haenisch 
initially agreed with Hoffmann's actions. By late Decem­
ber, however, the two socialist parties were bitterly 
divided over the tempo of change. The SPD insisted that 
reform had to await the convening of a democratically 
elected National Assembly. This belief led Haenisch to 
revoke both decrees.9 When the USPD resigned from the
^Ibid., "Erlaf3 des Preuflischen Ministeriums fur 
Wissenschaft, Kunst und Volksbildung an die Provinzial- 
schulkollegien und Regierungen uber den Religionsunterricht 
vom 29. 11. 1918", p. 254.
In the pre-war period, Hoffmann was so opposed to rel­
igious instruction in the schools that he had requested his 
own children be assigned to the Jewish class, an action 
that outraged not only the public, but the Jewish teachers 
as well. See GStA (Berlin) Rep. 76 VII neu Sekt 1B-I, Nr. 
37, vol. VII, p. 121.
®An example of discrimination against dissidents was 
their ineligibility for military promotion during the war. 
This question spawned a long debate in the Prussian legis­
lature from late 1916 to the middle of 1917. See GStA 
(Berlin) Rep. 76 VII neu Sekt 1B-I, Nr. 37, vol VII, pp. 
106-108, 114-116, 118, 121, 127-130, 133-136, 13S-139, 143, 
145.
‘’Ritter and Miller, "Anordnung des PreuPischen 
Ministers fur Wissenschaft, Kunst und Volksbildung, 
Haenisch, uber den Re 1igionsunterricht vom 28. 12. 1918", 
p. 261.
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government shortly afterwards, the prospect of secularizing 
the schools disappeared.
Catholics made up one-third of Prussia's population.
The Center Party was dedicated to maintaining the religious 
character of elementary education. In November, the lead­
ership of the party was overtaken by the rapidity of 
events; the party was in disarray. Hoffmann's decrees 
galvanized the Center into action, however. Catholics in 
the Rhineland threatened to secede from Prussia and Germany 
if the decrees were enforced.10
The Independents were furious that Haenisch rescinded 
the decrees. The Education Minister defended his action on 
several grounds. First, maintaining Prussian unity was 
essential in order to maintain German unity.11 Secondly, 
Haenisch insisted that changes could be enacted only after 
the proper legislative body, the National Assembly, con­
sidered the issues.13 Replying to the charge that he was
10Ibid., "Artikel der Kolnischen Volkszeitung uber 
Richtlinien und Arbeitsziele des Preuf3ischen Kultusmini- 
steriums vom 7. 12. 191B" , pp. 256-258 and "Entschl ie[3ung
einer Versammlung in Koln gegen die Aufhebung des Reli- 
gionsunterrichts, 3. 12. 191B", p. 25B. The SPD accused 
the Center of resorting to blackmail in threatening seces­
sion, "Das angebliche Schu1kompromiP. Die Expresserpolitik 
des Zentrum", Vorwarts. July 6, 1919.
llnKultusminister Haenisch uber den Einheitsstaat", 
Vorwarts. July 24, 1919.
1=GStA (Merseburg) Rep. 169D Preuflischer Landtag, xf 
B1, Die Schu1unterha 1tung Allgemein, Bd. 1: 1919-24. 11.
April 1919, Ver f assungebende Preuf3ische Landesversamm 1 ung .
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pandering to the Catholics' wishes, Haenisch pointed out 
that rash action could only lead to a backlash— the Novem­
ber decrees had given the Center an issue which had 
mobilized its constituency.13 A strong Center Party 
delegation in the National Assembly would only hinder the 
realization of educational reform on socialist lines.
The SPD's firm adherence to the establishment of demo­
cracy should not be viewed solely as a disinterested desire 
to empower the people. The party also believed that it 
would benefit electorally from universal suffrage.
Although the Social Democrats had not expected the victory 
of the proletariat so soon, they were now certain that the 
triumph would be bloodless— violent revolution appeared 
unnecessary because historical necessity had allegedly 
swept the socialists into power and historical necessity 
would keep them there. As the natural leaders of Germany, 
socialists would carry out their world historical task of 
supervising Germany's transition from capitalism to 
socialism. The party fully expected to receive a majority 
of votes when elections were held on January 19, 1919.
13Ibid., xc C2, Die Konfessionelle Verhaltnisse der 
Gchule (Konfessions-, Simu1tanschu1e ), Ldtg. Bd. 1: 1919-
27, Verfassunggebende Preupische Landesversammlung, 12. 
April 1919.
14"NeujahrgruP alien Schaffenden", Vorwarts. January 
1, 1919. This article linked the socialists with Luther,
Goethe, Kant, and Nietzsche. An untitled article, Vor- 
warts. January 2, 1919, expressed similar sentiments.
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The SPD did well in the elections but failed to secure 
a majority. Not only did it face competition from the 
USPD, but also from a third socialist party, the Communist 
Party of Germany (Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands or 
KPD), which was established on December 30, 1918. i=l While 
the USPD opposed collaboration with non-socialist parties, 
the KPD went even further— it advocated the seizure of 
power and implied that violence would be necessary in the 
process.
When two of the KPD's most popular leaders, Rosa 
Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht, were murdered in January 
1919, the Communists accused the SPD of complicity in the 
murders. (There is some controversy about who was res­
ponsible for the murders. What is important, however, is 
that the KPD believed that the Social Democrats were 
responsible.) At the very least, the SPD's press campaign 
contributed to the poisonous atmosphere of hatred and fear 
that led to the murders,16 At any rate, from this time on 
the Communists remained implacably opposed to the Social 
Democrats. While the USPD and SPD were able to mend
lsFor details on the founding of the KPD see Werner 
Angress, Stillborn Revolution; The Communist Bid for Power 
in Germany 1921-1923 (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1963).
16For an example of this see "Die Reichskonferenz des 
Spartakusbundes", Vorwarts. January 1, 1919. The SPD 
linked the KPD with the Russian Bolsheviks, whose example 
of violent revolution struck fear into the hearts of 
orderly citizens.
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•fences, a KPD-SPD reconciliation proved impossible. The 
KPD presented a constant threat to the SPD's voter base.
Even if the socialist movement had not been fragmented, 
the members of all three parties combined did not compose a 
majority of the nation's voters. The SPD hoped that its 
opposition to revolution and its readiness to collaborate 
with the middle-class parties would eventually win the 
loyalty of the nation.^ But as long as the SPD feared the 
loss of its working-class constituency to one of the other 
socialist parties, it felt obligated to continue speaking 
the language of apposition. Furthermore, as long as the 
SPD was bound to Marxist ideology, it could not appeal to 
the nation at large. It would have to remain a special 
interest party.1®
THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, FEBRUARY— AUGUST 1919
The newly elected National Assembly met on February 6, 
1919 in the city of Weimar, away from the tumultuous capi­
tal. The KPD boycotted the elections, leaving the field to
17Konrad Haenisch, Staat und Hochschule. Ein Beitraa 
zur nationalen Erziehungsfrage (Berlin: Verlag fur Politik
und Wirtschaft, 1920). This is an example of socialist 
attempts to broaden the appeal of the party to wider 
groups.
ieIn 1918 Max Weber commented that both the Center and 
the Social Democrats were special interest parties, and 
that they preferred to remain so. From Max Weber: Essays
in Sociology, trans. and ed. H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), "Politics as a
Vocation", p. 112.
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six major political parties. Two of the six were socialist 
parties— the SPD and the USPD, and two were traditionally 
liberal parties— the Democratic Party (Deutsche Demo- 
kratische Partei or DDP, successor to the Progressive 
Party) and the German People's Party (Deutsche Volkspartei 
or DVP, successor to the National Liberal Party).1̂  The 
remaining two parties were the Catholic Center Party120 
(essentially the same party as in Imperial Germany), and 
the National People's Party (Deutschnationale Volkspartei 
or DNVP, successor to the Conservative Party). The number
of seats each obtained in the assembly was as follows: 22
USPD, 165 SPD, 75 DDP, 90 Center, 22 DVP, and 43 DNVP.
Since no party managed to secure a majority, formation of a
coalition was necessary.
Â The best secondary source on Weimar liberalism is 
Larry Eugene Jones, German Liberalism and the Dissolution 
of the Weimar Party System. 191B-1953 (Chapel Hill: Univ­
ersity of North Carolina Press, 1988).
2ll’For the Center Party see Herbert Homig, Das 
PreuBische Zentrum in der Weimarer Reoublik (Mainz: 
Matthias-Grunewa1d , 1979); Gunther Grunthal, Reichs- 
schuloesetz und Zentrumspartei in der Weimarer Republik 
(Dusseldorf: Freien Universitat Berlin, 1968); and Ellen
Lovell Evans, The German Center Party 1870-1933: A Study
in Political Catholicism (Carbondale: Southern Illinois
University Press, 1981).
=AErnst Rudolf Huber, Deutsche Verfassunqsqeschichte 
Seit 1789. Band V, Weltkriea. Revolution und Reichser- 
neuruno 1914-1919 (Stuttgart: Verlag W. Kohlhammer, 1978),
p. 1069. A few splinter parties also received enough votes 
to earn a few seats at the assembly.
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What were the possible combinations? A return to an 
al1-socialist government composed of the U5PD and SPD, as 
in November and December 191B, was numerically impossible 
because the two parties together fell short of a majority.
A coalition of the USPD, SPD, and DDP was a possibility, 
but the DDP refused to join as a junior partner holding 
less than a third of the votes, and facing domination by 
the other two parties.22
What about an SPD-DDP-DVP coalition? After all, the 
DVP was a liberal party. And such a coalition was numei—  
ically possible. But there were tensions in the liberal 
camp. The DDP was established in late November by members 
of the Progressive Party. Although they hoped the National 
Liberals would join their new party, they were rather cold 
to Gustav Stresemann who had led the National Liberals in 
forming their own party, the DVP. 2:3 Division in the lib­
eral camp was similar to the division of the socialists—  
both movements were weakened.
5PD coalition with the DNVP was out of the question.
But was a Centei— DVP-DNVP combination possible? The 
Nationalists had defended Catholic religious freedom in 
Imperial Germany, giving the two parties a possible basis 
of co-operation. But this coalition was numerically
“"“The DDP felt it had to be careful and not appear to 
be too friendly to the socialists. Frye, p. 71.
^Jones, pp. 18-20.
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impossible, falling several votes short of the necessary 
majority. If the DDP joined the group, however, more than 
enough votes was secured. DDP-DVP animosity, however, 
could not be overcome.
Only one possible combination remained— the SPD-DDP- 
Center, commonly called the Weimar coalition. This group 
was responsible for writing a new constitution for the 
German nation. All three parties were united in their 
commitment to the establishment of democracy.24 Although 
there was a basis for co-operation in general matters, 
could the three compromise on religious and educational 
matters when writing the constitution?
The positions of all three parties remained essentially 
unchanged from their pre-war programs. The Center conceded 
that school administrators should be professionally trained 
educators, but still insisted that confessional segregation 
of elementary schools must be maintained. The Center also 
opposed formation of a centralized unitary state; the 
Catholics were ardent champions of "states' rights". Their 
preference was for regional (local or state), rather than 
federal control of the schools.25
240rlow, vol. 1, pp. 3-10.
=sGStA (Merseburg) Rep. 169D, Xc C2 Die Konfessionel1e 
Verhaltnisse der Schule (Konfessions-, Simultanschule), 
Ldtg. Bd. 1: 1919-27, Verfassunggebende PreuRische Landes-
versammlung, 16. Sitzung am 11. April 1919.
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Although the DDP was slightly warmer to the churches 
than the SPD, the two parties were nevertheless allies on 
issues concerning religion and education. Democrats wanted 
to solidify national unity by creating a stronger central 
government. A standardized educational system throughout 
the Reich, in which children of all religions were mixed, 
was their ideal. They called their school a "community 
school " .
While in theory the SPD still continued to support the 
idea of a free, secular, and integrated school, the party 
leadership was practical enough to realize that coalition 
with the Center would prevent complete implementation of 
its ideal. Considering the fact that the SPD and DDP 
commanded slightly more than two-thirds of the votes in the 
Weimar coalition, it is remarkable that the Center was able 
to realize any part of its educational program. External 
events, however, decisively affected negotiations on the 
constitution.
When Germany was presented with the Versailles Treaty,
4 -
the DDP left the assembly rather than sign the document. 
Without the support of its erstwhile ally, the Social 
Democrats were forced to make concessions to the Center. 
This resulted in what came to be known as the first school 
compromise. In this compromise, the favored school types
^  Frye, p. 60-61.
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of all three parties— the SPD's secular school, the DDR’s 
community school, and the Center’s confessional school —  
were given equal legal status in the constitution.S7
Before this draft of the constitution could be 
ratified, the DDP returned to the negotiating table and the 
education clauses were rewritten.28 A close scrutiny of 
these problematical articles is in order.
THE WEIMAR CONSTITUTION
Many observers at the time believed that the constitu­
tion produced by the Weimar coalition was one of the most 
democratic documents that the world had yet seen. The 
clauses on education and religion seemed to offer a sound 
basis for construction of a viable school system. But 
these articles proved to be extremely contradictory and 
subject to varied interpretation throughout the 1920s.
This source of partisan strife proved debilitating for the 
new democracy.
The third section, consisting of articles 135-141, 
dealt with the issue of religion. “  Articles 135 and 136 
guaranteed a number of basic freedoms, including the
27Wittwer, p. 95.
“ Frye, pp. 80-81.
“ Die Verfassung des Deutschen Reichs vom 11. August
1919. Testausaabe mit ausfuhr1ichem Sachreoister. ed. Karl 
Pannier (Leipzig: Verlag von Philipp Reclam jun., n.d.)
"Dritter Abschnitt. Religion und Re 1igionsgese11 schaften" 
pp. 40-42.
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freedom of belief and conscience. No citizen could be 
required to reveal his or her religious beliefs or be 
forced to participate in church ceremonies or to take 
religious oaths. The holding of public office was 
independent of an individual's religious confession. 
Religious beliefs would only be taken into account if such 
beliefs were relevant for the position.
Article 137 flatly stated that "There is no state 
church." The article went on to guarantee the churches' 
complete control over their own affairs. At the same time, 
religious societies that had previously enjoyed all the 
rights of a public corporation would continue to do so.
The article proceeded to define what this meant— public 
corporations were entitled to receive tax monies collected 
by the state. These two provisions meant that the churches 
retained all the benefits of the old church-state partner­
ship, while at the same time eliminating state interference 
in their affairs. This article added that other societies 
which had not previously enjoyed these rights might earn 
them if their "constitution and number of members offered 
assurance of permanency." This provision allowed pre­
viously banned dissident groups the chance to earn the same 
rights as the churches. The article concluded that if fur­
ther regulations were necessary, the individual states 
would be responsible for passing such legislation.
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The remaining articles in this section guaranteed the 
churches security oT their property, provided members of 
the military free time to fulfill their religious duties, 
and permitted religious organizations the right to provide 
services in hospitals and prisons as long as they were not 
coercive. Finally, article 139 deserves special mention 
because its tortured language so vividly illustrates the 
problem of socialist-Catholic co-operation. This article 
stated that "Sunday and state-recognized holidays remain 
legally protected as days of rest and spiritual elevation."
The next section, articles 142-150, dealt with educa­
tion and the schools.30 These articles generally guaran­
teed the free pursuit of knowledge. Article 143 provided 
that "teachers in the public schools have all the rights 
and duties of state officials." This article could be con­
strued as standing in contradiction to article 136, which 
had stipulated that the confession of state officials was 
not a consideration, unless the duties of the office were 
dependent on religious membership.
Article 144 stated that the entire school system was 
subject to state supervision. It went on to add that 
"School supervision will be exercised by full-time profes­
sionally educated officials." This article reinstated the 
decree of November 27, 191B that Haenisch had rescinded.
30 Ibid., pp. 43-46.
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School inspections Mould no longer be performed by local 
church officials who lacked pedagogical training. The 
teachers' demands of 1848 for professional supervision
seemed to be satisfied at last.
Article 145 mandated free education for at least eight 
years, to be fallowed by occupational training (which was 
also free) until the student was eighteen years old. This 
provision caused little problem. But Article 146, like 
article 143, was the source of numerous problems in the 
1920s. It stipulated that a common elementary school would 
provide the basis for the middle and high schools. The 
variety of professions was to be taken into account in 
establishing post-elementary institutions. While complete 
integration of the various levels was not achieved, the 
constitution provided that admission to any of the school 
types depended on the student's "predisposition and inclin­
ation, not the economic and social position or religious 
confession of one's parents."
The next paragraph of the same article returned to the
issue of the character of the elementary schools. Upon
petition, parents were granted the right to secure a school 
of their confession or Meltanschauung, as long as "orderly 
school administration" was not jeopardized. Details would 
be regulated by the states according to general principles 
established by a national law. But this law was never 
passed.
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The final paragraph of this article required that 
national, state, and community means be used to financially 
support poor students who were considered suitable to 
attend a middle or high school. Article 147 abolished 
private schools intended to segregate wealthy students from 
other children. State approval was necessary for private 
schools with legitimate missions. Private schools would be 
permitted if the public school in that area did not provide 
for a particular "confession or Weltanschauung . . .  or 
special pedagogical interest." This provision had the 
potential to fragment the school system. The article con­
cluded by abolishing private preparatory schools of the 
elementary grades. These schools had been used by the 
wealthy to secure rapid and certain admission into the high 
schools.
Article 148 showed its SPD-Center authorship in its 
provision that "all schools are to. strive to bring about 
moral growth, civic character, and personal and profes­
sional excellence in the spirit of the German nation and 
national reconciliation." Paragraph two stated that "care 
is to be taken that the sensitivities of dissenters not be 
injured." Paragraph three made "civic and work instruc­
tion" subjects in the schools. In addition, every student 
would receive a copy of the constitution upon graduation.
Article 149 stated that "Religious instruction is an 
ordinary subject of the schools with the exception of
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non-confessional (secular) schools."31 The article 
continued, "religious instruction will be taught in accord 
with the principles of the concerned religious community 
without prejudice to the supervisory rights of the state." 
The article concluded with the provision that participation 
in religious instruction or religious holidays and 
ceremonies was completely voluntary for both teachers and 
students. No student could be coerced into taking 
religious instruc- tion, nor could teachers be required to
teach the subject. Although the article seems
straightforward, we will see in chapter seven that this
provision provoked a barrage of letters to the Education
Ministry by local officials con- cerned about the proper 
way to interpret and carry out this provision.
Although not in this section, one additional article 
touched on the issue of education. It nullified many of 
the guarantees made in the articles just discussed. This 
was article 174, known as the "status quo" article. It 
stated that "until enactment of the national law foreseen 
in article 146, paragraph 2, the existing legal position 
would remain in force."33
The National Assembly ratified the constitution on July 
31, 1919. The parties of the Weimar coalition voted for
31Parenthesis in the original.
33 I bid . , p. 53 .
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it, while the USPD joined the DVP and DNVP in voting 
against ratification. Having received a majority, the 
document went into effect on August 11, 1919.
# # #
Although the SPD, DDP, and Center voted to ratify the 
constitution, none of them was entirely satisfied with it, 
especially the clauses dealing with education and religion. 
The Democrats were disappointed that federal control of 
education had not been established. The Center was pleased 
with the status quo article because it guaranteed continua­
tion of confessional schools, at least for the time being. 
Catholics now turned to the task of achieving legal 
preference for the confessional school through enactment of 
the promised national education law.
Many socialists vehemently objected to the education 
clauses. Haenisch thought contradictions in these articles 
would lead to chaos in school administration. Like the 
Democrats, he had hoped for greater federal control of edu­
cation, in order to counteract the particu1aristic influ­
ences of religion and region.53
Independent Socialists criticized the SPD for not 
getting the secular school clearly established. Socialist 
teachers of both parties had hoped for removal of church
33 " Ku 1 tusminister Haenisch gegen das Schu 1 kompromi|3 " , 
Vorwarts. July 22, 1919.
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influence from education,'54 In defense, Majority Social 
Democrats pointed out that the SPD had done the best it 
could, considering that the DDP, its ally against the 
Center, had abandoned the negotiations. Despite this, the 
SPD had triumphed by obtaining parity of the secular and 
confessional schools. 551
In any event, the SPD did not yet enjoy majority 
support at the polls. Until then, freedom from compulsory 
religious instruction and abolition of private preparatory 
schools were considerable achievements.56 Now that 6er—  
many had adopted a democratic form of government, the 
voters had to learn to accept majority decision, even if 
this meant the continuation of confessional schools for the 
time being. The task was now to persuade the voters of the 
necessity of the secular school.37
Although the SPD remained formally committed to the 
principle of secularizing the elementary schools, members 
in the party disagreed on the specific meaning of seculari­
zation. The next chapter will examine the attempts of one 
socialist educator to define the term and formulate an
^"Das Lehrer gegen das Schu1kompromifl", Vorwarts. 
July 19, 1919 and an untitled article, July 21, 1919.
3S"Der Kampf urn die Schule", Vorwarts. July 20, 1919.
“ "Das neue Sc hu 1 kompromi fl" , Vorwar ts . July 31, 1919.
37"Das Sc hu 1 kompromi 13 in der Nations 1 versammlung " , 
Vorwarts. July 19, 1919.
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educational reform plan consistent with the principles of 
the larger socialist movement.
CHAPTER FOUR 
THE SECULARIZATION OF EDUCATION;
THE REFORM IDEAS OF KURT LOWENSTEIN
Kurt Lowenstein began his political career in the 
Independent Social Democratic Party. He was the socialist 
movement's most tireless proponent of the SGcularization of 
education. He objected not only to confessional segrega­
tion of the elementary schools, but also to the inclusion 
of religious instruction in the schools. This chapter will 
examine the basis for Lowenstein's deep antipathy for the 
established churches and the Christian religion.
Lowenstein's ideas were not restricted merely to criti­
cizing religion. Rather, he sought to develop arugments 
which would persuade parents that the secular school, as he 
defined it, could best prepare the nation's youth to deal 
with their tasks in the modern world. While his ideas seem 
to be a logical interpretation of Marx's criticism of reli­
gion, not all socialists agreed with Lowenstein. A more 
serious obstacle to implementation of his ideas, however, 
was that Lowenstein was unable to secure the active support 
of the party's leadership. While he was free to publicize 




Kurt Lowenstein was born May IB, 1B05 in Bleckede, a 
small town on the Elbe.1 His father, a merchant, and his 
mother, a milliner raised him in the orthodox Jewish 
religion, sending him to a private Jewish Res 1 gymnasium.
As a student, he worked at odd jobs to help pay the tuition 
fees. After completing high school, he studied philosophy, 
education, and national economy at several German univer—  
sities, graduating in 1911 from the University of Erlangen. 
Lowenstein intended to become a rabbi at first; in 1908, 
however, he had a change of heart and abandoned not only 
Judaism, but religion altogether. Although qualified to 
teach in a Gymnasium, he worked as a free-lance journalist 
until the outbreak of the World War.
Lowenstein served at the front as an ambulance orderly. 
Like many of his generation, he experience a loss of faith 
in the established order.= At the end of the war, his
"’The following biographical information comes from 
Nachlass Dr. Kurt Lowenstein. Findbuch. 19B2, pp. 2-6, a 
guide written for the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (hereafter 
cited as FES) in Bonn, where Lowenstein's papers are 
located. One of his favorite pseudonyms was Kerlbw- 
Lbwenstein; Kerlbw was a combination of the first syl­
lables of his wife's maden name, Kerwel, and his own. This 
pen name expressed his commitment to the idea of the equal­
ity of men and women. Although his intention might be 
praiseworthy, use of this name can cause the researcher 
some confusion. For purposes of simplification, only the 
name Lowenstein will be used throughout this dissertation.
=Modris Eksteins, Rites of Spring; The Great War and 
the Birth of the Modern Age (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co.,
19B9); Eric J. Leed, No Man's Land: Combat and Identity
in World War I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
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conviction that society and economy needed to be completely 
transformed led him to join the Independent Social Demo­
cratic Party. Lowenstein represented the USPD at the 
National Assembly of 1919.
From 1920 to 1933 he was a member of the Reichstag and 
a town councillor for school administration in Berlin. In 
addition to his political and administrative responsibil­
ities, Lowenstein also actively participated in the Kinder- 
freunde, a children's organization dedicated to cultivating 
a sense of civic responsibility in youth. In February 
1933, Lowenstein's home was raided by the Nazis, who hated 
him because of his race and his politics. He left Germany 
and eventually settled in Paris, where he continued to work 
with socialist educational organizations and children's 
movements. On May 8, 1939 he died of a heart attack in
Paris.
Although Lowenstein addressed different aspects of 
educational reform, he focussed on eliminating church 
domination of the schools. His ideas on the secularization 
of education reflected his prior political affiliations.
1979); and Robert Wohl, The Generation of 1914 (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1979). These three books discuss 
various aspects of the affects of the war experience. Wohl 
concluded that few generalizations could be made about the 
war; it affected different people with the same kinds of 
experiences in different ways— there was no such thing as a 
front "generation", he maintained.
LOWENSTEIN AND THE SOCIALIST MOVEMENT
Before the war, Lowenstein had vaguely identified with 
liberal ideology without becoming politically active or 
joining a party. But the war experience propelled him into 
politics— social and economic reform, he believed, were 
necessary to ensure that such a catastrophe would never 
recur. Like many of his contemporaries, Lowenstein lost 
faith in abstract liberal concepts, which seemed hollow 
after the exprerience of witnessing the carnage at the 
front.* He turned to Marxist ideology because it seemed 
more concrete— unlike liberalism, Marxism claimed to 
account for the social and economic conditions that shaped 
the lives of individuals.4*
Lowenstein thought that the concrete realistic nature 
of Marxism promoted a positive attitude to life.* While 
previous ideologies were remote from reality, socialism
3Eksteins, p. 256.
AFES 3.3.2., 8, 217, "Die Lage der sozialistischen 
Erziehung", Sozialistische Erziehuno. 1, January, 1929.
*Kurt Lowenstein, Das Kind als Trader der werdenden 
Gesel1 schaft (Vienna: Jungbrunnen, 1. Auflage 1926; 2.
verbesserte Auflage, 1928), p. 30. This is Lowenstein's 
most important book. The best translation for "werdenden 
Gesellschaft" is "developing society". The phrase can be 
translated as "future society" as well, but the connotation 
of the process of dialectical development is lost, giving 
too much import to the final result as apposed to present 
reality— Lowenstein mixed the past, present, and future, a 
difficult theme to relate. Another possible translation is 
"becoming society" which conveys the notion of change and 
reminds one of Nietzsche, but is awkward in English.
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united theory and practice. Lowenstein embraced Karl 
Marx's famous dictum that "the philosophers have only 
interpreted the world, in various ways; the point, 
however, is to change it."6
But what could one do to change a world which Marx 
himself had asserted was historically determined? Lowen- 
stein thought that belief in historical determinism did not 
preclude belief in the ability of the individual to change 
things. He wrote, "It appears to us that historical events 
both in their totality as well as in their individual 
phases are neither mechanical nor passive."7' What part, 
then, did the individual play in the process?
Lowenstein thought that "past, present, and future 
exist simultaneously."3 While unenlightened individuals 
acted as representatives of their estate or class and 
failed to grasp the necessary direction of historical 
change, those who were armed with the gospel of Marx could 
divine the future in the present. The task of the leaders 
of the socialist movement was to share its knowledge of the 
necessary direction of history. As Lowenstein put it, "Dur 
task is to accelerate the process in which the conscious­
ness becomes ripe and strong enough to become decisive
‘’Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach", p. 145. 
^Lowenstein, Das Kind. p. 7. 
eIbid.
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action."*” Although one could not alter the future, one 
could hasten its coming. Liberal ideology did not offer 
such a compelling vision.
Lowenstein's emphasis on the individual's ability to 
shape history was not uncommon among socialists— the 
Hungarian Communist Georg LukAcs (1885-1971) expressed the 
same attitude. Although he never directly cited LukAcs,iCI 
Lowenstein was undoubtedly familiar with his book of 1923, 
History and Class Consciousness. LukAcs believed that the 
totality was more important than isolated facts; facts 
could even be deceptive and misleading.'1"1' By grasping the 
totality, one could overcame the limitations of time and 
place and anticipate the future. To overcame time, one 
must adopt the standpoint of the proletariat because it was 
the only universal class, the only class that could tran­
scend its narrow, "special" interests. As individuals, 
however, proletarians failed to comprehend the totality.
**1 bid . , p. 24 .
10The three reformers I discuss in this dissertation 
aimed at a mare general audience; their works lacked foot­
notes, so it is often difficult to draw a direct connection 
between the reformers' ideas and those of their contempor—  
aries.
“ The following discussion draws heavily from Leszek 
Kolakowski, Main Currents of Marxism. Its Origin, Growth, 
and Dissolution, vol. 3, The Breakdown, trans. P.S. Falla 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), pp. 258-306. Kolakow­
ski 1s discussion of Luk£cs betrays a great deal of anger; 
as a socialist, Kolakowski felt that the cause was betrayed 
by those who twisted the ideology.
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Only the socialist leadership understood the totality; it 
would inform the proletariat of its own best interests. If 
individual workers questioned the validity of the leader­
ship's position and attempted to cite facts on their 
behalf, their arguments should be dismissed as misguided 
due to their partial and limited understanding of 
historical reality.
Lowenstein was not as dismissive of facts as was 
Lukics. Nevertheless, there are some similarities in the 
two men's positions. In post-war Germany feelings of 
insecurity were widespread. While many Germans tried to 
escape the pressing problems of the day by fleeing into a 
mythical past, 12 socialists dreamt of a utopian future.
When one could no longer believe in liberal values or in 
Christianity, Marxist ideology could serve as a substitute. 
With its claim to be based on science, and its promise of 
hope for the future, it could serve to still the qualms of 
anxiety in the chaotic world of the 1920s.
Both Lowenstein and LukAcs would have done well to heed 
the advice of the sociologist Max Weber. Weber drew a dis­
tinction between an ethics of responsibility and an ethics 
of ultimate ends. Although he recognized that serving a
1=Richard Bessel, Germany after the First World War
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), pp. 255-2B4.
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goal gave one faith and passion, it could also blind the 
devotee.i3
Given his atraction to Marxist ideology, why did Lowen- 
stein choose to join the USPD in 1918 rather than the 
Communists? His choice must be attributed to his firm 
belief that consciousness-raising was the proper means of 
bringing about change and to his deep-seated aversion to 
violence. Lowenstein insisted that "The best weapon of 
humanity is reason. The irrationality of the masses is the 
greatest enemy of socialism."14 He remarked that he too 
had experienced revolutionary excitement in the Republic's 
early days. But he painted out that emotion never hastened 
change; only reason did. 181 The KPD was too emotional and 
too eager for violence to suit Lowenstein's tastes.
Why did Lowenstein join the USPD, rather than the 
larger and more powerful SPD? He rejected the SPD because 
of its collaboration with the Center Party. The Catholic 
Church had its own gospel; its religious message was 
anathema to Lowenstein. Political compromise with the 
Center made the socialists' task of consciousness-raising 
impossible, he t h o u g h t . W h e n  the USPD and SPD reunited
13Weber, "Politics as a Vocation", p. 127.
14Lowenstein, Das Kind, p. 140.
1=lI bid.
'1<’FES 3.3.1., 1, "Koalitions- und Ku 1 turpo 1 i ti k " ,
Frei hei t. June 1, 1920.
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in 1922, about two-thirds of the Independents joined the 
Communists, while the other third, including Lowenstein, 
joined the SPD. He never ceased, however, criticizing the 
SPD's collaboration with the Center. Why was he so ada­
mantly opposed to the established churches?
LOWENSTEIN AND THE ESTABLISHED CHURCHES
While liberals had insisted on the supremacy of state 
authority, both the DDP and the DVP allowed the churches a 
public role in the life of the nation.17 The majority of 
socialists opposed this; party programs insisted on the 
complete exclusion of the churches from the public sphere. 
The Eisenach Program (1869) had called for "separation of 
church and state and separation of education from the 
church";10 the Erfurt Program (1891) demanded the 
"secularization of the school";19 the Gbrlitz Program 
(1921) repeated the old formula "separation of church and 
state"; ®:> and finally, the Heidelberg Program (1925) 
insisted on "separation of church and state, separation of 
school and church".
l7Treue, PP . 120, 127.
iBIbid. , P- 60.
^Ibid. , P- 77.
=<:’ I bid . , P- 105.
Ibid . , P ■ 109.
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Lowenstein took these platforms seriously. He criti­
cized both the Catholic and the Evangelical churches; he 
viewed the Catholic Church, however, as the greater threat 
because of its excellent organization and the pivotal posi­
tion of its political representative, the Center Party.^ 
Both churches were nevertheless suspect because of their 
long collaboration with the old caste-ridden, capitalist, 
authoritarian state. 121 As Lowenstein put it:
Throne and altar were bound closely with one another. 
One cannot therefore precisely distinguish who was the 
maidservant and who the master in the reciprocity of 
the relationship.
The churches posed as guardians of morality and gate­
keepers to a spiritual life; in fact their real goal was 
political: to recapture the power they had enjoyed in the
old authoritarian state. Lowenstein found the churches 
more despicable than monarchists because the latter were at 
least honest about their goals. The churches' leadership 
pretended to be moral and above politics, when in fact,
'““'FES 3.3.2., 6, 178, "Klerikalismus, Sozial reaktion 
und Reichsschulgesetz * , Per K1 assenkampf. October 1, 1927, 
pp. 12-13.
=3FES 3.3.1., 1, “Die Kulturreaktion", F reihei t. 
January 12, 1921.
^Lowenstein, Das Kind, p. 142.
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they were merely hypocrites intent on playing, and winning, 
the game of power pol itics. ==L
The churches preached the virtue of obedience, but this 
was true only in an authoritarian state; attitudes of sub­
servient obedience would handicap citizens in a democratic 
state. The promises of equality contained in the nation's 
constitution could only be realized when the power of those 
who supported the hierarchical class society was broken.*4’ 
The established churches had compromised any true spiritu­
ality they may have ever possessed by serving the authori­
tarian state.
Lowenstein felt that the dishonesty of the churches 
betrayed people who remained loyal to the established 
churches only because they believed the churches were truly 
religious and moral, as the churches claimed.*7 Lowenstein 
labored to free people from the yoke of illusions which he 
believed the churches deliberately fostered in order to 
serve their own political ends. The new democratic 
republic could only thrive if the powers of the old auth­
oritarian state were broken. The established churches were
““3.3.2., 6, 178, " Kleri ka 1 ismus , Sozial reaktion und 
Reichsschulgesetz", Per Klassenkampf. 1, October 1, 1927, 
pp. 12-13 and GStA (Dahlem) Rep. 76 VII neu Sekt 1B-I Nr. 2 
Bd. XXV, p. 241, USPD speech in the Prussian Landtag, 
January 26, 1922.
^Lowenstein, Das Kind, p. 37.
^Kurt Lowenstein, Die weltliche Schule (Bochum: 
Graf, 1924), pp. 9, 17.
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inextricably entwined with the old order, an order that was 
inimical to the modern secular democratic state, the state 
Lowenstein believed to be in accordance with dialectical 
historical development.28
Such mistrust of both established churches was wide­
spread among socialists. The mistrust was mostly due to 
the churches' role in supporting the state during the World 
War29 and their support of the old ruling classes.30 
Pollsters reported that workers’ perceptions of the 
Evangelical Church were slightly more negative— the 
Catholic Church seemed to be more willing to help the 
needy.31 In any case, did condemnation of the behavior of 
the churches mean a rejection of religion in general?
SOCIALIST ATTITUDES TD RELIGION
It is necessary to consider party programs again, in 
order to determine the official position of the SPD on
301 bid., pp. 4-B.
^"Die religiose Wahlperiode. Zum Wahlaufruf des 
Deutschnationalen", Vorwarts. November 6, 1924; "Bemerk- 
ungen iiber das Verhaltnis des Sozialismus zur Religion" 
Sozialistische Monatshefte. February 20, 1922; GStA 
(Dahlem) Rep. 76 VII neu Sekt. 1B-I Nr. 1 Bd. VIII, pp. 33- 
35, Landtag session of June 20, 191B.
5°"Fur die weltliche Schule", Vorwarts. September 25, 
1919, and "Kirche und gese11 schaf11iche Neugesta1tung", 
Sozialistische Monatshefte (June 14, 1926): 390-395.
31 "Der Sozialistische Arbeiter und die Religion. Das 
Ergebnis einer Rundfrage in Gro(3-Ber 1 in" , Vorwarts. May 1, 
1924.
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religion. The programs at Gotha and Erfurt stated that 
"religion is a private matter."3® The Gorlitz Program 
elaborated: "religion is a private matter, of inner
conviction, not a party or state matter."33 Although the 
Heidelberg Program called for a secular school, it remained 
silent on religion. A wide range of opinion existed in the 
socialist movement on the validity and usefulness of reli­
gion in the modern world. Socialists disagreed on whether 
religion was necessary for maintenance of public morality.
The issue had arisen even before the end of the war.
On March 14, 1916, the National Liberals in the Prussian 
House of Deputies introduced a bill that would have 
abolished compulsory religious instruction in the schools. 
The intention was to free the children of dissidents, those 
who had left the established churches, from compulsion.34 
Dissidents were dying in the war too, liberals asserted, 
and they should have the right to abstain from religious 
instruction.33 The proposal opened a debate that lasted 
until May 1917, when the bill was finally defeated.
3=Treue, pp. 67, 76.
331 bid . , p. 105.
34GStA (Dahlem) Rep. 76 VII neu Sekt 1B-I, Nr. 37, Bd. 
VII, p. 107, unidentified newspaper clipping of November 
30, 1916, "Zur Dissidentenfrage".
3=iIbid., p. 118, "Die Dissidenten f rage" , Ber liner 
Moroenpost. January 28, 1917.
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The debate centered around whether a substitute moral 
instruction class, in place of confessional religious in­
struction, should be required. Many socialists opposed the 
idea— they argued that children did not learn morality from 
books or in special classes. Rather, they learned morality 
by watching their elders. Since the capitalist system 
forced adults to act immorally, only implementation of a 
socialist economy and society could result in a truly moral 
society. Furthermore, since all education built on 
morality, no separate classes were necessary.*'*
Lowenstein agreed that morality was not learned in 
abstract lessons. Neither a substitute non-confessional 
morality course nor confessional religious instruction 
could produce moral citizens. He wrote,
Religion could not now, nor did it in earlier times, 
protect us from moral disinteg ration. . . . The
religious lesson is a very poor means of achieving 
morality.3"7.
He went even further, however. Not only was religion 
useless in forming a moral sense; it actually could 
inhibit development of moral character. The teaching of 
Christianity encouraged immorality, Lowenstein believed,
^"Unterricht in Sittlicher Lebenskunde", Vorwarts. 
September 4, 1920 and "Sittl1ichkeitsfragen und Lehrer—  
innenzolibat" September 24, 1920; GStA (Merseburg) Rep. 
1£9D xf A1, Bd. 2, 29. November 1919, Hoffmann in Prussian 
Land tag.
^Lowenstein, Das Kind, p. 154.
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because it bred hypocrisy and a cavalier attitude towards 
reality. The Christian focussed too much on the afterlife, 
which led to an indifference and passivity towards this 
life.38 In his belief that religion fostered illusion and 
tried to make one ignore exploitation and abuse Lowenstein 
echoed Marx, whose most famous sayings is that religion 
"is the opium of the people."39 Marx expounded on this 
theme:
The abolition of religion as the illusory happiness of 
men, is a demand for their real happiness. The call to 
abandon their illusions about their condition is a call 
to abandon a condition which requires i 11 usions.*'1'
Lowenstein found Marxism attractive because he believed 
it was scientific. Much of Christian teaching flatly con­
tradicted commonly accepted scientific axioms. Lowenstein 
thought that "it is easy to prove that numerous religious 
assertions are scientifically impossible and historically 
false."41 He added that we must "recognize our supersti­
tions and subject them to scholarly explanation".42
^FES, 3.3.2., 6, 162, "Weltlicher Oder religoser soz- 
ialismus? Vortragsabend des sozialistischen Jugendar—  
tells", Schleswio-Holsteinische VoIkszeituno. April 25, 
1927.
39Marx, "Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's
Philosophy of Right: Introduction", p. 54.
'4,:,I bid.
41Lowenstein, Das Kind. p. 10.
*=Ibid., p. 152.
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Many socialists agreed with Lowenstein. In the dawning 
age of aviation, children could see that the story of 
Jesus' ascension to heaven was a patent impossibility.*3 
Teaching children to believe something that was so ob­
viously untrue could only result in a distorted attitude 
toward objective reality. Old religious forms were dead; 
repeating them was hypocritica1. "Ten Commandments" 
Hoffmann added that since adults no longer believed in 
religion, it should not be forced on children.**
Socialists were not the only ones to criticize reli­
gion. Max Weber believed that rationalization was the mark 
of the modern age. This meant the disenchantment of the 
world. Many people could not bear the loss of religion.
But in adhering to faith, they sacrificed reason.*5 
Lowenstein agreed with many of Weber's arguments, but did 
not think that abandoning religion necessarily had to lead 
to disenchantment:
Life, history, nature offers the eyes and the heart an 
unending abundance of possibilities and opportunities. 
We should absolutely not shrink from these occasions. 
Elevation and sacredness are not special privileges of 
the churches, on the contrary. ***
*3GStA (Dahlem) Rep. 76 VII neu Sekt 1B-I Nr. 37 Bd. 
VII, pp. B-9, letter to the Prussian House of Deputies, May 
21, 1914.
**"Fur die weltliche Schule", Vorwar ts. September 27,
1920.
*5Weber, "Science as a Vocation", pp. 139, 155.
**Lowenstein, Das Kind, p. 15B.
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Sigmund Freud also believed in the march of science and 
rationalism, although he did not believe that this was 
necessarily progress. Religion, he wrote, had originally 
arisen from a sense of helplessness.47 As humans learned 
more about the environment and how to control it, the less 
they needed religion. Religion, Freud thought, was a fairy 
tale. And contrary to what its supporters thought, it was 
not a necessary f i c t i o n . F r e u d  believed that retaining 
religious illusion was more dangerous than giving it up, 
quite simply because religious instruction impeded the 
development of reason.
Because religion did not promote morality, and even 
inhibited development of a moral sense, and because 
religion was irrational, Lowenstein rejected the arguments 
that insisted on its necessity. Religion only posed an 
obstacle in the task of educating the new generation of 
German youth. The school of the "developing society", 
Lowenstein insisted, could only be the secular school.
SOCIALISM AND THE SECULAR SCHOOL
Lowenstein argued that "the state is a secular power, 
therefore the separation of church and state is necessary;
^Sigmund Freud, The Future of an Illusion, trans. 
James Strachey (New York and London: W.W, Norton and
Company, 1961; original German 1927), p. 23.
^ I  bid. , p. 36.
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the state school must be a secular school, He defined 
a secular school as one that offered absolutely no reli­
gious instruction nor any references to Sod in the form of 
school prayers, songs, reading material, or holiday cele­
brations .
Many socialists debated the definition of the secular 
school. Could it be considered a Weltanschauung school, as 
its critics charged?915 If so, secular schools were special 
schools, no different from a Moslem school, for example. 
Lowenstein strongly rejected the notion of the secular 
school as a Weitanschauung school —  the secular school was 
meant for all youth, not only those holding a particular 
ou 11ook.
Lowenstein believed that the secular school was the 
school of the proletariat. But this did not make it a 
special-interest or Weitanschauung school. Rather, it was 
the true community school,951 the school type favored by the 
constitution; mast contemporaries considered the term 
“community school" to refer to the liberals' ideal of an 
inter-confessional school. Lowenstein insisted that the 
proletariat was the core of the "developing society" or the
49Lijwenstein, Das Kind, pp. 142-143.
^ ’GStA (Dahlem) Rep. 76 VII neu Sekt 1B-I Nr. 2 Bd. 
XXV, pp. 65-70, pamphlet by the Bishop of Paderborn.
W1 "Sozia1demokratischer Kulturtag", Vorwarts. March 
25, 1921.
so
community. As such, the interests of this class were the 
interests of the whole future society.==
Lowenstein disagreed that the German "soul" was funda­
mentally religious; on the contrary, it was secular, and 
so the community school should be secular too. ”  He wrote,
Secularization seems to many as only a negative 
attitude to church and religion, but secularization has 
a greater positive content; it provides the new inner 
structure for the developing society.5"
Opponents claimed that a school of the proletariat was
none other than a party school— a socialist party school.85
In these schools, a religious in terpretation of history was
replaced by the socialists' economic interpretation. The
socialist secular school was no less dogmatic than any of
the traditional denominational schools— the secular school,
was inr fact, a confessional school.514* Lowenstein hotly
denied the comparison:
Christian education can only be binding for the circle 
of believers who belong to the religious community. . .
Therefore, Christian education can never become a
'“GStA (Dahlem) Rep. 76 VII neu Sekt. IB-I Nr. 60 Bd. 
Ill, p. 18 and "Bundestag der weltlichen. Die Freien 
Gesellschaften versammeln sich", Vorwarts. May 27, 1931.
53"Gemeinschaftschule in gefahr!", Vorwarts. March 13,
1923.
^Lowenstein, Das Kind, p. 159.
ss"Burgerliche Kampf gegen die weltliche Schule. Ein 
Stadtverordnetenbesuch fordert mehr Erwerblosenfursorge", 
Vorwarts. October 27, 1922.
“^GStA (Dahlem) Rep. 76 VII neu Sekt. 1B-I Nr. 2 Bd. 
XXV, p. BO, "Die Parteien sind in Stellung", Die Schul- 
frage. an Evangelical newspaper, November 30, 1921.
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general demand in our time* socialist education alone 
can lay claim to this right.
Defenders of the secular school insisted that their schools
were not political; in class, socialism was never
mentioned— since the evolutionary path to socialism was
inevitable it was not necessary to drum it into students.”
The constitution of 1919 gave parents the right to
choose their children's school. Lowenstein saw his task,
and his party's, as one of consciousness-raising. He
wrote, "We who have confidence, we who have the firm belief
in the necessity of socialism, we should press on with the
work of enlightenment." Enlightenment meant educating
parents on the necessity of choosing the secular school as
the appropriate school for workers.
Like many members of the socialist movement, Lowenstein
began the decade with high hopes; as the 1920s wore on,
however, his articles began to express an increasing mood
of exasperation. Parents were not responding to his
appea1s .
Lowenstein insisted that children were not the property 
of their parents; parents could not do exactly as they 
chose with their offspring. The needs of the whole society 
overrode the wishes of individual parents. Lowenstein
97Lowenstein, Das Kind, p. 46.
90"Sozia 1demokratischer Kulturtag", Vorwarts. March 
25, 1921.
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pointed to the restriction of child labor in factories and 
mandatory inoculation as examples of how the needs of 
society and state took precedence.aw
Many socialists viewed the patriarchal family as a 
conservative institution that inhibited change. Since many 
parents tried to use education to advance the interests of 
their own children, the state, as the representative of the 
whole society's interests, should have the final say in 
educational matters.*'5 Lowenstein disliked the educa­
tional clauses of the Weimar Constitution that gave parents 
choice of school types.
The constitution had provided for the creation of demo­
cratically elected parents' councils to aid the work of the 
schools. Originally intended to promote parental involve­
ment, these councils soon became weapons in partisan 
strife. Indeed, many came to be dominated by reactionary 
and religious groups. Socialists were outraged when 
Catholics and Protestants united forces and captured 
control of many of the parents' councils,61 They felt that 
this was a blatant misuse of an institution meant to
^Lowenstein, Das Kind, pp. 18, 20.
■̂’"Die Neuordnung der Volksschullehrerbildung in 
Preuf3en", Sozialistische Monatshefte (September 7, 1925): 
548-552.
'“ "Ein neues Ku1turinstrument. Die Bedeutung der 
Elternbeiratswahlen", Vorwarts. May 27, 1922 and "Schul—
kampf und E 1ternbeiratswah1", June IB, 1924.
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promote democratization. Socialist educators tried to 
rouse wDrking-class parents from their apathy to public 
education. They hoped that the party leadership Mould do 
more to promote interest in educational issues so the 
proletariat could capture these councils .62
The leadership of the SPD, however, did not offer much 
help; it could not exert the necessary leadership because 
it was worried about maintaining good relations with the 
Center. Lowenstein and others were free to express their 
positions on these issues, but the party would not take an 
active role in promoting the secularization of education. 
While both Catholics and Protestants actively pursued the 
goals of protecting religion, the family, and the confes­
sional segregation of education, the socialists were 
hampered by lack of organization and their inability to 
offer workable alternatives. As a result, the school 
system remained confessiona11y divided and retained 
religious instruction.
Lowenstein insisted that the promotion of the interests 
of the proletariat was not the promotion of special inter­
ests. He tried to support his contention by identifying 
the interests of the proletariat with those of the future 
society. But Lowenstein could not convince those who did
42"Unsere Elternbeirate", Vorwarts. September 22, 
1922; "El tern, merk es euch!", Hay 31, 1924; and "Von 
christ1ich-unpo1itischer Kampfesweise", June 20, 1924.
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not accept the premises of his arguments. To them,
Marxist ideology was no more scientific than the Bible. 
Socialist ideology offered a substitute religion for some 
whose Christian faith was shaken by the war.
Although Lowenstein was not oblivious to the reality 
around him, his insistence on interpreting everything with 
reference to the "developing society" made it impossible 
for him to judge the present accurately. Lowenstein's 
influence on Prussian education was limited by his inabi­
lity to deal with the inconsistencies and inaccuracies in 
his new faith, problems the party leadership also chose to 
ignore.
CHAPTER FIVE 
THE INTEGRATION OF EDUCATION:
THE REFORM IDEAS OF PAUL OESTREICH
The issue of integration excited less debate than did 
the problem of secularization of the schools. Neverthe­
less, a discussion of socialist attitudes to educational 
reform would be incomplete without considering the SPD' 5 
position on integration.
Paul Oestreich vehemently objected to occupational 
specialization of the post-elementary schools. He believed 
that such segregation was inherently unfair to the working 
class. Furthermore, he maintained that the talents of each 
individual were better cultivated when all children were 
educated together. Not only the working class, but the 
whole community would benefit if education were integrated.
Like Lowenstein, Oestreich failed to secure the support 
of the party's leadership. In addition, although he penned 
numerous pamphlets, books, and articles, Oestreich was 
unable to communicate effectively with workers who were, on 
the whole, simply indifferent to cultural issues.
A BRIEF BIOGRAPHY
Paul Hermann August Oestreich was born March 30, 1B78 
in Kolberg, the son of a carpenter.1 His education began
i0estreich's private papers are located in the Insti- 
tut fur Padagogik at the Universitat Wurzburg. Plans to 
move these documents to the University Library were to be 
carried out late summer 1994. Basic biographical material 
taken from Biooraphisches Lexikon zur Weimarer Reoublik.
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in the local ValksschuJe; Oestreich then attended the 
Gymnasium in Kolberg. This was quite unusual at the time—  
Gymnasium students were primarily drawn from exclusive 
private preparatory schools. Volksschule students were 
admitted only after passing a difficult entrance examina­
tion, a test not required of private school students.
Young Paul felt isolated in the Gymnasium. He lived in 
a working-class neighborhood in which most children 
attended other schools. This early experience made a great 
impression on him. He later remarked that the humanistic 
education he received seemed far removed from the practical 
demands of daily life.= He wondered if the exclusivity of 
the Gymnasium really served to protect and promote Get—  
many's, rich cultural heritage, as its defenders claimed;3, 
from his personal experience, he concluded that the real 
purpose was to maintain the privileges of the elite and 
perpetuate class segregation. Oestreich's subsequent 
attendance at the even more exclusive university, first in
ed. Wolfgang Benz and Hermann Graml (Munich: Verlag C.H.
Beck, 19BB), p. 242. Another invaluable source on Oest­
reich is Winifred Bohm, Kulturpolitik und Padagooik Paul 
Qestreichs (Bad Hei1brunn\Obb: Verlag Julius Klinkhardt,
1973), pp. 48-60 for Oestreich's personal biography.
^Paul Oestreich, Menschenbildung. Ziele und Weoe der 
entschiedenen Schulreform (Berlin: Ernst Oldenburg Verlag,
1922), p. 194. The abstract nature of modern education was 




Berlin, then Greifswald, only intensified his feelings of 
isolation and estrangement. The problem of class segrega­
tion continued to agitate Oestreich throughout his life.
In 1900, Oestreich passed the state examination for 
Gymnasium teachers, the pro facuJtate docendi, in the 
fields of math, chemistry, physics, and mineralogy.
Although he chose the practical and modern field of 
science, as a member of the educated class he received a 
thorough grounding in the classics and humanities. After 
serving as a student teacher for two years, he obtained a 
position in an exclusive boarding school in Ilfeld. This 
experience only intensified his feelings of class exclu­
sion. He taught briefly in Barmen until 1905 and then 
obtained a position in a Berlin Gymnasium, where he taught 
until 1933.*
During the World War, Oestreich remained on the home 
front. Soldiers and civilians alike were deeply affected 
by the catastrophe, leading many of them to a political 
reorientation; the war proved to be the catalyst that 
turned Oestreich from liberalism to socialism. Unlike 
Lowenstein however, Oestreich chose to join the Social 
Democrats, rather than the Independents. He remained true 
to the socialist movement for the rest of his life.
'‘Bohrn, pp. 62-63.
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Early in 1933 Oestreich joined Thomas Mann and Kathe 
Kollwitz in signing a petition asking, in vain, for the SPD 
and KPD to unite to fight the rise of Hitler.® Soon after 
the Nazis came to power, Oestreich was arrested and impris­
oned. An old colleague with connections to the national­
ists managed to secure his release. For the remainder of 
the Nazi period, Oestreich was free, but barred from 
teaching and publishing. He nevertheless continued to 
develop his school reform theories, in anticipation of the 
end of the Thousand Year Reich. Oestreich was determined 
that if the socialists ever held power again, the mistakes 
of the vacillating SPD in 1918-19 would not be repeated.
In April 1946 Oestreich j'oined the Socialist Unity 
Party, a combination of the old KPD and SPD. ** He finally 
saw his cherished ideal of a comprehensive school system 
implemented by the Soviet dominated East German government. 
What the Weimar Social Democrats had been unwilling to 
implement by fiat in 1918-19 and unable to obtain later by 
compromise was now a reality.
Commitment to socialist ideals prompted Oestreich's 
activities in the 1920s. His understanding of Marxist 
ideology affected his relationship with the SPD and shaped 
his educational reform plans. A consideration of these 
issues is in order.
“Ibid., pp. 153-176. 
bid., p . 158.
B9
OESTREICH AND THE SOCIALIST MOVEMENT
Before the war, Oestreich had been associated with the 
liberal, Friedrich Naumann, who in 1919 helped establish 
the Democratic Party.^ Oestreich declined to join the DDP, 
opting instead for the Social Democrats. The liberals' 
defense of capitalism alienated Oestreich; he had come to 
believe that capitalist competition was a major cause of 
the World War. As a militant pacificist, Oestreich 
embraced Marxism because he thought a socialist system 
would better serve the preservation of peace.®
Marxism also attracted Oestreich because he thought 
socialism could restore meaning to human life by restoring 
meaning to work. Unlike Lowenstein, who was attracted to 
Marx’s criticism of religion, Oestreich was especially 
drawn to Marx's description of man as the producing animal. 
According to Marx, humans are distinguished from animals in 
that humans "produce their means of subsistence. . . . " **
7For more on Naumann, see Peter Theiner, Sozialer 
Liberalismus und deutsche Weltpolitik; Friedrich Naumann 
im Wi1helminischen Deutschland (1B60-1919) (Baden-Baden: 
Nomos Ver1agsgesel1schaft, 1983). Also see Frye, pp. 13- 
15; Jones, pp. 8-10. Naumann died shortly thereafter.
Many observers lamented his loss, speculating that the DDP 
was crippled from the start by the deaths of some of its 
key leaders, among them Naumann and Max Weber.
BBohm, p. 89. After World War II, Oestreich disliked 
the West German chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, because of his 
rearmament policies.
’Marx, "The German Ideology", p. 150. Marx often 
stressed certain words and phrases— all italics appear in 
the origina1.
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Marx wrote that "as individuals expressed their life, so 
they are. What they are, therefore, coincides with their 
production, both with what they produce and with how they 
produce. " 10
According to Marx, capitalist economy subverted the 
natural order of things by emphasizing the consumption of 
products rather than the process of production. Worse yet, 
however, capitalism depended on the exploitation of the 
worker's labor power. Since human essence lies in 
productivity, capitalism dehumanized workers by robbing 
them of the very activity that separated them from the rest 
of the animal kingdom, the very activity that made them 
human. Capitalism, in short, was both inhuman and 
unnatural.
Unlike supporters D f  capitalism, Oestreich was 
interested in work as a process, as an end in itself, not 
as a means to the goal of making money. Protesting the 
materialism of capitalism, he believed in the primacy of 
the spirit: "The spirit should form the material, the idea
should penetrate the daily!"ii Elaborating on the theme of 
anti-materialism, Oestreich claimed that machines now ruled
i0Ibid. A contrast to Feuerbach's materialism: "One
is what one eats." ("Man ist, was man iftt.") Marx might
be paraphrased thus: "One is what one does."
11Paul Oestreich, Aus dem Leben eine Politischen 
Padagnqen. Selbstbiographie (Berlin: Volk und Wissen
Verlags Gmbh, n.d.), p. 7.
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man, not man the machines.12 We need to stop and ask 
ourselves why we are producing more and more, Oestreich 
insisted. The process of work shaped humanity— that was 
the true value of work, not the material goods produced.13 
The capitalist system devalued humanity by worshipping 
commodities, something the Hungarian Georg Luk£cs called 
reification . x*
Oestreich's concern with work as a process (as opposed 
to the usual concern with wages and hours) was not unusual 
among socialist intellectuals. The monthly party journal 
Sozialistische Monatshefte was a forum for socialists like 
Lowenstein and Oestreich who were concerned with cultural 
problems. Fritz Karsen, a socialist school reformer noted 
for his involvement in pilot schools, equated the process 
of work with the process of self-realization. When work 
became meaningless, as it did in industrial capitalism, 
life became meaningless.1® Martin Weise, a colleague of
1=Right-wing reactionaries also had mixed feelings 
about technology. See Geoffrey Herf, Reactionary Modern­
ism. Technology. Culture, and Politics in Weimar and the 
Third Reich (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984).
13Paul Oestreich, Die Produktionsschu1e als Nothaus 
und Neubau: Elastische Einheits-. Lebens-. Berufs-. und
Volkskulturschule (Berlin: C.A. Schwetschke und Sohn,
1924), pp. 223-235.
1'ftKol akowski, pp. 275-276.
1BIngrid Neuner, Der Bund entschiedener Schu1 reformer 
1919-1933. Proqrammatik und Realisation (Bad HeilbrunnS 
Obb: Verlag Julius Klinkhardt, 1980), pp. 165-166.
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Oestreich's, concurred— work brought about the process of 
self-transformation. In other words, one attained humanity 
through work.w
A socialist school reformer active in the state of 
Thuringia, Anna Siemsen, protested against the German 
tendency to over— emphasize work and occupation. The 
English, she wrote, knew how to balance their lives between 
work and leisure. The Germans could learn something from 
them.17 For their part, foreign observers admired German 
vocational training for its efficiency.1®
Oestreich rejected liberalism because its support of 
capitalism made it too materialistic. Why did he join the 
SPD, however, rather than the USPD or KPD? Like Lowenstein
^Martin Weise, Paul Oestreich und die Entschiedene 
Schulreform (Leipzig: Kurr'sche Buchhand1ung, 1928).
17Anna Siemsen, "Schu1prob1 erne in England und bei 
uns", Sozialistische Monatshefte (November 9, 1925): 
693-697.
For a completely different view of the English see 
Oswald Spengler, Preussentum und Sozialismus (Munich: C.H.
Beck'sche Ver1agsbuchhand1ung, 1924; manuscript written 
late 1919). Spengler detested the English view of work.
The English, he wrote, viewed work only as a means to money 
and status, whereas the German, and specifically the Prus­
sian, saw work as an end in itself. Spengler did not like 
capitalism, but he did not like Marxism either. He thought 
that Marx had spent too much time in England.
ieGStA (Dahlem) Rep. 76 VII neu Sekt. 1B-I Nr. 1 Bd. 
IX, pp. 241-242, Liverpool Echo. April 24, 1928, "The Key 
to Success", manuscript draft sent to the Education Mini­
stry from the author, Mr. F.B. Brown, chairman of the 
Liverpool Education Committee. He had been a delegate to 
the first International Education Conference held in 
Berlin. He waxed ecstatic about the wonders of German 
vocational training.
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and many other socialists, Oestreich abhorred the Commu­
nists because he believed them to be violent revolution­
aries. As a passionate pacifist, Oestreich Mould not 
consider revolution a viable option; revolution destroyed 
more than it built, he t h o u g h t . O e s t r e i c h  also opposed 
the Communists' position that social and economic changes 
had to precede educational reform.®5
Oestreich rejected the Independents because he thought 
the USPD did not give the need for school reform sufficient 
emphasis. The SPD proved to be disappointing in this 
regard as well, and although Oestreich remained in the 
party, his attitude to parliamentary politics and political 
parties was generally hostile.
Preferring to maintain his freedom from party dicta­
tion, Oestreich established an independent organization, 
the Alliance of Decided School Reformers (Bund entschied&ne 
Schulrefarmer or BESCH) in October 1919. Although BESCH 
remained independent of SPD control, it consisted mostly of 
socialists; Adolf Grimme, although a Democrat at this 
time, was an exception. Oestreich defined the organiza­
tion's relationship to political parties:
[BESCH] is not party political, but its individual 
members are members of parties; only they cannot
i,?Bdhm, p. 237.
®*’Paul Oestreich, Unabhangige Ku 1 turd o  1 itik . Vom 
oraden UJea eines " Disz i p 1 in 1 osen " . Gesammelte Aufsatze
(Leipzig: Ernst Oldenburg Verlag, 1924), pp. 9-12.
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become a tool of a party, can never see in a party 
anything other than an instrument.sx
Consonant with its founder's beliefs, BESCH affirmed 
its commitment to the democratic republic, promoted social 
change, and denied violent revolution as a valid means to 
these ends. Instead, the Decided School Reformers believed 
change would result peacefully, through the gentle art of 
persuasion, an "intellectual revolution". In the early 
years BESCH members often accepted official administrative 
positions, so they could exert influence on the system from 
within. But Oestreich began to disapprove of this tactic, 
writing that,
Whoever believes that individuals in secure positions 
can take decisive and energetic action against economic 
and political powers is in error. We need, I say it 
again and again, scorn for the petty and personal daily 
advantages. . . .==:
Many members were angered by Oestreich's dictatorial 
behavior and left BESCH.
Oestreich's outspoken criticism of the SPD angered many 
party comrades. Like Ldwenstein, Oestreich protested vehe­
mently against SPD participation in coalition governents.
2iPaul Oestreich, "Mitten im Kampf[", Die Neue 
Erziehuna (January, 1921): 8-10.
“ Ibid .
=3Paul Oestreich, "Der Minister und der entschiedene 
schulreformer", Die Neue Erziehuna (October 1919): 721-726; 
"Neuland oder versumpfung?" (January 1922): 1-6; and
"Rettet das Zentrum" (April 1925): 235-241.
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Oestreich's attitude to the party, however, was more 
sharply critical than Lowenstein's because Oestreich 
objected not only to caalitian politics, but to party 
politics. How did Oestreich conceive of politics then?
And how did he link the realms of politics and the cultural 
life of the nation?
KULTURPOLITIK AND MODERNITY
The term "culture" is used here to mean the traditional 
culture of the educated class in Germany. Fears of cul­
tural decline began around 1B90, when the effects of indus­
trialization first began to be felt in Germany. After the 
war, complaints became increasingly strident.M
Oestreich shared these concerns. He too felt that 
Germany's culture was endangered, but his solution was 
radically opposed to the prescriptions of the conservative 
"mandarins". While the latter group wanted to protect 
culture by maintaining its exclusivity, Oestreich thought 
culture could be invigorated only by broadening access to 
it, permitting the participation of the whole nation, 
irrespective of socio-economic position. The recovery of 
the nation would accompany the rejuvenation of its culture.
But what does the second part of the word, "politik" 
mean? Oestreich contrasted cultural politics to party 
politics. Party politicians, he insisted, represented
^Ringer, pp. 1-3, 253-256.
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special interest groups. A Kulturpolitiker, however, 
represented the interests of the whole nation. (Compare to 
Lowenstein's insistence that representing the interests of 
the workers should not be considered as a special or class 
interest, but a national interest.) Furthermore, members 
of the socialist movement would be the new guardians of 
culture because only they understood that culture was the 
concrete external expression of human productivity or 
creativity. For Oestreich, to be a socialist was to be a 
defender of culture and hence of the nation.
The socialist Education Minister, Konrad Haenisch, 
advanced similar ideas. He hoped to promote the image of 
the SPD as the party of culture. To do so, the Social 
Democrats needed to demonstrate their goodwill to academics 
by supporting state expenditure on books and journals 
needed by scholars. Rising costs had forced libraries to 
discontinue subscriptions to scholarly journals. German 
scholarship would suffer when academics were isolated. The 
SPD's support of their interests would win many academics 
over to the socialist banner. The party would then break 
out of its role as representative of special interests and 
truly be a people's party.
29Konrad Haenisch, Die Not der oeistiaen Arbeiter.
Ein Alarmruf (Leipzig: Verlag von Dr. Werner Klinkhardt,
c. 1920). Also, see Haenisch's book Kulturpolitische 
Aufoaben (Berlin: Arbeitsgemeinschaft fur Staatsburger-
liche und Wirtschaft1iche Bildung, 1919). Haenisch first 
expressed many of these ideas in the Prussian Assembly,
April 11, 1919. See GStA (Merseburg) Rep. 169D, Preufi.
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Although Haenisch and Oestreich agreed on the necessity 
of protecting culture, Haenisch and many other socialists 
branded Oestreich as a utopian dreamer. This phrase echoed 
Marx's derision of various eighteenth and nineteenth cen­
tury socialists as Utopians.^ Oestreich defended himself, 
writing that, "The creative, active human must have ideals 
before he can create reality."327'
Oestreich's constant criticism of party politics was 
not completely unfounded. Although the political scene in 
Prussia was not as tumultuous as on the national level, 
parliamentary politics nevertheless earned a bad reputa­
tion, one not completely undeserved. Oestreich's aversion 
to party politics was shared by many during Weimar, all 
along the political spectrum. Thomas Mann's Reflections of 
an Unpolitical Man720 is one instance of an expression of 
distaste for politics. Oswald Spengler joined in the
Landtag, xc, C2, Die Konfessionelle Verhaltnisse der 
Schule, Ldtg. Bd. 1: 1919-27.
^Untitled articles, Vorwarts. October 9, 17, and 18,
1919; "Ku1turpolitik und Koalition", November 24, 1921. 
Oestreich defended himself in his book, Es reut mich nichti 
Schulpolitische Kampfe zwischen Revolution und Kapp Putsch. 
Gesammelte Aufsatze. Leipzig: Ernst Oldenburg Verlag,
1923. The common argument throughout these essays is 
Oestreich's insistence that his ideas were not impract­
ical; many could be easily implemented.
^Paul Oestreich, "Die Voraussetzung als Ziel", Die 
Neue Erziehuna (November 1922): 347—350.
2GThomas Mann, Reflections of an Nonoolitical Man. 
trans. Walter D. Morris (New York: Frederick Ungar, 1983).
The original German appeared in 1918.
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attack an the new republic in his book of 1919, Preuflenturn 
und gozialismus. These criticisms are perhaps not so 
surprising, since artists and intellectuals tend to pride 
themselves on the "divine nature of the muses" and quite 
often scorn such materialistic realms as politics and 
finance.
But it is surprising to find that even some politicians 
dissociated themselves from party politics. Hans Luther, 
Reich chancellor in 1925, entitled his memoirs Politician 
without Party.30 Other educational reformers, such as Carl 
Becker, who served as Prussian Minister of Education from 
1925 to 1930, shared in the distaste for modern parlia­
mentary political parties and refused to join a political 
party *
Oestreich shared many of these attitudes. When his
party comrades charged him with being too inflammatory,
Oestreich responded,
I want to be provocative, against imperfection, mental 
laziness, satisfied affects, even in my own 'estate* 
and party. . . . Criticism is the beginning [of
c hange].31
Oestreich saw his role as raising the consciousness of the
“’Gay and Laqueur both make these points.
■'•’Hans Luther, Politiker ohne Partei (Stuttgart: 
Deutsche Ver1ags-flnsta1t, 1960).
51Paul Oestreich, "Die Voraussetzung als Ziel", Die 
Neue Erziehuna (November 1922): 347-350.
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voters and keeping school reform issues in the public eye, 
even if this made some socialists uncomfortable.3=2
Many of his contemporaries agreed that culture was in 
danger in the modern world. Max Weber believed that 
increasing specialization was part of the modern trend of 
increasing rationalization.33 Oestreich believed that the 
increasing specialization of the modern world posed the 
greatest threat to culture. His solution: a broader type
of education, one not defined narrowly by occupation. 
Critics on the right wing of the political spectrum could 
agree with this solution. What made Oestreich different?
He was different in that he insisted that all of the 
nation's youth should share in this broader education. He 
was resuscitating Fichte's ideas following a last war a 
century before.
Oestreich thought that educational reform would revive 
culture; cultural revival was synonomous with national 
revival. Germany would recover from the war and could then 
make its unique contributions to humanity. And Germany had 
quite a world historical task to perform; according to 
Oestreich:
We have but one mission: to conquer the earth for
humanity! . . .  To banish hell from the world, the hell 
of baseness through the heaven of joyful pain! To 
outlaw the use of force! To make love manly and
’“ Paul Oestreich, "Parteidienst oder Bundesarbeit", 
Neue Erziehuna (1924): 66-69.
“ Weber, "Science as a Vocation", p. 135.
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aggressive1. We have a mission and an adventure without
end, a trip of discovery into the infinite!3*
Oestreich insisted that divisions in the nation's 
school system only served to divide its people and hindered 
performance of its national task. Furthermore, education 
for a specific occupation was unjust in that it led to 
inequality. While a favored minority received an education 
which led to satisfying careers free from exploitation 
(professional jobs), the education of the masses ensured 
that they would continue in pool— paying, low-status jobs 
that offered scant opportunity for personal growth. Segre­
gated education only served to maintain the positions of 
the middle and upper classes. An integrated school system, 
Oestreich believed, would serve the whole nation, not 
particular class interests.3* Just what did Oestreich mean 
by the integration of education?
THE INTEGRATION DF EDUCATION
Before 1919, it was possible for a child from a wealthy 
family to attend school without having ever had a class 
with children of working-class parents. The Weimar Consti­
tution changed this by providing that the first four years
^Paul Oestreich, "Wir sind Deutsche!", Die Neue 
Erziehuna (June 1922): 161-163. Such poetic language was
not unusual in Oestreich's articles and books.
3*Ibid. and Die Produktionsschu1e . pp. 236-241. 
Oestreich differed from right-wing nationalists who desired 
regeneration so Germany could avenge itself on the West.
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of schooling would be common for all children. Beginning 
with grade five, however, students were still separated, 
ostensibly according to inclination and ability, into dif­
ferent tracks. Because the child was only nine years of 
age, the decision was made by parents, in consultation with 
teachers. Many socialist educators believed that the 
division of students should begin at a later age. This 
would allow a more accurate assessment of the child's 
abilities, as well as permitting a greater decision-making 
role for the student.3*
Although the constitution forbade the parents' socio­
economic or religious affiliation from determining which 
track was pursued, Oestreich insisted that only an inte­
grated system of elementary, middle, and high schools could 
assure the realization of these constitutional provisions. 
He proposed a system similar to that of the United States, 
in which all students attended a free common school 
throughout their education.
People differed, Oestreich acknowledged, but their 
differences should not result in inequality.37 In his 
view, talents were not natural, but developed through 
contact with the environment. Oestreich could point to 
John Locke's tabula rasa for support. Closer to his own
“ "Gedanken zur Einheitsschule", Sozialistische 
Monatshef te (May 1919): 448-455.
37Paul Oestreich, Aus dem Leben. pp. 40-58.
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field, the educators Maria Montessori and John Dewey both 
advanced similar ideas.3® Oestreich thought that any 
intelligence or talent that one might exhibit were the 
result of an environment that had cultivated those talents. 
Since environment was the key factor, Oestreich believed 
that the only way to ensure equal opportunity for all youth 
was to give them the same advantages early in life.
In order to ensure that all youth shared roughly the 
same environment, Oestreich insisted that kindergarten must 
be mandatory for all children, rich and poor. 3,1 The first 
kindergarten, a German invention as the word implies, was 
opened in 1837 by the educational reformer Friedrich
Froebel. Its purpose was not intellectual development, but
socialization of the child. ^  Oestreich adopted these 
ideas— he thought attendance by all the nation's tots would
lower the barriers between rich and poor.
?sMaria Montessori, Spontaneous Activity in Education 
(New York: Schocken Books, 1965), p. 160. Montessori said
that the same environment produced different individuals 
only because their inclinations, not their talents dif­
fered .
John Dewey, Liberalism and Social ftction. The Page- 
Barbour Lectures (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1935).
Dewey believed that intelligence was not natural, but 
shaped by society. Hence, social planning was necessary. 
Dewey was not a socialist, however, but a liberal reformer 
of the activist, rather than laissez-faire variety.
3S,Bdhm, p. 262.
‘*°The reactionary Prussian government banned it as a 
subversive institution in 1851; the ban was lifted ten 
years later and the popularity of the kindergarten began to 
grow. See Gutek, pp. 225-231.
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Basic elementary education would begin at age seven; 
there would be a gradual transition from the play of 
kindergarten to more disciplined work.41 The middle level, 
would gradually introduce students aged eleven to sixteen 
to more advanced studies. This level would also include 
both manual and intellectual training, combining practical 
and theoretical work. Oestreich believed that an education 
which combined both of these elements would result in a 
more balanced, harmonious individual. The dangers of one­
sided intel1ectualization of the traditional Gymnasium 
would be avoided. He wrote,
We must struggle tirelessly against the inte11ectua1 ism 
of the old schools, in order to achieve full humanity, 
which is attainable only through the training of all 
aptitudes in the community.42
Criticism of traditional abstract book-learning was not 
uniquely socialist. Jean-Jacques Rousseau began the revolt 
with his novel Emile; the lead character learned more from 
his experiences in life and from nature than he ever could 
from a book.** The German novelist Hermann Hesse included 
similar characters in his stories.44 The Swiss educational
41"Ein Schulprogramm", Vorwarts. February 23, 1921.
4SPaul Oestreich, "Ku1turerziehung", Die Neue 
Erziehuna (May 1921): 129-131.
'43Gutek, p. 206; Hayward, p. 25.
44Hermann Hesse, Tales of Student Life, ed. Theodore 
Ziolkowski, trans. Ralph Manheim (New York: Farrar, Straus
and Giroux, 1976).
104
reformer Heinrich Pestalozzi expressed the same sentiments 
and emphasized the importance of concrete sense experience 
as opposed to abstract book learning.49 Later in the nine­
teenth century, Julius Langbehn's best seller, Rembrandt as 
Educator. expressed the belief that art education could 
counteract the stultifying effects of too much book- 
learning. While foreigners admired the German Gymnasium 
for providing an excellent intellectual education, these 
schools were criticized at the same time for ignoring 
physical education."4"7 Finally, John Dewey criticized 
abstract theoretical knowledge because of its distance from 
life and growth.40 The constitution of 1919 had provided 
that "Arbeitsunterricht" or "work instruction" would be as 
the preferred method in education.
Socialist educators welcomed this provision. The old 
schools had emphasized learning from books; work instruc­
tion meant using one's hands as well. A more well-rounded
4SGutek, p. 200; Hayward, pp. 3B-40.
44*A 1 bisetti , p. 151.
A-7Ibid. , pp. 37-43.
^JDhn Dewey, Democracy and Education. An Introduction 
to the Philosophy of Education (New York: The Macmillan
Company, 1916).
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student with character would be the r e s u l t . O n  a more 
practical note, implementation of "work instruction" 
allowed students to produce some of the school's needs, 
saving the hard-pressed state money. 8,5
Oestreich maintained that if work were to become 
meaningful and joyful once again, it had to be self­
initiated, a cardinal point in his thinking. There could 
be no goal outside of the activity itself. Although 
Oestreich drew these ideas from his understanding of 
Marxist ideology, we again see that non-socialist educators 
had been advancing the same principles for some time.
Froebel, of kindergarten fame, stressed the importance 
of self-activity of the child; the self-activity of a 
child is play. In this way, the child learned about the 
environment.01 Montessori also recognized the importance 
of play. Her concern was how to channel the child's 
spontaneity. Spontaneity could be both encouraged yet 
disciplined by controlling the environment. Children did
^"Gedanken zur Einheitsschule", Sozialistische 
Monatshef te (May 1919): 448-455; "Sozia1demokratische
Schulreform" (March 8, 1920): 194-196; and "Der
Gemeinschaftsgedanke in der Neuen Schule" (October 19,
1923): 602-607.
®°G5tA (Dahlem) Rep. 76 Oil neu Sekt. 1B-I Nr. 61, Bd. 
II, pp 64-66, "Richtlinien zur Aufstellung von Lehrplanen 
fur die oberen Jahrgange der Volksschule", 15. Oktober 
1922. For instance, book binding taught students a skill 
as well as providing textbooks for the school.
01Gutek, pp. 225-231.
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not shun work, but would choose to do work spontaneously, 
if it interested them, even when outsiders were unable to 
see a purpose or goal in the activity,83 She added that 
active intervention by adults did not produce a positive 
result that did not already reside in the child's innate 
spirit.“
Dealing with older students, Oestreich believed that 
occupational segregation should occur only in the final 
stage of education, when students ranged in ages from 
sixteen to twenty. Three tracks would be offered! 
practical, technica1-industrial, and intellectual- 
scholarly. In all levels, including the final stage, 
education would be completely free, supported by a 
progressive income tax.54 Oestreich called his school an 
"elastic integrated school" (elastische Einheitsschule), a 
school that he believed combined discipline with freedom, 
unity with individuality. It did so by offering a basic 
core curriculum which provided a sound foundation common to
“ Maria Montessori, Childhood Education (Chicago: 
Henry Regnery Col., 1949), p. 58.
“ Montessori, Spontaneous Activity, p. 6.
®^"Die Schulgeldfrage", Vorwarts. February 12, 1921; 
Paul Oestreich, "Fordert die Schu1steuer!", Neue Erziehuna 
(1922): 211-214.
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all students, while also allowing students to choose a 
certain number of electives.”
Oestreich criticized the traditional practice of 
requiring the study of foreign languages. In his ideal 
school,
Ancient and modern languages are pursued precisely and 
thoroughly if one needs them as a teacher, traveller, 
interpreter, translator, etc. For those specialties, 
education can begin around age eighteen. Basic educa­
tion has nothing to do with learning foreign 
languages. ”
He thought that Latin and Greek had been required in the 
past only as a method of maintaining upper class exclu­
sivity. There was no compelling pedagogical reason, 
however, to retain mandatory study of these languages.”  
Many non-SDcialists agreed. Herbert Spencer, the 
social Darwinist, thought dead languages did nothing to aid 
one in the struggle for survival; study of the sciences 
was more useful in modern society.”  Ex-Kaiser Wilhelm
"Paul Oestreich, Die elastische Einheitsschule; 
Lebens- und Produktionsschule (Berlin: C.A. Schwetschke
und Sohn, 1921). This work is a 61 page pamphlet in which 
Oestreich outlines his idea of the comprehensive school. 
See also his article, "Die elastische Oberstufe", Neue 
Erziehuna (1921): 287-292 and untitle article, Vorwarts.
June 20, 1920.
” Paul Oestreich, "Die Schu1 reform", Die Neue 
Erziehuna (1919): 659-661.
"Oestreich had a particular fondness for Esperanto; 
other than this personal preference, he thought language 
learning should be connected to utility. Bdhm, p. 265.
*** Gutek , p . 260 .
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also shared an aversion for the ancient languages.w  
Montessori's position was most similar to Oestreich’s in 
that she maintained that a child learned a language from 
his or her environment. Possession of language did not 
signify special talent, only that one had been exposed to 
it.*0
Many socialist pedagogues agreed that foreign language 
study had been over-emphasized in the past. Even those who 
wanted to retain foreign language study suggested modifica­
tions. For example, the elementary shools should offer 
languages— this made good pedagogical sense and also served 
to break the upper— class monopoly on the subject.*1 Anna 
Siemsen believed that learning modern languages was just as 
valuable as learning Latin or Greek— what one studied was 
not as important as how one studied it.*=
If elementary, middle, and high schools were to be 
integrated as Oestreich called for, then teacher training 
needed to be integrated too.*3 Oestreich called for all
*^1 bid., p. 328.
“ Montessori, Childhood Education, pp. 81-88.
61"Prinzipielles zur Umwandlung der Berliner Real- 
schulen", Sozialistisches Monatshefte (March 2, 1925): 
151-155.
“ "Humanismus und Gegenwartsschule", Sozialistisches 
Monatshefte (June 24, 1924): 381-386.
*3"Studentenschaft und Hochschulreform", Vorwarts. 
December 9, 1919.
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teachers to receive a general humanistic education in the 
university, along with preparation for their intended 
future position in either the lower or upper grades. In 
Oestreich, elementary teachers at long last found a 
champion of their demands for equality with middle and high 
school teachers.
Although many middle-class educational reformers may 
have supported the integration of the different levels of 
the school system, many Weimar politicians rejected these 
ideas. One Prussian Landtag deputy made a very revealing 
comment about the German attitude towards education when he 
said, "The Volksschule is for life, the high schools pre­
pare for scholarly studies. Therefore the transfer from 
one to the other is hardly passible without difficulty."^ 
Notice that pursuit of scholarship was contrasted to life. 
This was precisely the point that reformers made when they 
criticized the high schools for being too abstract— they 
were useless because they were unconnected with life. 
Conservatives nevertheless insisted that the elementary 
schools must not become preparatory schools for higher 
education— scholarship would only suffer as a result.
Educators who supported segregation in the upper grades 
insisted that different types of high schools were neces­
sary in order to deal with the multiplicity of culture.
^GStA (Dahlem) Rep. 76 VII neu Sekt. 1B-I Nr. 1, Bd. 
VIII, p. 12, Sitzung am 20. Januar 1917.
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Only different kinds of high school, with their unique 
specialties, could prevent the overburdening of the student 
in the modern age of information. Without different high 
school types, depth of knowledge would be sacrificed and 
superficial knowledge would result. The different types 
should be co-ordinated but not abol ished. *** Different 
school types did not necessarily imply inequality; each of 
the four main types was equal to the others. “
Opponents criticized Oestreich's idea for an elastic 
comprehensive school because they thought the students were 
offered too many choices; the student simply had too much 
freedom. It would be passible to graduate without being 
properly educated. This kind of school would not integrate 
education, but would rather fragment it, because when 
students were left to choose, they would all study 
different subjects,67
Oestreich's own party comrades tended to agree with him 
on the integration of the various types of high school.
As long as the high schools remained divided, however, the
ASGStA (Dahlem) Rep. 76 VII neu Sekt. 1B-I, Nr. 1, Bd. 
VIII, pp. 349-379, Education Ministry pamphlet of 1924.
See also The Reorganization of Education in Prussia, trans. 
I.L. Kandel and Thomas Alexander (New York: Teachers Col­
lege, Columbia University, 1927).
^GStA (Merseburg) Rep. 169D Preullischer Landtag, xf, 
A3, Bd. 1: 1919-28, December 13, 1921 Landtag speech.
t7GStA (Dahlem) Rep. 76 VII neu Sekt. 1B-I, Nr. 1, Bd. 
VIII, pp. 349-379, Education Ministry pamphlet of 1924.
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question arose of whether proletarian children should 
attend them. The debate centered around what was known as 
the "rise of the gifted". One position held that if 
workers' children attended high schools in increasing 
numbers, integration would be achieved de facto. Another 
view was that by allowing gifted but poor children the 
opportunity to rise, the whole class and the whole society 
would benefit. Others disputed this, saying that these 
gifted children quickly adopted the mores of their new 
environment and abandoned their poorer brethern, further 
impoverishing the working class, by robbing it of its 
brightest members.60
The issue of how to determine which students were 
talented also excited debate. Critics of the traditional 
system believed that tests which supposedly determined 
intelligence were rigged to.favor the middle and upper 
classes; these tests only confirmed what the testers 
wanted to find. They only measured socio-economic 
differences, not differences in inte11igence.^  The idea 
of the "rise of the gifted" was a bourgeois idea, based on
“ "SozialdemDkratische Schulreform", Sozialistische 
Monatshefte (March 8, 1920): 194-196.
^"Psychologie", S0 2 ia1istische Monatshefte (December
29, 1919): 1235-1239 and "Prinzipielles zur Umwandlung der
Berliner Realschulen" (March 2, 1925): 151-155.
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selfish individualism, which only divided the community.70 
Oestreich's position was that "We want to replace ranking 
through tests by . . . estimation of personal indivi­
duality in the service of the community."7,1 Who did the 
estimating and on what basis was not specified.
Oestreich, like Lowenstein, insisted that he repre­
sented the best interests of the nation, indeed of humanity 
itself, rather than merely advancing the cause of a special 
interest group. Oestreich's ideas excited a certain amount 
of debate among Social Democrats interested in educational 
and cultural problems but made no discernible impact on the 
Prussian school system.
Oestreich's ideas were intended to benefit blue-collar 
workers. This group, however, remained unresponsive.
Issues connected with education and culture seemed to have 
little to do with their daily lives; workers tended to 
regard these problems with indifference. Furthermore, the 
leadership of the SPD would not take an active part in 
promoting Oestreich’s plans because to do so would only 
antagonize the SPD's relationship with the middle class.
It made no political sense to antagonize its coalition 
partners for a cause that was not popular with its
7,’"Die Sozial istische Schule", Sozial istische Monats­
hefte (September 29, 1919): 903-908 and "We 1taufgaben der
Erziehung" (May 17, 1920): 381-388.
71Paul Oestreich, "Stufung Oder G1iederung", Die Neue 
Erziehuno (August 1922): 243-245.
constituency and would not earn it any votes. The 
discussion of the integration of post—elementary school 
remained largely restricted to socialist intellectuals.
CHAPTER SIX 
ADOLF GRIMME AND SOCIALIST SCHOOL REFORM
Adolf Grimme joined the Social Democratic Party after a 
brief membership in the DDP; as a religious socialist, he 
belonged to the right wing of his new party. While Ldwen- 
stein wanted to accelerate the modern trend of seculariza­
tion and Oestreich aimed at retarding the modern trend of 
specialization, Grimme focussed less on the present and the 
future. He was more interested in the past, in preserving 
what was valuable in traditional culture.
Grimme reconciled the teachings of Jesus Christ with 
those of Karl Marx. Such a synthesis, he thought, pre­
served religion, which was valuable, while eliminating 
corruptions of the true faith. Grimme was also interested 
in promoting the welfare of the whole nation by promoting 
the rise of talented individuals. He believed that the 
ideal of equality was compatible with a promotion of 
talented individuals who could ably lead the community. 
Education was the key to both the preservation of true 
religion and the cultivation of ‘’personalities" who would 
become the nation's leaders.
Grimme's position on religion and individualism led him 
to arrive at interpretations of the party planks calling 
for the secularization and integration of education very 
different from those of Lowenstein and Oestreich. Unlike 
these reformers, Grimme enjoyed the party leadership's
114
115
support, which culminated in his appointment as Education 
Minister in 1930. His rise illustrates that the SPD was 
truly a moderate party that offered few fresh or viable 
approaches to the problem of reforming the schools.
A BRIEF BIOGRAPHY
Adolf Berthold Ludwig Grimme was born on December 31, 
1889 in Goslar, son of a roya1 stationmaster.1 He attended 
the local elementary school for the first four years, then 
enrolled in the Gymnasium in 1900, earning the Abitur in 
1908. From 190B to 1914, he studied in the universities in 
Halle, Munich, and Gottingen. After passing qualifying 
examinations in philosophy, German studies, French, and 
religion in 1914, he secured a position in a Gymnasium in 
Leer, where he taught until 1919.
Under the new republic, Grimme transferred to a 
Gymnasium in Hannover. A year after joining the Social 
Democratic Party, he began his career as an administrator 
in the school system, serving first on Hannover's 
provincial school board from 1923 to 1924 and then as
1Grimme's papers are to be found at the Geheimes 
Staatsarchiv der Stiftung PreuRischer Kulturbesitz in 
Ber1in-Dah1em. Biographical information from Bioaraph- 
isches Lexikon zur Weimarer Republik. ed. Wolfgang Benz and 
Hermann Graml (Munich: Verlag C.H. Beck, 19BB), p. Ill;
Biooraphisches Staatshandbuch: Lexikon der Politik. Presse
und Publizistik (Bern: Francke Verlag, 1963), pp. 424-425;
Who's Who in Germany, ed. Horst G. Kliemann and Stephen S. 
Taylor (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1956), p. 417.
Unfortunately, none of these sources, nor Grimme's own 
writings, offers much information on his personal life.
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district superintendent in Magdeburg until 1927. The 
following year he joined the staff of the Education Min­
istry. From 1929 to 1930, he was vice-president of the 
provincial school board for Berlin and Brandenburg.
For a socialist to hold such high administrative 
positions was quite unusual in the 1920s.3 Right-wing 
politicians insisted that socialist officials in the school 
system antagonized Christian parents, who had a right to 
insist that, since the schools were religiously identifi­
able, the educational personnel should be as well. Since 
many socialist politicians were negative towards or indif­
ferent to religion, Grimme's outspoken identification with 
Christianity, attested to by numerous speeches and news­
paper articles, led middle-class cirles to trust him in 
public office, despite his party orientation.
In February 1930, Grimme's rapid rise in office culmi­
nated in his appointment as Minister of Education in Prus­
sia, the first socialist to hold the post since Konrad 
Haenisch's resignation in 1921. He headed the ministry 
until Reich Chancellor Franz von Papen dissolved the 
Prussian government on July 20, 1932. When Hitler came to
a"Kulturpolitik und Koalition", Vorwarts. November 24, 
1921; "Militarappel1 fur Schuldirektoren", January 13, 
1922; "Der Kampf urn die Schule", January 14, 1922;
"Schulreaktion in Berlin", November 23, 1922; "Radaustatt 
Kulturdebatte", November 4, 1925.
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power six months later, Grimme had to retire from public 
life. In 1942 he was arrested for consorting with an oppo­
sition movement and spent the rest of the war years in 
jail .
In the immediate post-war period, Grimme participated 
in the reconstruction of German education in the western 
sector, serving as Education Minister of the new state of 
Lower Saxony. In 1940 he embarked on a new career, be­
coming General Director of the Northwest German Radio, a 
position he held until his retirement in 1956. He died on 
August 27, 1963 at Brannenburg/Inn.
GRIMME AND THE POLITICAL PARTY SYSTEM, TO 1922
Grimme's political activity began in 1919, with the 
establishment of the democratic republic. Grimme never 
spoke or wrote much about his personal life so we cannot be 
certain about the reasons for his new-found interest in 
politics. We can surmise, however, that Grimme, like many 
others of his generation, was so shocked by the catastrophe 
of the war that he felt impelled to become involved in 
public life in order to help create a better world so that 
such a disaster could never happen again.35
These beliefs led Grimme to join the German Democratic 
Party in 1919. He was attracted to the DDP because it 
championed the ideals of freedom and democracy, ideals that
3See note two in chapter four.
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he believed expressed the true yearnings of the German 
soul. He defended the new constitution— it was neither 
unnatural, nor un-German, as its critics charged.4 Nor was 
it merely an abstract intellectual construction divorced 
from reality, but a natural development for a nation which 
had produced Immanuel Kant. The ideal of democracy in 
Germany, Grimme asserted, had its roots in Kant's insis­
tence that the individual was responsible for the whole 
community;® the new constitution provided the framework 
for realization of this ideal.*
Grimme initially viewed the SPD as too materialistic; 
he was interested in reviving spirituality. The DDP's 
favorable attitude towards religion, combined with its 
criticism of the established churches, parallelled Grimme's 
beliefs. Even during his brief stint as a Democrat (he left
the party after a year), however, Grimme displayed
socialist leanings. For example, he welcomed the Revolu­
tion of 191B, because he believed it was a spiritual
revolution.7. He also cultivated personal contacts with
*GStA (Dahlem) 1 HA Rep. 92 Grimme, "Glanzende 
Kundgebung der SPD", Landsbero. August 29, 1930.
®Ibid., 45\1, "Grimme in Osnabruck", unidentified and 
undated newspaper clipping.
*Ibid., 547, "Politik und Intellektuellen", Leerer 
Anzeioeblatt. November 29, 1929.
7Ibid., unidentified newspaper clipping from December
1918.
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many socialists. In 1919, Grimme established a regional 
chapter of the Bund entschiendener Schu1 reformer in 
Hannover. Although not part of the SPD, its membership 
consisted primarily of socialists. The Hannover chapter's 
program called for "a school without confessional ties 
which educates religious humans."® The program also con­
tained demands for an integrated school system in which 
tracks would differ only by students' inclinations and 
abi1i ties.^
Grimme left the Democratic Party in 1920; for two 
years he remained unaffiliated with any political party. 
Although we have no direct evidence, a newspaper article of 
May 1920 provides a clue to his reasons for temporarily 
abandoning politics.10 In this article, Grimme expressed 
disillusionment with the election campaigns of all the 
parties. He believed that Germany desperately needed a 
leader in its time of crisis, but the party system did not 
seem to be producing one. Like Oestreich, but for 
different reasons, Grimme was disillusioned with party 
po1i tics.
sIbid., 22, "Programm Entwurf der Ortsgruppe Hannover 
des Bundes entschiedener Schu1 reformer", June 25, d.J. 
[1919].
^Ibid. Although Oestreich later changed his mind, 
originally he too had favored "rise of the talented".
l0Ibid., "Wolken am Horizent", Leerer Anzeigeblatt. 
May 22, 1920.
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After two years, however, Grimme was once again engaged 
in party politics, this time as a socialist. Why would a 
devout Christian and ardent champion of the rights of the 
individual choose to join the Social Democrats, a party 
with an ideology ostensibly hostile to religion and indi­
vidual ism?
GRIMME BECOMES A SOCIAL DEMOCRAT
Upon entering the SPD in 1922, Grimme abandoned neither 
his religiosity nor his strong belief in individualism. 
Ironic as it may seem, it was his very commitment to both 
Christian ideals and individualism that provoked him to 
join the Social Democrats.
Although Grimme continued to harbor reservations about 
the ability of parliamentary political parties to produce 
the leadership Germany so desperately needed, the assasina- 
tion of Walther Rathenau in 1922 provoked him to join the 
SPD. Terror and violence could be combated only by working 
within the system. The citizen had a duty to participate 
in the public life of the nation; passivity was an unac­
ceptable position.
Grimme believed that religion and politics were con­
nected. Religion cultivated feelings of responsibility for 
the whole society; the new democracy needed individuals 
conscious of their duties to the community. Religious 
teachings could aid in civic training.
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When Grimme became Education Minister in 1930, he 
hastened to assure his fellow Social Democrats in the 
legislature that he was one of them. He pointed at 
independent Carl Becker, Grimme's predecessor in the 
education ministry, as an example of the last of the 
individuals. The modern age, Grimme said, was an age of 
the masses. He did not abandon his belief in the necessity 
of cultivating individuality; he only insisted that it 
could be attained only within the framework of the larger 
group. Becker's fall from power, Grimme insisted, resulted 
from his refusal to affiliate himself with a political 
party. The individual alone was too weak to survive in 
party politcs. Security lay only in the larger group.11
Despite the common perception of socialism as anti- 
religious and anti-individua 1 istic, Grimme found a ready 
reception in the SPD for his ideas. Although maintaining 
coalition with the Democrats and the Center may have 
influenced the party leadership in a more moderate 
direction, political considerations do not completely 
explain the party's acceptance of Grimme and his rapid rise 
in the ranks. His ideas were very similar to many other 
socialists. For Grimme, the important topics of religious 
socialism and attitudes to individualism were linked.
“ Ibid., "Die Koaltionsverhandlungen in PreuBen", 
Frankfurter Zeituna. January 29, 1930; "Die grof3e PreuBen- 
Koalition gescheitert!", General Anzeioer. January 31,




As chapter four showed, many socialists took Marx's 
criticism of religion literally. His characterization of 
religion as "the opium of the people"i= only confirmed the 
position of this group. The SPD's party planks calling for 
separation of church and state and its insistence that 
religion was a private matter gave the impression that the 
party was hostile to religion. Some socialists, however, 
reconciled Marxist ideology with Christian teachings. 
Religious socialists were anxious to emphasize Marxism's 
idealistic heritage.
Opposition to materialism predated the War. The 
classic studies by Fritz Ringer and Fritz Stern discussed 
the antipathy which many intellectuals felt for the modern 
industrial age and mass production that had led to an 
alleged over-emphasis on material prosperity. Indeed, 
"mandarins", along with the majority of the nation, 
welcomed the outbreak of the War in 1914 because they 
thought it would sweep away this "English disease".13 
Cultural critics before the war criticized bourgeois
1=Marx, "Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's 
Philosophy of Right; Introduction", p. 54.
13Ringer, pp. 18B-1B9; Spengler, pp. 40, 45, 4B-49, 
7B, 79.
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capitalism because they believed that it deadened the 
spirit.
But while conservative cultural critics have received 
the attention of scholars, anti-material ism in the 
socialist movement has attracted less notice. Perhaps this 
is due to the fact that Marxist ideology is commonly 
considered to be centered around "historical materialism". 
Even in the 19th century, however, some socialists had 
rejected this centerpiece of Marxist ideology and attempted 
to return Marxism to its Idealist heritage. i=>
"Ethical" or idealist Marxism was quite developed 
during the 1920s and appears to have had many adherents, 
even if they did not always define themselves in these 
terms. Marxists concerned with theoretical purity have 
spilled much ink over the question of defining orthodoxy 
and deviation. Suffice it to say that using the measuring 
rod of materialism as the standard for determining 
orthodoxy is no longer a useful way to think about 
social ism.
One recent scholar has suggested that Marx strongly 
emphasized materialism only because he was trying to refute
14Stern, p . xi x.
lsThomas E. Willey, Back to Kant (Detroit: Wayne
State University Press), pp. 116-117.
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the dominant ideology of idealism. 16 He described the 
attempts of Ernst Bloch (1885-1977) to reinstate the 
idealistic, utopian elements of Marxism. Both the emphasis 
on ethics and belief in utopia are found in the religious 
socialism of the 1920s.
Party journals often printed articles which expressed 
positive attitudes to religion. Most parents continued to 
send their children to confessional schools and declined to 
exercise their constitutional right to abstain from 
religious instruction. We must conclude that religious 
beliefs were more prevalent in the socialist movement than 
previously believed.
Religious socialists distinguished themselves from 
their .more secu1ar1y-oriented comrades by insisting that 
Marxism consisted of more than a materialist interpretation 
of history. Rather, it was a moral and ethical, even a 
spiritual movement. Like Spengler and other cultural 
critics traditionally associated with conservatism, they 
thought that materialism was one of the defining features 
of the 19th century— and a sickness to be overcome.17
Grimme agreed. Striving for profit could never be a 
meaningful or satisfying goal to pursue. The core of
1AJohn Joseph Marsden, Marxian and Christian 
Utopianism. Toward a Socialist Political Theology (New 
York: Monthly Review Press, 1991), p. 40.
17"bkonomi5cher und Religioser Sozialismus",
Sozia1 istische Monatshefte (May 3, 1920): 338—341.
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Marxist ideology did not concern materialism, Grimme 
believed, but spirituality. Socialism could restore 
meaning in human life, the meaning which had been robbed by 
materialistic capitalism and called into question by the 
experience of the war.10 Grimme, like Oestreich, thought 
that the purpose of work was not merely production of 
commodities; Grimme thought that the very process of work 
shaped the individual engaged. He preached the dangers
of a purely materialist outlook. What was valuable about 
Marx was his recognition of the true nature and meaning of 
work.20
Many religious socialists disagreed with Lowenstein's 
contention that religion served no purpose in the modern 
rationalized and increasingly secularized society. On the 
contrary, reason did not, and could not banish the realm of 
feeling. There were limits to reason; religion began 
where reason ended.21 Religion cultivated the feeling that 
everything was inter-connected; this was not a subject of
iaGStA (Dahlem) 1 HA Rep. 92 Grimme 557, "Kampf und 
Frieden", unidentified newspaper dated December 23, 1930.
^Adolf Grimme, Auf freiem Grund mit freiem Volk. 
Ansprachen und Aufsatze (Berlin: J.H.W. Dietz, 1932), "Vom
Sinn der Arbeit", pp. 71-77.
■̂’GStA (Dahlem) 1 HA Rep. 92 Grimme 557, "Gedanken 
uber Kultur und Wirtschaft", unidentified newspaper dated 
June 5, 1930.
21"Denken und Andacht. Ein Beitrag Hum religibsen 
Problem", Sozia1istische Monatshefte (October 31, 1921): 
953.
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knowledge, not subject to proof.33 Lowenstein's attempt to
reduce everything to reason was fruitless; the totality of
man would not allow itself to be so contained. Grimme
asserted that,
One incorrectly understands knowledge as exclusively 
that which is subject to proof and everything else is 
readily labelled a matter of faith. . . . But there is
also an unproveable knowledge. One may call this 
"belief" . . . But the basis of science is not less a
matter of faith than the fundamental idea that we have 
an earthly mission because one is not less proveable 
than the other.23
A clergyman writing for Vorwarts appealed to the 
workers to realize that reason and religion could be 
reconciled.24 Theologians such as Karl Barth disagreed.
He thought that if one combined faith with reason and 
science, religion would be profaned, become too worldly. 
Grimme, however, thought just the opposite— he wanted to 
make religion a daily affair, not restricted to Sundays.
For him, meaningful work was the link between the objective 
material world and the subjective spiritual inner world of 
the individual. By removing capitalist exploitation, work 
became meaningful, or spiritual, even holy— God's kingdom 
realized on earth.
“ "Religion und Wirtschaft", Sozialistische Monats- 
hefte (March 6, 1922): 225-229.
=3Adolf Grimme, Per religiose Mensch. Eine Zielset- 
zunq fur die neue Schule (Berlin: C.A. Schwetschke und
Sohn, 1923), p. 9.
24"Arbeiterschaft und Kirche", Vorwarts. June 25,
1920.
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The reformer Anna Siemsen agreed with many of these 
ideas. She thought that complete secularization was 
impossible because absolute knowledge was impossible— the 
process of learning would never be complete.29 As long as 
there was a realm of the unknown, religion would be 
necessary. The rational secular realm and the realm of 
faith or religion were not enemies, Siemsen insisted, but 
complementary aspects of the total human condition. Her 
position was echoed by others. She warned, however, 
about the dangers of over— emphasizing the importance of 
feeling; subject neither to rational argument nor 
empirical proof, the domination of feeling could lead to 
irrational ism. Irrational ism posed a danger if it was 
expressed in acts. Romantics like Rousseau and Nietzsche 
were wrong in stressing the realm of irrational feeling too 
muc h.
Religious socialists believed that while reason 
divided, socialism unified, by recognizing the underlying 
common soul in reality. Socialism had its roots in reason 
and materialism— it had begun as a political and economic
=BAnna Siemsen, Erziehuna im Gemeinschaftsoeist 
(Stuttgart! Ernst Heinrich Moritz, 1921).
26"Zum Religionsproblem", Sozialistische Monatshefte 
(June 1919): 544-549.
27"Das rationale und das irrationale Element in der
Religion", Sozia1istische Monatshefte (December 15, 1921):
1106-1115.
12B
program. But it had now developed into a cultural- 
historical movement, in which the realms of reason and 
feeling could become one. 2 8 Religion combined the 
subjectivity of the observer to the objectivity of reality, 
which combined the spiritual and the material.^  Spirit 
was the source of culture; materialism divided while 
spirit united. 30 Socialism would reunite spirit and 
matter, which had become separated in the capitalist, 
materialist dominated world. 31
Socialists of this persuasion argued that Marx was not 
just a materialist; the Kantian or Fichtean "should" was 
an integral part of his ideology. Socialism was, in fact, 
ethical and spiritual. 33 Historical materialism precluded 
individual responsibility necessary for moral behavior—  
youth must be trained to shoulder responsibility. 3'3 For
“ "Sozialismus, Religion und Kirche", Sozia1istische 
Monatshef te (April 1919): 334-342.
^"Der Religiose", Sozialistische Monatshefte (July 7, 
1919): 642-645; "Okonomischer und Religioser Sozialismus"
(May 3, 1920): 338-341.
30 "physische Gewalt und geistige Kraft", Soz ia1ist- 
ische Monatshefte (June 6 , 1921): 473-475.
3i"Aktivismus und Sozialismus", Sozialistische Mon­
atshefte (December 20, 1920): 1089-1091.
3="Dialektik, Geschieht1iche Vo1ksbi1dung, Geschichts- 
philosophie, Positivismus", Sozialistische Monatshefte 
(June 27, 1921): 573-577.
'^"Zur gesitigen Erziehung der Arbeiterklasse",
Sozia1istische Monatshefte (August 29, 1921): 751-757.
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Grimme, responsibi1ity played a key role. Capitalism 
encouraged the exploitation, not the respect, of one's 
fellows. This encouraged an attitude of "every man for 
himself". Now that Germany had adopted democracy, 
assumption of responsibility was even more critically 
important than ever before. Only when Germans pooled their 
resources and cooperated with one another could Germany be 
rebuilt. Grimme’s ideas an responsibility will be dealt 
with in greater detail in the next section, because 
responsibility was the link between the individual and the 
commun i ty.
When religious socialists turned their attention to 
Jesus's place in modern life, they generally tended to 
emphasize the Jesus who delivered the Sermon on the Mount. 
If this aspect of his teaching was revived, the corruptions 
of the established churches would become obvious. Puri­
fied, Jesus' message could once again live in the human 
heart.34 Grimme echoed these ideas. The message of the 
Sermon on the Mount was that of brotherly love. Capitalist 
society could not realize Jesus' message— while it taught 
love as the ideal, the system depended on its members 
violating Jesus' injunction to love others. Socialism
^"Sozialismus und Jesus", Sozia1istisc he Monatshefte 
(September 19, 1921): 816-818.
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would allow the unity of theory and practice— one would 
finally be able to truly live a Christian life.3®
To religious socialists, the religion of the 
established churches was not true religion because these 
churches were too secular and materia 1istic —  they 
worshipped things, degrading humanity.3** This type of 
religion corresponded to capitalism; both turned humans 
into material commodities.37 Proletarian religion, 
however, restored the central position of humanity, which 
would result in true brotherly love.
Religious socialists did agree with Lowenstein and 
other “secular" socialists that the established churches 
had used religion as a tool of class oppression.343 But 
while.for Lowenstein this discredited religion and 
Christianity, for religious socialists this misuse only 
discredited the churches. They had deviated from Jesus' 
message of brotherly love. Old forms of religious worship 
had lost their meaning; if they continued to be used, only
3=Grimme, Per religiose Mensch. pp. 2B-29 and GStA 
(Dahlem) 1 HA Rep. 92 Grimme 380, rough draft for a speech, 
dated August 30, 1931.
^"Die Religion des Arbeiter", Sozialistische Monats­
hefte (November 22, 1920): 1007-1009.
37Kolakowski, pp. 274-275.
^"Zuin Rel igionsproblem" , Soz ia 1 i s tisc he Monatshefte 
(June 1919): 544—549 and "Christentum und Sozialismus"
(January 26, 1920): 61-63.
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hypocrisy could result.3’ In his day, Luther had broken 
with the Catholic Church precisely because the old forms no 
longer stimulated belief and feeling which led to right 
action. find this is exactly the same reason socialists 
were breaking with the established churches now— in order 
to revive true rel igiosi ty. 40 On a more practical note 
Vorwarts advised workers to retain their church membership 
and try to change them from within.41 Grimme echoed these
* _i 42ideas.
For many religious socialists, religion alone was 
useless if it did not promote activity and channel it to 
positive ends. In its hour of need, Germany needed to tap 
every source of energy in order to rebuild and recuperate 
from the war. Religion, Christianity specifically, was 
indispensable in cultivating the necessary attitudes. True 
religion did not lead to passivity, religious socialists 
maintained. Traditional religion did— it tended to focus 
on the afterlife. But religious socialism was different in 
that it attempted to realize God's kingdom here on earth.43
w "Neue Religion", Sozialistische Monatshefte (August 
25, 1919): BIO—816.
40Ibid.
4i,,Religion und Sozialdemokratie" , Vorwarts. Feburary 
28, 1920 and "Arbeiterschaft und Kirche", June 25, 1920.
4=Grimme, Per relgiose Mensch. pp. 28-29.
43"Die Befehle Gottes", Sozia1istische Monatshefte 
(January 26, 1920): 44-48.
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Grimme expressed this eloquently: "Our high-spirited 
mission, the task of the community of all nations is: to
be God's collaborator in the victorious erection of his 
kingdom on earth."44 He added, "There are no two worlds in 
the sense that one is for humans and the other entirely for 
God."48 Religious socialists believed that the future 
utopia could be realized in the present.46
To Grimme, true Christianity was not flight from the 
world, but immersion in it. In his own words: "Religion
is not submission, religion is task.""4-7 Religion, Grimme 
added, did concern inwardness; but it was useless unless 
this inwardness was outwardly expressed.40 Inwardness was 
individual subjectivity; outward expression meant activity 
and activity meant work— not the alienated labor of the 
capitalist economy, but socially useful work that contri­
buted to both the individual and the community. The needs 
of the individual and the community were not opposed, but 
mutually beneficial.
^Grimme, Per religiose Mensch. p. 37.
**I bid. , p . 38.
“̂ "Religion und Sozialismus", Sozialistische Monats­
hefte (May 15, 1922): 442-447.
'"GStA (Dahlem) 1 HA Rep. 92 Grimme 560, "Frieden der 
Menschen auf Erden, die guten Wiliens sind!", Der Leuch- 
turm. December 25, 1931.
4SGrimme, Der religiose Mensch. pp. 44-45. Although
Grimme was a practicing Protestant, he attempted to correct
a major problem with Lutheran theology— its passivity,
particularly regarding the state.
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CONCEPTS OF THE INDIVIDUAL, COMMUNITY AND NATION
In the early years of the Republic, Grimme Mas sus­
picious of the Social Democratic Party not only because of 
its materia1istic orientation, but also because he was 
concerned with the extension of individual freedom. 
Socialist ideology had at least a partially deserved 
reputation for wanting to level society. Such levelling 
was usually seen as a levelling down, as the restriction of 
individual opportunity.
Reformers like Oestreich, with ideas of radical egali­
tarianism, seemed to confirm this opinion. Many people 
believed that all individuals deserved equal opportunity, 
but that actual talents were unequally distributed.
Indeed, we have seen that even articles in the normally 
moderate SPD journal, SoziaIistische Monatshefte often 
protested against the "rise of the talented", agreeing with 
Oestreich on this point. What these socialists really 
objected tD, however, was not recognition that aptitudes 
were unequal; what they objected to was that the measures 
used to determine aptitudes were not fair because they were
“̂ GStA (Dahlem) 1 HA Rep. 92 Grimme 546, "Was soli nun 
werden?", Rede des Studienassessors Grimme aus Leer in den 
Salen der Stadthalle zu Osnabruck am 7. Januar 1919 auf 
Einladung der DDP, pp. 1-7.
1 3 4
skewed to favor the middle and upper c l a s s e s . I n  effect, 
these socialists parted company with Oestreich, in that 
while he denied the existence of natural inequality, they 
only called for more objective, fairer means for deter—  
mining ability. Grimme belonged to this group. His ideas 
on the nature of individuality and the functions of com­
munity and nation all came together and are linked to his 
religious ideas.
Grimme insisted that all life was intrinsically equal. 
Ranking, however, did occur, at the supra-individual level 
or in the community. Grimme wrote,
The more a person shapes his life, the more a per­
sonality is he. Higher than mere existence . . .
stands the developed person, the personality . . .  A 
person is more human to the extent that he develops 
into a living persona1ity.Si
Ranking based on amount of possessions was improper because
amount of wealth does not indicate talent beneficial for
the whole community. For Grimme, the inner worth of the
individual and external ranking by one's ability to
contribute to the community were linked by the individual's
capability to shape him or herself as a personality. The
more one was able to do so, the more talent one developed
in the process, hence the more one had to give to others.
“‘■’"Gedanken zur Einheitsschule" , Sozia 1 istische 
Monatshefte (May 1919): 448-455; "Die Sozia1istische
Schule" (September 1919): 903-908; "Psychologie"
(December 1919): 1235-1239.
slGrimme, Der religiose Mensch. p. 13.
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The very shaping of one's personality was the only 
meaningful goal worth striving for. 892
These ideas were not unique to Grimme. The philosopher 
Karl Jaspers believed in equality of opportunity, to become 
what your were. But what people were varied from person to 
person; all people were not equally endowed with special 
gifts.83 The success of democracy depended on selection of 
the best in all areas of life, according to Jaspers.
The constant "becoming" or shaping of the individual 
was not merely a matter for self-congratulation, according 
to Grimme. He reconciled the individual's interests with 
the interests of the community in a way that should be 
familiar way— by asserting that the individual became an 
individual only in service to the community.84 Grimme 
believed he had advanced beyond the one-sided focus on the 
individual characteristic of the bourgeois capitalism, by 
re-introducing the element of community. Grimme put it 
thus:
I risk the assertion that a socialism which effaced the 
personality would have forgotten its purpose. But I 
hear you protest, is it not exactly the mark of our 
time that the individual only thinks of himself? Is 
not socialism the assault against this curse?”
“ Ibid., p. 12.
“ Karl Jaspers, Was ist Erziehuno? Ein Lesebuch. ed. 
Hermann Horn (Munich: Piper, 1977, 1992), pp. 324-327.
M Grimme, Der religiose Mensch. p. 20.
“ Ibid. , p. 14.
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Grimme insisted that his concept of personality was not 
that of the self-seeking ego. Neither should the indivi­
dual become a herd animal. Instead, one became an indivi­
dual in the community.
Others agreed. Martin Buber's ideas similarly empha­
sized community. *“■ Buber thought that the realization of 
self could occur only in relationship with another. 
Inwardness of the individual was realized only when it was 
shared with another. Life was something to be worked at; 
individuality was not a given. Buber was careful to avoid 
both the radical isolation characteristic of Kierkegaard's 
philosophy, as well as the complete immersion in the group, 
which would extinguish true individuality. Buber called 
this third possibility the realm of the "Between".57, While 
the collective annihilated the individuality and the 
possibility of responsibi1ity, the community exalted 
personality and included freedom and responsibility.5®
There are obvious parallels here with Grimme's ideas.
Indeed, while Buber disapproved of "materialist" socialism
^Adir Cohen, The Educational Phlosophy of Martin 
Buber (Rutherford: Farleigh Dickinson University Press,
1983).
571 b i d . , p. 83.
^Buber's use of the terms "collectivity" and "commu­
nity" parallels Ferdinand Tonnies' distinction between 
"society" and "community".
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because he thought it would result in stifling over­
regulation, he favored "religious" socialism.
The capitalist notion that everyone was but a 
replaceable cog was a mistaken idea, Grimme said. We all 
have our own unique talents and should be treated as 
individuals, not merely part of a homogenized, undiffer—  
entiated mass. Parents and teachers had to recognize the 
differences in children, rather than ignoring their pecul­
iarities. Democracy did not have to lead to mediocrity, or 
worse yet, a levelling down. It should lead to cultiva­
tion of the most talented leaders. Equality was not 
necessarily incompatible with the development of indivi­
duals into personalities. Grimme wrote, "Democracy need 
not be the sworn enemy of personal individuality."^’ He 
expanded on the theme:
I suggest, moreover, . . . that an organization of the
people can never wipe out the distinction between 
leaders and followers. . . . Genuine democracy wants
that those should lead who best understand how to lead. 
It [democracy] wants that each will be placed where he 
can most productively serve the whole.61
Spengler too had called for an aristocracy of talent. Only
the English, he said, measured value by the amount of goods
“’Cohen, p. 97.
^Grimme, Der relioiose Mensch. p. 21. 
6,1 Ibid., p. 22.
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one possessed; the Germans, on the other hand, measured 
value by achievement and ability.
The yearning for a strong leader to end division pre­
dated the war.65 This longing was magnified by the 
enormity of the problems of the post-war world. What 
Germany needed, many thought, were not politicians beholden 
to their party organizations, unable to be creative and 
bold, but real leaders.^ The Nazis are infamous for their 
exaltation of the leadership principle. But they were not 
alone in calling for a strong leader; Stefan George, Ernst 
Junger, Gustav Stresemann, Max Weber, and Ernst Kantorowicz 
were among notable public figures who shared this yearning.
Parallels between Grimme and non-socialists can also be 
seen in their concepts of the nation. Grimme thought that 
all nations were different from one another, and all were 
irreplaceable. He maintained that it was sinful to want to 
be other than what you were. One must accept one's own 
individuality. This applied to nations as well. The self- 
consciousness of a people made them a nation. No one 
nation was superior to another; they were indeed all 
different, but nevertheless equal. Each had their own
“ Spengler, p. 102.
^Stern, p. xxviii.
^Detlev J.K. Peukert, Die Weimarer Republik. Krisen- 
jahre der Klassischen Moderne (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1987),
p. 21B.
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God-given mission, specific to the peculiar strengths of 
that p e o p l e . A n d  that mission was "to be God’s co­
workers in the victorious erection of his rule on earth." 6’6> 
A few socialists thought that Germany should follow the 
Bolsheviks’ lead in instituting the brotherhood of mankind. 
Grimme insisted that Germany must remain independent of 
both the spiritual imperialism of the East, as well as the 
economic imperialism of the West. Germany's unique task 
was to emphasize the worth of the individual. And Germany 
could best represent this idea by combining the ideas of 
religion and those of socialism. Germany could never be a 
true nation in the sense of being a united Volk until
The owner overcomes his ego and through his example 
promotes the idea that, higher than his own interests 
is his love for the nation . . . [and] to prove this
love through the renunciation of property.67
He added,
We will no longer fail to recognize that nationalism 
and socialism are opposites. They have the same 
source; they are only two forms of the same mani­
festation of love: the will to brotherhood. This
source is Christianity.6*0
What does all this have to da with education? Grimme, 
like Lowenstein and Oestreich, was more concerned with 
larger political and social problems; he did, however,
6SGrimme, Der religiose Mensch. pp. 24-25.
6*6>I bid., p . 37.
** I b i d . , p. 59.
I bid . , p . 56.
140
provide a broad outline on haw education should be 
structured to produce the kind of society he envisioned.
GRIMME GN THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM
Although Grimme was a religious socialist and Lowen- 
stein was a free-thinker, the two reformers shared many of 
the same attitudes towards the established churches and 
their links to the school system. Grimme's attitude is 
best expressed in his own words: "The history of Christ­
ianity is the history of the constant falsification of its 
pure teachings through the churches of both confessions. "6,? 
Grimme maintained that there was a big difference between 
Jesus' teachings and those of the representatives of the 
churches who had supported the state in the World War. To 
Grimme, the churches did not display true Christianity—  
socialism was the best expression of Jesus' teachings of 
brotherhood.
Grimme believed religious education was important, but 
his definition of the term was so broad as to almost empty 
it of its meaning. Religious instruction would not be 
divided by denomination. Although he was often vague about 
the content of his proposed course, he intended that it 
would train youth in their duties to society, cultivate 
their love of community, and provide an insight to the
^GStA (Dahlem) 1 HA Rep. 92 Grimme, "Besitz ist 
Schuld!", unidentified newspaper clipping of Apri1 5, 1930.
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meaning of life, a critical part of education in the modern 
nihilistic age.70 Grimme equated religious education with 
the study of phi losophy. He believed that history taught 
what was and what is; philosophy, however, taught one what 
could be. Although some people thought philosophy had no 
connection with daily life, Grimme thought that it did, 
that it could enrich everyday life and infuse work with 
joy. The study of philosophy was the way to an ever 
greater clarity.
In the same pamphlet, Grimme anticipated the objec­
tions of religious authorities, that philosophical ques­
tioning might result in a loss of respect for religion. He 
replied that true religion was more durable, that it could 
survive the questioning. The age of blind obedience to the 
churches was over; youth today must be taught to question 
all authority. Although it might be true that philoso­
phical questioning would arouse skepticism, such ques­
tioning was also the only cure for growing skepticism.
Grimme insisted that the study of philosophy was not an 
escape from this world; rather "We are the eternal seekers 
after the connection between world and spirit." ”  By 
equating philosophy with religious education, Grimme could
’'''Grimme, Der religiose Mensch. p. 62.
riGStA (Dahlem) 1 HA Rep. 92 Grimme, "Wozu Philo- 
sophie?" undated 31 page pamphlet by Grimme.
I b i d .
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reassure his fellow socialists that he supported the 
socialist party planks respecting education, including the 
demand that it be secularized.73
Many non-socialists were confused— how could someone 
who claimed to be religious support a secular school? They 
concluded that it must be a political ruse, a smokescreen, 
in order to camouflage a socialist take-over of the 
schools.7'4 Other opponents maintained that even if Grimme 
were sincerely devoted to Christianity, as a socialist he 
could never hope to successfully oppose the free-thinking 
atheistic elements, men like Lowenstein, that dominated the 
SPD. 7'“
One did not have to be a socialist to oppose the 
prevailing practice of religious segregation. While still 
a Democrat, Grimme had formed a BESCH chapter in Hannover. 
Its program provides a good account of Grimme's specific 
reform ideas. In the list of goals of the schools is the 
demand for “a school which desires to educate religious
^GStA (Dahlem) 1HA Rep. 92 Grimme, "Ein sozial- 
istisches Bi1dungsprogramm", unindentified newspaper 
clipping of April 5, 1930.
^Ibid., "Die sittliche Einstellung des preuf3ischen 
Kultusminister", unidentified and undated newspaper 
c 1i pping.
7’®Ibid., "Ehrendes Mifltrauen. Reaktionarer Vorstofl 
gegen den Kultusminister Grimme", Vorwarts. November 26, 
1931 .
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persons, but without denominational connections."74 Grimme 
agreed with Lowenstein that denominational division only 
sustained division of the community. He disagreed with 
Lowenstein, however, in his insistence that all children, 
even those of dissidents, must take religious 
instruction."7"7 Grimme is worth quoting at length on the 
subj ec t:
The religious human is socialist . . . The struggle
against the confessional school is a struggle for the 
religious school . . . the struggle for a church-
free school should make the way clear for the school 
of the true church . . . It is a school for the world,
a secular [weltliche] school, which to call godless is 
done in evil or folly."7B
Turning to the problem of integrating education, Grimme 
agreed with Oestreich that class privileges in pursuit of a 
higher education must be abolished. Grimme differed from 
Oestreich in that he believed specia1ization and branching 
were necessary. The different branches, however, should be 
better co-ordinated and access to each open to all stu­
dents."7"7 This would result in an integrated system.®1’
^Ibid., "Programm Entwurf der Ortsgruppe Hannover des 
Bundes entschiedener Schu1 reformer".
7^Ibid.» "Volksversammlung der deutschen dem. Partei”, 
Ostfriesische Zeitung. December 17, 1918.
7SGrimme, Der religiose Mensch. p. 44.
7"p I b i d . , p. 61.
^ ‘GStA (Dahlem) 1 HA Rep. 92 Grimme, 546, "Was soil 
nun werden", unidentified and undated newspaper clipping of 
1919.
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Like Oestreich, Grimme adamantly rejected any organization 
of the educational system that would allow unfair advantage 
to the propertied. A student's education and profession 
would be decided solely on the students' inclinations.01
It was not the organization of education that was of 
primary importance to Grimme; he was concerned more with 
its content. As Education Minister during the Depression, 
he had to consider how problems of education were linked 
with employment. As unemployment increased, the various 
types of schools all scrambled to secure special privileges 
for its graduates. Grimme criticized this as selfishness; 
the crisis could be overcome only when individuals assumed 
responsibility and thought about the needs of the whole 
society, not just their own special interests.®3
With large numbers of unemployed, employers raised 
standards in their hiring decisions; this often resulted 
in good positions being reserved for secondary school 
graduates, even when the nature of the job did not 
specifically require that type of preparation.^ Grimme 
criticized this practice; he thought that a good basic 
education in the Volksschule was often more suitable than
eiIbid., "Programm Entwurf (BESCH)".
°3Ibid., "Minister Grimme gegen die 'Knopfloch- 
Gesinnung' und gegen das Zeugnisunwesen", unidentified 
newspaper clipping, March 31, 1930.
“ Ringer, p. 32.
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an interrupted course of study in a higher institution. 
Command of Latin did not make one person better qualified 
for a job than the applicant who lacked this mostly useless 
skill.
Like Grimme, university mandarins deplored the numbers 
of students enrolled in the university who were motivated 
by the desire for social mobility, for privileges and 
titles. The mandarins wanted to restrict the numbers of 
those admitted to these institutions. While they insisted 
that their position was based on their concern for main­
taining high standards of scholarship, their real motiva­
tion seemed to be to maintain their exclusivity.08 
Grimme disagreed— he thought that only greater access to 
higher education could result in the true "rise of the 
talented".
While Grimme rejected socio-economic position of the 
student as the measure of value, he failed to offer a 
workable substitute. Although he thought that moral and 
spiritual qualities should be decisive, neither he nor 
other socialists were able to offer a standard for 
measuring these elusive qualities. Lacking an abjective 
standard of judgment, the yearning for a strong leader was 
decided by irrational, or at least non-rational feeling.
^GStA (Dahlem) 1 HA Rep. 92 Grimme, "Programmrede 
Grimmes", Volkswacht. April 1, 1930.
e=1Ringer, p. 287.
Hitler came to power and socialist attempts to build 





Despite the best efforts of Lbwenstein, Oestreich, and 
Grimme to develop a practical program of educational reform 
consistent with Marxist principles as they understood them, 
the three theorists made little impact on either their 
party or the schools. This becomes apparent when attention 
is shifted from theoretical debate to the actual political 
situation in the 1920s.
THE NATIONAL SCHOOL CONFERENCE OF 1920
In 1917, the Social Democrats had proposed a national 
conference to discuss educational issues after the war.
This suggestion was adopted by the government; on March 6, 
1920 the national Minister of the Interior formally an­
nounced that the conference would meet in Berlin in June.
It was intended to be a non-partisan discussion conducted 
by pedagogical professionals in order to publicize the 
issues and problems of the schools. SPD leaders agreed 
with the Interior Minister that party politics should not 
play any part in this public discussion of experts.1 The 
hope was that an open, non-partisan discussion of the 
issues would allow both parents and politicians to make 
informed decisions concerning the school system.
^■"Die Reichsschul konf erenz " , Vorwarts. June 11, 1920.
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In order to keep the conference from becoming engaged 
in political issues, the socialist Heinrich Schulz, head of 
the Division of Culture in the Interior Ministry, kept the 
issue of religion off the agenda.= Instead, the delegates 
focussed on issues such as the proper number of grades for 
the elementary school, work education as a method of in­
struction, the role of the newly created parents' councils, 
and teacher training. Not only were the sensitive issues 
of religious instruction, confessional segregation, and the 
proper role of the established churches in the schools 
ignored, but the issue of integration of the high schools 
was also kept off the agenda. As a consequence, even the 
modest intentions of educating the public and influencing 
politicians were unrealized.
Even though both Oestreich and Lbwenstein objected to 
the proceedings, the majority of the delegates leaned to 
the left.3 Lbwenstein objected to the inclusion of any 
non-socialist educators— -he completely rejected cooperation 
with other political parties and quoted Karl Marx's dictum 
that only the proletariat could free itself.'1 Oestreich's 
complaints were similar— he thought that reactionaries,
'“"Die Reichsschulkonferenz" , Vorwarts ■ June 20, 1920.
3"Die Reichsschulkonferenz. 4. Tag: Lehrerbi1 dung",
Vorwarts. June 15, 1920.
"FES, 3.3.1, 639-681, unidentified and undated 
newspaper clipping of 1920.
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miffed at left-wing domination, had stooped to obstructive 
tactics to wreck the conference.3
The conference made no discernible impact on education. 
Intended to be non-partisan, it degenerated into petty 
squabbling between would-be reformers and conservatives.
The arguments had no effect on politicians in power, who 
were more concerned with the intricacies of conducting 
politics in the new republic than in the theoretical 
debates of peripheral issues and the bickering of peda­
gogues. The decisive and meaningful debates could only be 
partisan, occurring each time a legislative proposal for 
the national school law promised by the constitution was 
made.
PROPOSED LEGISLATION FOR THE NATIONAL EDUCATION LAW
Four pieces of legislation for the promised national 
education law were proposed in the 1920s. Each time, the 
issue of the relationship between the established churches 
and the elementary schools was the central issue. Since 
secular schools had not existed during Wilhelmian Germany, 
their legitimacy was brought into question by article 174 
of the constitution, the "status quo" provision. One would 
expect a political party that publicly insisted on
3"Die Reichsschulkonferenz. Fortsetzung der Aus- 
schuflberichte. Erklarungen iiber Erklarungen" and "Die 
Reichsschulkonferenz. Ein Verzweif1ungsakt der Reaktion", 
Vorwarts. June IB, 1920.
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separation of church and state and which supported the 
establishment of secular schools to be active in trying to 
get a national law passed. Yet not one of these four 
legislative proposals originated with the SPD or enjoyed 
socialist support— the SPD voted against every one of these 
proposals, yet offered none of its own. Unable to agree on 
a common direction for educational reform, the SPD was 
incapable of introducing its own proposals; it could only
reject bills proposed by the other parties.
The first proposal was the only one that the SPD even 
considered. Offered in 1921, it would have given secular 
schools full legal equality with the confessional school 
type. The legislation thus permitted both secular and 
confessional schools; although it weakly repeated the 
constitution's preference for the community school, it did 
nothing to promote this type. The legislation further 
provided that the individual states would have wide 
latitude in deciding what fit the definition of "orderly 
school operation" provided for in article 146 of the 
constitution.
Both the SPD and DDP objected to the proposed legis­
lation. The Democrats objected because they believed that 
only mixed religious schools could promote solidarity of
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the community; confessional schools destroyed unity,6 The 
Democrats also maintained that only the churches, not the 
parents, really wanted confessional segregation.7
In its objections, the SPD repeated its assertion that 
separation of state and church meant the separation of 
church and school. The community school referred to in the 
constitution, the party maintained, was actually the 
secular school, the only type of school in which the rights 
of freedom of thought and conscience could actually be 
realized.® The SPD's party program of 1921 repeated its 
standard position, that "religion is a private matter, of 
inner conviction, not a party or state matter: separation
of church and state."9 The program went on to call for a 
secular, free, and integrated school system. Since the 
proposed legislation violated these principles, many 
socialists rejected this proposal.
Lbwenstein, speaking for the USPD, dismissed the 
legislation as part of the Independents' rejection of 
participation in any compromise which made concessions to
^GStA (Merseburg) Rep. 169D Preu|3ischer Landtag, xc 
C2, Die Konfessionelle Verhaltnisse der Schule (Konfes- 
sions- Simultanschule), Ldtg. Bd. 1: 1919-27, Berlin, den
7. Juni 1921.
7Ibid., xc C3, Der Religionsunterricht Allgemein Ldtg.




the Center. Always ready with his acid wit, the Inde­
pendent "Ten Commandments" Hoffmann claimed that Schulz 
would not be happy until the pope ruled Berlin.*0 Schulz 
replied that negotiating with moderates in the Center Party 
undercut the position of Catholic reactionaries. Besides, 
this legislation deserved consideration because it would at 
least legalize the secular schools.11 The SPD-USPD dis­
agreement ended when the USPD dissolved itself in 1922; 
the majority of the party joined the Communist Party, while 
about one-third, including Lbwenstein, chose to join the 
SPD. Lbwenstein nevertheless continued to criticize the 
propriety of a socia1ist-Catholic coalition and warned that 
the Center could not be trusted.
The first piece of legislation was finally shelved in 
1924. The second proposal came in 1925. Before it was 
made, the SPD adopted a new program at its yearly confer—  
ence in Heidelberg that year. The new program was neces­
sary to cement the SPD-USPD reunification. It reflected 
the leftward push the USPD members gave the party. Not 
only must church and religious influence in the schools be 
struggled against, stated the program, but "no expenditure 
of public funds for church and religious goals" should be




made. 155 The usual affirmation for a secular, free, and 
integrated school system was repeated.
The 1925 proposal was a DNVP-sponsored bill supporting 
confessional segregation. It was of short duration because 
the national government at the time was so unstable; when 
the government fell, the proposal was dropped. In 1926, a 
DDP-sponsored bill was offered. The SPD considered negoti­
ating on this proposal. But this government was unstable 
too and the legislation was shelved when the govnerment 
fell. Both of these bills would have implemented the DDP's 
favored type of school of mixed denominations.
The final legislative proposal for the national educa­
tion law illustrated the problem of a SPD-Center coalition 
— that their differences were irreconci1iab1e as many 
socialists, including Lbwenstein had been maintaining for a 
long time. It is known as the Marx-Keudell bill after its 
authors, Wilhelm Marx, prominent Center politician and head 
of the Catholic School Association, and Herr von Keudell, a 
reactionary German Nationalist. Their proposal, while 
ostensibly claiming to grant equality to confessional, 
secular, and community schools, actually favored the 
confessional schools by providing that not only would all 
teachers and non-religious subjects in the curriculum be 
oriented to the school's confession, but that all of that
1=Treue, p. 109.
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school's inspectors would share the same religion. In 
addition, religious instruction would be required, not 
voluntary, in schools of mixed confession.13
The bill seemed to vindicate members of the SPD, such 
as Lowenstein, who had always maintained that the Center 
could not be trusted. The provisions in the Marx-Keudell 
Bill not only favored the confessional school but actually 
tried to reverse rights granted by the constitution, rights 
the SPD especially cherished. Administrators had always 
attempted to match the religion of the teacher with that of 
the school, in order to minimize conflict. But for the 
Center and DNVP to insist that school inspectors also had 
to be of that religion seemed outrageous. Even more out­
rageous was the infringement on the right of a student to 
abstain from religious instruction. Dissidents had been 
persecuted before and during the World War. This provision 
seemed to signal a return to the coercion of Imperial days.
Lbwenstein viewed the bill as a renewal of the class 
struggle, disguising itself in the cloak of religion and 
morality. Other party members agreed with him. Schulz 
felt betrayed by the Center alliance with the DIWP. The 
SPD had patiently co-operated with the Center, only to be 
betrayed by Catholic reactionaries. Schulz nevertheless
13"Das Reichsschulgetsz und die Verfassungsparteien", 
Sozia1istische Monatshefte (August 8, 1927): 613-618 and
Dietrich Orlow, Weimar Prussia, vol. 2, pp. 35-66.
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insisted that opposition to the bill did not mean opposi­
tion to religion or even the established churches, only 
opposition to the churches' attempt to play the game of 
power politics. The party conference that year in Kiel 
passed a resolution which affirmed SPD support for the 
secular schools and called for support of inter— confes­
sional schools in places where secular schools did not yet 
exist.
Indeed, although the Marx-Keudell Bill antagonized 
relations between the SPD and the Center, the coalition 
between the two parties continued to flourish, if not at 
the federal level of government, at least in Prussia. 
Successful conclusion of a concordat, or treaty, with the 
Pope in 1929 illustrated the SPD's commitment to compromise 
with the Center, as Schulz consistently advocated and 
Lbwenstein and Oestreich consistently criticized.
The failure of the Marx-Keudell Bill in November 1927 
ended attempts to enact the constitutional provision that 
promised a national education law. In lieu of this law, 
which was supposed to reconcile contradictory clauses of 
the constitution, educational matters were left to state 
governments to solve. In Prussia, lack of the national law 
led to a chaotic situation. Since there was a lack of
14Heinrich Schulz, Kirchenschu1e oder Volksschule? 
Ein Kampf gegen den Reichsschulgesetzentwurf der 
Rechtskoalition (Berlin: J.H. W. Dietz, 1927).
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legal precedents to refer to, quite often there were no 
good answers to the very difficult problems. Appeals to 
Imperial law were disputed by socialists, but the SPD could 
offer no alternative.
THE PRUSSIAN EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM IN THE 1920S AND THE ISSUE 
□F SECULARIZATION
Prussian elementary schools during Imperial Germany 
were divided by confession, included religious instruction 
in the curriculum, and were administered primarily by the 
established churches. The SPD was able to alter only the 
third point, and even on this issue, the established 
churches continued to successfully challenge state 
authori ty.
Although education certainly was not secularized by the 
constitution, positive steps were made in that direction: 
school supervision was made a matter of the state, not the 
churches, although the state was required to consult the 
churches on religious instruction; teachers were given all 
the rights of state officials, one of which was that reli­
gious denomination was not tD be considered unless this 
were relevant to the office; religious instruction and 
participation in church ceremonies and holidays was no 
longer compulsory but voluntary; secular schools were 
mentioned in the constitution, implying their legitimacy; 
and finally, care was to be taken to protect the 
sensitivities of dissenters.
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Every one of these provisions proved difficult to 
implement in practice. A barrage of letters from local 
officials to the Education Ministry requested advice an how 
to apply these clauses in particularly difficult cases.
□ne might be amused at the ridiculous ways in which the 
meanings of words could be stretched and distorted if the 
end result had not been cynicism about government and 
politicians.
The state had always retained authority over the 
schools in principle, even during the 19th century; the 
state had only used the churches as administrators because 
it was been convenient to do so. Teachers resented super—  
vision by clergymen not professionally trained as educa­
tors.- They preferred pedagogues as state officials in 
overseeing the schools. Their desires seemed to be 
realized by articles 143 and 136 of the constitution. 
Article 143 granted teachers all the "rights and duties of 
state officials".15 Article 136 stipulated that the reli­
gion of state officials was not to be a consideration, 
unless the duties of the office were dependent on religious 
membership.1'1’ Since teachers believed that the duties of 
the teaching profession were not dependent on religious 
confession but on professional training, they thought they
lsDie Verfassuno. p. 43.
Ibid.
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were now free from church interference. The leadership of 
both the Catholic and Evangelical churches insisted othei—  
wise; the essence of the confessional school, they main­
tained, was that its lesson plans and school books must 
reflect the spirit of that particular religion.1^ A 
teacher of a different confession could not adequately 
teach properly in such a school. Jewish teachers as well 
as dissidents were barred from the confessional school,18 
And certainly Jewish educators could not serve as rector's 
of Evangelical or Catholic schools.19 But not only did the 
churches oppose the idea of Jewish administrators of 
Christian schools; they also insisted that all school 
officials must belong to the religion of that s c h o o l . I f  
a teacher left the church after securing employment in a 
secular school, then that teacher must be removed from the 
confessional school. The argument that a teacher had the
^GStA (Dahlem) Rep. 76 VII neu Sekt 1B-I Nr. 61 Bd.
I, p. 388, letter to Ku1tusministerium, January 27, 1922.
iBIbid., Nr. 2 Bd. XXV, p. 351, letter from Education 
Minister Boelitz to Provinzia1 schu1ko11 egium in Berlin- 
Lichterfelde, June 26, 1924.
1,?Ibid., p. 435, Ku 1 tusmin isterium to Berlin- 
Lichterfelde, November 2B, 1924.
■̂’Ibid, Nr. 2 Bd. XXVI, p. 190, Evangelical church 
official to the Kultusminister, May 31, 1930 and Nr. 60 Bd. 
I, p. 204, undated resolution of the Catholic School 
Organization of Germany.
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constitutional right to freedom of belief and conscience 
did not dissuade church authorities.31
Chronic financial problems of the period aggravated the 
situation. Whenever it became necessary to reduce the num­
ber of personnel in the schools, supporters of the confes­
sional school insisted that the official's religion should 
be a factor. Their argument was that the remaining teach­
ers would have to be prepared to teach all subjects, in­
cluding religion.33 But then where could a teacher who 
chose to exercise the constitutiona1 right to abstain from 
religion find employment, since the supporters of the con­
fessional school also insisted that secular schools were 
il legal?33
When proponents of confessional education insisted that 
most teachers did not choose to abstain from religion be­
cause they believed in its validity and necessity, the USPD 
insisted that if teachers were reluctant to exercise their
31"Katholischer Schu1streik", Vorwarts. June 20, 1920, 
an interesting report on a school strike at a Westphalian 
Catholic school, conducted by Catholic parents who demanded 
the removal of four Catholic teachers who had left the 
Church. School strikes by both supporters of confessional 
schools and of secular schools were quite common throughout 
the decade. The Education Minister was firm that local 
authorities not capitulate to strikers or to the threat of 
a strike.
^GStA (Dahlem) Rep. 76 VII neu Sekt 1B-I, Nr. 2, Bd. 
XXV, p. 331-332, Directive of Boelitz to the local govern­
ments, March 1, 1924.
33Ibid., p. 381-363, unidentified newspaper clipping 
of November 2, 1924.
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constitutional right to refrain from religion it was 
because they were afraid they could neither obtain nor keep 
their positions otherwise.24 Quite often non—religious 
teachers were the first to be laid off, not only because 
they would not teach religious instruction, but also be­
cause, since the right to refrain from religion was so 
recent, they tended to be the newest teachers.25 Religious 
teachers might then fill these positions, even in schools 
without religious instruction. Proponents of confessional 
education worried that religious teachers might be trans­
ferred against their will to schools they considered to be 
godless. Education Minister Boelitz instructed local 
officials not to violate the rights of teachers in confes­
sional schools by transferring them to non-confessional 
ones.
One attempt to address this problem was to assign 
teachers to the schools of their religions whenever pos­
sible, or in the case of non-religious teachers, to secular
=4Ibid., p. 250, USPD speech in the Prussian Landtag, 
March S, 1922.
25Ibid., Nr. 60 Bd. Ill, pp. 39-40, teachers' petition 
to the Ku1tusministerium, August 13, 1931. Married teach­
ers were usually targeted for early retirement as well; 
the SPD tried to defend this group, while the Catholics 
maintained that married teachers could not properly devote 
themselves both to the profession and to their marital and 
motherly duties.
3t,Ibid., Bd. 1, p. 437, Ku 1 tusminister Boelitz to 
Provinzialschulkollegium in Ber1in-Lichterfelde, September 
23, 1922.
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schools.^ The Education Minister also ruled that if a 
teacher in a Catholic school converted to Protestantism, 
that teacher would be transferred to the appropriate 
school. In addition, that teacher could teach religious 
instruction only after one year had elapsed since the 
conversion and only after taking a state examination in 
religious instruction.20 Most teachers, even those who 
considered themselves personally religious, resented what 
they regarded as infringement by the churches into state 
authority. "  Many insisted that the churches had no role 
in public education, not even in religious instruction.30 
Despite the protests of the teachers, however, the churches 
continued to assert'their authority over the schools,
=,,Ibid., Nr. 2 Bd. XXV, p. 478, Kul tusminister Becker 
to Provinzialschulkollegium, April 8, 1926; and GStA
(Potsdam) Rep. 76 VII neu Sekt 1B-I, p. 117 Kultusminister 
Grimme to Prussian Minister President Braun, October 17, 
1930. The problem with dissident teachers was that the 
Teachers' Academies were also confessiona1ly segregated. 
When he became Education Minister, Grimme insisted that the 
academies had to accept dissidents too; the government 
would then try to assign them to schools which corresponded 
to those beliefs. Also see GStA (Merseburg) Rep. 169D 
PreuRischer Landtag, xc J9 Die Dissidenten, Ldtg. Bd. 1: 
1920-33, March 17, 1931.
^GStA (Dahlem) Rep. 76 VII neu Sekt 1B-I Nr. 2 Bd. 
XXVI, p. 131, Kultusminister to the Evangelical Church, 
October 15, 1927.
^Ibid., p. 39, “Religionsunterricht und Kirche", 
Alloemeine Deutsche Lehrerzeituna Nr. 16 (May, 1927).
3°Ibid., p. 218-220 and pp. 235-240, teachers' 
petitions to the Ku1tusministerium August 1930.
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insisting that in the matter of religious instruction, 
church officials were superior to civil servants.®1
Article 144 of the constitution made the entire school 
system subject to state supervision. Article 149 provided 
that religious instruction was ordinarily a subject of the 
schools (except for the secular schools) and added that it 
would be "taught in accord with the principles of the con­
cerned religious society without prejudice to the super—  
visory rights of the state.’"32 This latter provision gave 
the churches the right to involvement in the schools, a 
right they used as a wedge to broaden their influence over 
other areas of education whenever they could.
In a Landtag debate, the Social Democrats insisted that 
religious instruction in the schools was still subject to 
state supervision and control —  the constitution had not 
intended that religious instruction would be dogmatic, but 
a more general type of religious instruction. Confessional 
religious education was actually incompatible with the con­
stitutional provisions for freedom of belief. The Demo­
crats agreed that while dogma had to be avoided, religious 
instruction should remain confessional .
31Ibid., p. 190, Letter from an Evangelical church 
official to the Ku1tusminister, May 31, 1930.
3:sDie Verfassuno. p. 45.
3"3GStA (Merseburg) Rep. 169D Preu(3ischer Landtag, xf 
A3, Bd. 1: 1919-28, Sitzung am September 13, 1923.
163
Despite pressure from both churches, the state 
partially agreed with the SPD and insisted on limitations 
on church interference in education. When one Evangelical 
church official attempted to pay a surprise visit to in­
spect a religious instruction class, the school turned him 
away. He responded by writing a letter of grievance to 
local officials, claiming the church's right to inspect 
those classes had been violated. The Education Minister 
rejected his complaint, supporting the school in this in­
stance, stating that the requirement to give notice was a 
reasonable one.34 The Education Minister also instructed 
local officials that, although the churches might be con­
sulted on matters pertaining to religious instruction, it 
was not mandatory to obtain their approval.35
One of the ways in which the churches tried to maximize 
their influence over the schools was through an insistence 
on their right to determine how many hours a week religious
®aGStA (Dahlem) Rep. 76 VII neu Sekt 1B-I Nr. 2 Bd. 
XXVI, p. 246, Evangelical Office in Schlesien to Breslau 
officials, December 30, 1930 and p. 247, Breslau local 
officials reply of January 20, 1931. For other instances 
of the Evangelicals' insistence that religious instruction 
was strictly a church matter see Bd. XXIV, p. 428, a peti­
tion to the Kultusministerium to this effect, dated April
6 , 1921. The Catholic Church repeatedly made similar 
claims— see Bd. XXIV, p. 107, press clipping from the 
Kolnischer Volkszeitung of November 13, 1919 and p. 259, 
press clipping Germania. February 25, 1920 which forcefully 
insisted that the state could not abridge the church's 
right to supervise religious instruction.
3SIbid., Nr. 2 Vol XXV, p. 352, Kultusministerium to 
Provinzia1 schu1ko11 egium, June 26, 1924.
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instruction should be. This was one of the few instances 
in which the Evangelical Church was at odds with the Cath­
olics, claiming that Catholics received more hours per week 
of religious instruction than did Protestants.36 When the 
Education Ministry attempted to mediate the dispute by 
equalizing the number of hours of religious instruction, 
the Bishop of Osanbruck protested that there were reasons 
unique to Catholicism that necessitated more than the stip­
ulated number of hours.37 The Kultusministerium believed 
that if the number of hours was too high, students would 
not take it and teachers would refuse to teach it.30
We have dealt with the problem of teachers and how they 
could not really exercise their constitutional right to re­
fuse to teach religious instruction. What was the situa­
tion with the students? Article 149 again proved problem­
atical in its stipulation that participation in religious 
instruction depended on a "declaration of intent" by the 
guardians of the student. The constitution did not stipu­
late the form, however— would students have to declare that
^Ibid., Nr. 61 Bd. II, p. 160, unidentified report 
dated January 1923.
^Ibid., p. 76, letter by the Bishop of Osnabriick to 
the Ku1tusminister, September 21, 1922.
^ I b i d ., pp. 471-475, undated minutes of a meeting 
between Ku1tusministerium, Evangelical church leaders, 
school administrators, and teachers.
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they wanted religious instruction or the opposite? The 
issue aroused heated debate.
The Independent Socialists, Oestreich's organization 
BESCH, and socialist teachers all insisted that the intent 
of the constitution clearly was that the parent must speci­
fically request religious instruction for the child, other—  
wise none would be provided.3^ Representatives of the Cen­
ter Party scoffed at this argument. They maintained that 
since the earlier part of article 149 had provided that 
religious instruction was ordinarily part of a school's 
curriculum, the declaration of intent surely must be one of 
abstention. 415 Furthermore, the Center insisted, since the 
majority desired religious instruction, it would be ludi­
crous to have them all make statements of intent.
Socialist Education Minister Haenisch hedged by 
claiming that there was no stipulated form; it could be 
positive or negative, oral or written, as long as it was as
3-7 GStA (Dahlem) Rep. 76 VII neu Sekt 1B-I Nr. 2 Bd. 
XXIV, p. 99, USPD and BESCH representatives' speeches in 
the Prussian Constitutional Convention, October 17, 1919; 
pp. 167-189, session of December 6, 1919; and p. 172, 
petition to the convention by a socialist teachers' organi­
zation, September 30, 1919. Also, see GStA (Merseburg)
Rep. 169D Preuf3ischer Landtag, xc, C3 Der Rel igionsunter- 
richt Allgemein, Ldtg. Bd. 1: 1919-33, October 20, 1919
and "Teilnahme am Religionsunterricht", Vorwarts. November
15, 1919, for BESCH's protests.
*,:,GStA (Dahlem) Rep. 76 VII neu Sekt 1B-I Nr. 2 Bd. 
XXIV, p. 189.
‘‘Mbid., p. 100, Center representative speech at the 
Prussian Constitutional Convention, October 17, 1919.
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simple as possible— officials could not purposely make the 
process more complicated than necessary. In addition, one 
could not repeatedly change one's mind about whether to 
participate in religious instruction or not.43
Haenisch's successor, Otto Boelitz, agreed with the 
Center's position— if religion were an ordinary school sub­
ject, surely the student should not have to specifically 
request the course."43 National Minister of the Interior 
Walter Koch agreed; if parents sent their children to 
confessional schools, they probably wanted them to receive 
religious instruction, and it would be wasteful and time- 
consuming to force them to make formal statements to that 
effect.4"4 Applying this argument to the secular schools, 
one would assume that a positive declaration of intent to 
take religious instruction would be necessary at this type 
of school . 4=1
Were the secular schools even constitutional? Although 
the secular school was mentioned in article 149, opponents
43:Ibid., Nr. 60 Bd. I, p. 110, Kultusminister to the 
local Coin government, January 19, 1921; Nr. 2 Bd. XXIV, 
p. 126, unidentified newspaper clipping of December 6, 
1919; and pp. 13-15, letter from Haenisch to local 
governments and Provinzialschulkollegium.
"43Ibid., Nr. 2 Bd. XXV, pp. 301-320, letter from 
Boelitz to the Reich Interior Minister, June 29, 1923.
"“"“Ibid., Bd. XXIV, p. 272, unidentified and undated 
documen t.
4=Ibid., Nr. 60 Bd. I, p. 110, Haenisch to the local 
government in Cologne, November 26, 1920.
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insisted that article 174, the status quo article, invali­
dated the earlier provision until a national school law was 
passed. In the 1920s, the Education Ministry dealt with 
the problem by maintaining that secular schools did not 
exist. Instead there were "collection schools" or "coll­
ection classes" or "Evangelical schools without religious 
education".
The last term provoked outrage from Protestants. If a 
school were Evangelical, then religious instruction was an 
ordinary school subject— this meant that an "Evangelical 
school without religious education" was a constitutional 
impossibi1ity. Although no school was ever designated a 
"Catholic school without religious education", a Center 
Landtag representative wanted to know if this, or a "Jewish 
school without religious education" were possible.40 
Education Minister Haenisch had to concede that those type
“̂ Ibid., Nr. 2 Bd. XXIV, p. 258, Haenisch's address to 
the Prussian Landtag, April 10, 1920 and Bd. XXV, p. 12,
Ku1tusminister to Potsdam local officials, December 1921; 
Nr. 60 Bd. I, p. 138, Haenisch's address to the Prussian 
Landtag, January 13, 1921; p. 279, article in the Koln- 
ische Volkszeituno. July 12, 1921; p. 380 Boelitz to the 
President of the Landtag, December 28, 1921.
“"’Ibid., Nr. 60 Bd. I, p. 40, letter from an 
Evangelical church official to the Education Minister, 
November 18, 1920; p. 43, article in Deutsche Zeitunq. 
November 4, 1920.
“̂ Considering the fluidity of language use, one can 
almost imagine a "secular school with religious instruc­
tion". The proposal is not made in jest— it seems an apt 
phrase to describe Grimme’s ideal school.
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of schools were indeed possible if the majority in that 
type of school chose to refrain from taking religious 
education.4,1 But the term was never used except in 
reference to Protestant schools. Socialists insisted, 
however, that use of the term was accurate; these schools 
still retained Evangelical books and teacher plans; they 
only omitted religious instruction.90
In practice, even supporters of confessional segrega­
tion and religious instruction realized that the admini­
stration of the schools was much more efficient when those 
students who did not take religious instruction were "col­
lected" into their own schools. Although some of these 
supporters argued that non-confessional moral instruction 
should be held for these students while other students 
attended confessional religious instruction, socialists 
insisted that not even a non-confessional course could be 
required.31 To prevent the chaos that would arise from
“̂ GStA (Dahlem) Rep. 76 VII neu Sekt 1B-I Nr. 60 Bd.
I, pp. 29-30.
®°Ibid., p. 39, Haenisch letter of November 19, 1920; 
pp. 432-433, Kultusminister to local government in Munster, 
August 31, 1922 and GStA (Merseburg) Rep. 169D PreuPischer 
Landtag xc C3, Der Religionsunterricht Allgemein, Ldtg. Bd. 
I: 1919-33, December 7, 1920, DNVP speech and Haenisch's
reply.
&1Ibid., Nr. 2 Bd. XXV, p. 365, Division of Church and 
School Affairs to the Ku1tusminister, November 1, 1924; p.
364, Ku1tusministerium response, December 4, 1924; GStA 
(Potsdam) Rep. 76 VII neu Sekt 1B-I Bd. 8, p. 31, Haenisch 
to local governments and Provinzia1 schu1ko11 egium, March 
13, 1920.
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either dismissing those not participating in religious 
instruction early or allowing them to arrive late, the 
Education Ministry approved of the practice of "collecting" 
these students in their own schools.82
Whatever these schools without religious instruction 
were called, there were very few of them; less than two 
per cent of the nation's youth received an education in a 
"secular school" by the end of the period.33 Furthermore, 
not even the principle of the secular school was accepted. 
The socialist plank of secularization of education remained 
un rea1i zed.
THE PRUSSIAN EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM IN THE 1920S AND THE ISSUE 
□F INTEGRATION
Although the issue of religion in the schools attracted 
more time and attention from Prussian politicians and 
educators, the issue of integration of the school system 
was not entirely ignored. Hopes for integrating the 
educational systems of the various states to create a 
uniform system throughout the nation became increasingly 
dim as the 1920s wore on and chances for a national school
s=Ibid., Nr. 60 Bd. I, p. 135, SPD representative 
speech in the Prussian Landtag, January 13, 1921; p. 379, 
Landtag President to the Kultusminister, December 10, 1921.
33GStA (Merseburg) Rep. 169D, xd A1, Bd. 1, Unterricht 
und Erziehung Allgemein, Preuflische Statistik (Amtliches 
Duellenwerk). herausgegeben in Zwanglosen Heften vom 
Preu|3ischen Statistischen Landesamte in Berlin (Berlin: 
Verlag des Preu|3ischen Statistischen Landesamtes, 1931).
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law being passed diminished. Integration of education in 
the sense of mixing the confessions not only failed, but 
introduction of Weltanschauung and secular schools further 
divided the system. Likewise, the occupational segregation 
of post-elementary education not only prevailed, but even 
worsened during the 1920s, with the introduction of two new 
types of high schools— the Aufbauschulen and the Deutsche 
Oberschulen. While these schools were intended to allow 
greater flexibility, greater fragmentation resulted.'
The intent of several constitutional clauses was to 
soften the, previously inflexible divisions of the upper 
grades, a division that largely followed class lines. The 
constitution provided for eight years of free education, 
followed by free occupational training until the student 
turned eighteen years of age. All children were required 
to attend a common elementary school; subsequent enabling 
laws set this for four years. Before attending middle or 
high schools, all students from all social classes were 
required to attend this four year school. Admission to 
middle and high schools was to depend only on the student's 
predisposition and inclination, not economic, social, or 
religious background. Private schools whose purpose was to 
segregate the wealthy from others and ensure admission to 
the high schools were abolished. Financial aid for capable 
but needy students was to be awarded in order to make 
higher education accessible to the economically
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disadvantaged. Every one of these articles was undermined 
in one way or another throughout the 1920s.
Even during the war, the issue of vertical integration 
of Prussia's school system arose. In 1916, a Prussian 
legislative session considered the issue after the SPD 
repeated its demand that education be secularized, inte­
grated, and free.®4 Supporters of the status quo said that 
free high schools would allow too many unprepared students 
in these schools. Since people differed in intelligence, 
they could not be educated together; different tracks were 
necessary. Even the Progressives insisted on maintenance 
of different types of high schools.®®
In this debate, Haenisch maintained that students in 
private schools should not enjoy special privileges. He 
called for greater access to high schools and universi­
ties.®* Adolph Hoffmann insisted that open admissions 
would not result in hordes of unprepared students in the 
high schools; the SPD only wanted to make sure that 
talented but poor students had the opportunity to attend 
them. ®7
®*GStA (Dahlem) Rep. 76 VII neu Sekt 1B-I, Nr. 1, Bd. 
VIII, p. 8B-101, Landtag session, March 16, 1916.
® ® I b i d  .
I bid . , p. 13.
^Ibid., pp. 88-101. Hoffmann's address to the 
Landtag, March 15, 1916.
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Those who supported the continuing division of the 
upper grades, however, insisted that this was necessary for 
maintaining the country's great cultural heritage. Educa­
tion Minister Boelitz expressed this point of view in a 
pamphlet of 1924.w  The only way to deal with the mult­
iplicity of culture was to continue maintaining four dif­
ferent high school types, each with its emphasis on a 
different, but equally important aspect of culture. This 
way the students could re-experience a certain aspect of 
culture in depth; then they all worked together as an 
educated community to maintain the entirety of culture.
But the different parts had to be co-ordinated, rather than 
each concentrating solely on their respective special­
ties .
Although the Center and the Social Democrats clashed on 
the issue of religion in the schools, both wanted the upper 
grades better integrated with the elementary level. During 
the war, the Center joined the SPD in denouncing private 
preparatory schools that served as class institutions, 
ensuring their students admission into the exclusive high
“̂ Ibid, pp. 349-379, "Die Neuordnung des preu|3ischen 
hoheren Schulwesens. Denkschrift des Preu[3ischen Minis- 
teriums fur Wissenschaft, Kunst und Volksbildung" (Berlin: 
Weidmannsche Buchhand1ung, 1924).
="5’GStA (Merseburg) Rep. 169D PreuRischer Landtag, xc 
C2, Die Konfessione11e Verhaltnisse der Schule (Konfes- 
sions-, Simultanschule), Ldtg. Bd. I: 1919-27, Boelitz's 
address to the Landtag, May 8, 1923.
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schools. 4,0 Haenisch pointed out that the three-year 
private school students were not as well prepared as 
students who had attended a four year public elementary 
school. To support his contention, he pointed out that 
areas which had no private schools sent students to the 
high schools who did just as well, and very often better 
than their private school counterparts. The conservatives' 
insistence that private schools were necessary to maintain 
high standards was unjustified . 4,1
When he became Education Minister, Haenisch was deter—  
mined that the constitutional provision phasing out exist­
ing private schools which served as class institutions 
would be enforced. He instructed local governments to 
refuse permission for establishment of new private 
s c h o o l s . D e s p i t e  this, Independents and Social Democrats 
drew the Education Minister's attention to what they viewed 
as violations of this provision. In 1921, the USPD pro­
tested that some private schools were continuing to send 
their students to the high schools after three instead of 
the required four years. Boelitz was Education Minister by
^ ’GStA (Dahlem) Rep. 76 VII neu Sekt 1B-I Nr. 1, Bd. 
VIII, p. 42, discussion of a Center proposal in the 
Landtag, January 20, 1917.
^Mbid, pp. 11-13, Landtag session of January 29,
1917.
^Ibid., p. 121, Haenisch directive to local offi­
cials, November 12, 1919.
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this time; he said that this was permissible until the 
1923-24 school year.*3
Despite these protests, and the constitution's position 
on the issue, private preparatory schools kept their doors 
open throughout the 1920s. The DNVP expressed support for 
these schools, insisting that these students were so well- 
prepared that they should be allowed to go to the high 
schools after three years of elementary education. The SPD 
scoffed at this claim; the DDP, although it believed in 
"rise of the talented", had to agree with the SPD on the 
necessity of four years of elementary education.64
The DNVP offered a better case for retaining the 
private schools when it asked the state how the public 
system would deal with the dramatic and sudden increase in 
enrollment if the private schools were closed. And where 
were all the newly unemployed teachers to find work? Con­
sidering that finances were a constant problem throughout 
the period and lay-offs periodic, these questions could not 
just be brushed aside.*5
*3GStA (Merseburg) Rep. 169D Preufiischer Landtag xf, 
Al, Die Volksschule Allgemein, Ldtg. Bd. I: 1919-24, June
1921 .
^Ibid., adh 2, AusschuPverhand 1 ungen zu den Akten 




Not only were all levels of the school system not inte­
grated in the manner Oestreich called for, but even the 
constitutional provision for a common four year elementary 
education for all students proved difficult to implement. 
One must conclude that integration of the school system by 
any definition of the word was not realized in the course 
of the 1920s.
* # #
Despite the earnest attempts of educational reformers, 
Prussia's school system continued to be characterized by 
class and religious segregation throughout the brief exis­
tence of Germany's first republic. Both the inability of 
the Social Democrats to unite behind a common educational 
reform program and the necessity of conducting coalition 
politics with parties hostile to general socialist ideology 
prevented the implementation of any meaningful changes. 
Except for superficial alterations, schools during Weimar 
were almost identical to those of Imperial Germany. The 
fragmentation of the schools reflected the fragmentation of 
Weimar politics and society. It is ironic that in striving 
for unity, fragmentation only increased.
CHAPTER EIGHT 
CONCLUSION
Prussian schools in 1932 were almost exactly as they 
had been before 1918— confessionally divided at the ele­
mentary level and occupationally divided in the upper 
grades. The only political party that professed a desire 
to reform the system was the Social Democratic Party. Cer—  
tainly the necessity of political compromise in a coalition 
government posed obstacles to the implementation of any 
reforms. A more important reason, however, for the SPD's 
inactivity in this area is that the party lacked a common 
plan. While there was no dearth of ideas, the leadership 
could not agree to coordinate the forces in the party and 
unite behind one program. Quite simply, the party proved 
incapable of consistently applying Marxist principles to 
the practical problem of reforming the schools. Educators 
in the party could not agree on the funadmental issues of 
the role of religion in the modern world and the place of 
the individual in society.
Following unification in 1871, Prussia's sizeable 
Catholic minority hoped to protect their traditional way of 
life in the predominantly Protestant Reich and formed a 
political party to help them do so. The Center was an 
erstwhile defender of the confessional segregation of 
elementary schools. Middle-class liberals opposed the 
public power of the established churches; according to
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them, the power of the state should not be checked by any 
outside power. Since the schools were state institutions, 
the state's authority over education was supreme. Despite 
their negative attitudes to the churches, liberals were not 
hostile to religion itself. As an important part of Ger—  
many's cultural heritage, religion could not be excluded 
from the schools. Furthermore, the occupational segrega­
tion of the upper grades was necessary for the transmission 
of culture, education’s main task. Neither Catholics nor 
liberals contemplated major reforms of the state's schools.
In the years before the War, the Social Democratic 
Party had grown rapidly. While the party adopted the 
liberals’ criticism of the established churches, its posi­
tion on religion appeared to be more negative. Because the 
SPD was excluded from power in the Second Empire, however, 
its commitment to its programs remained untested. As long 
as socialists were considered pariahs, they could retain 
the language of opposition that proved attractive to so 
many of the nation's disaffected elements. Ambiguities and 
contradictions did not have to be resolved as long as the 
party remained outside the halls of power.
When the socialists--the SPD, along with its offspring, 
the USPD— unexpectedly found themselves in power in 
November 1918, they were forced to make many difficult 
decisions. The SPD had already exhibited its collabora­
tionist tendencies during the war when it supported the
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state. At the war's end, the party went even further, 
revealing its character as a liberal party, committed to 
the realization of the liberal ideal of democracy. The 
USPD, on the other hand, was more radical— it wanted to 
impose permanent changes on the prostrate nation immedi­
ately, while the socialists were still exclusively in 
power. The viewpoint of the SPD prevailed, and elections 
were held for the National Assembly. If it wanted to 
continue to rule, the Social Democrats had to form a 
coalition with the liberal parties.
While the leadership of the SPD could justly claim that 
the necessity of coalition politics inhibited the pursuit 
of educational reform, the fact remains that the party 
failed to unite behind a common plan. Part of the problem 
was that the SPD was more interested in issues that more 
directly affected its constituency— wages and hours. 
Socialists who were concerned with cultural issues often 
expressed frustration at the party's indifference to these 
problems.
But there was a more serious obstacle to forming a 
common program of educational reform— quite simply, the 
Marxist ideology that underpinned the party's position 
proved to be difficult, if not impassible, to apply tD 
actual situations. Specifically, the party's positions on 
both religion and individualism were unclear. Three 
different educators in the party attempted to work out
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these contradictions and apply Marxist principles to 
educational reform; in the process, all came up with very 
different theories. The ideas of these reformers had very 
little impact on the educational system because the assump­
tions and attitudes embedded in their approaches lessened 
their potential appeal.
Kurt Lowenstein tried to persuade both parents and the 
leadership of his own party of the necessity of completely 
eliminating religion from the public sphere. Although his 
arguments often had merit, his attitude of smug certitude 
was grating. His insistence on separation of church and 
state originated with liberals. His potential allies, 
however, could not stomach his prophecies of the inevitable 
triumph of the proletariat. Lowenstein grew increasingly 
disillusioned as the 1920s wore on; he could not under—  
stand why others were not as persuaded by the "truth 
according to Marx" as he was. Despite his belief that 
Marxism was scientific, while religion was based merely on 
faith, in the final analysis his behavior was no less 
sectarian than his religious opponents,
Paul Oestreich focussed on the problem of integrating 
the upper grades of the Prussian schools. He was con­
stantly obliged to combat the charge that his ideas were 
impractical and utopian. While he repeatedly defended 
himself against these accusations, we must conclude that 
his critics were correct. Oestreich's ideas logically lead
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to the erroneous conclusion that if the schools were re­
formed and all children received an equal education, then 
as adults they would never have to accept dull, unsatis­
fying, exploitative employment; furthermore, status dis­
tinctions would disappear. Even had all of his ideas been 
implemented, however, Oestreich’s vision of a society 
without status distinctions could not have been realized.
Both Lowenstein and Destreich claimed the high moral 
ground for their ideas. Although they were primarily 
interested in the welfare of blue-collar workers, both 
reformers identified service to this strata of the pop­
ulation with service to the whole German nation. Recovery 
from the war could occur only when all vestiges of the old 
authoritarian order, particularly religious and class 
divisions, were abolished. To fight the established 
churches or undermine the exalted position of the upper 
classes were not negative actions, in Lowenstein's and 
Destreich's eyes— they merely sought to create a better 
future for all. But unless one was already predisposed to 
accept Marxist ideology, these arguments lacked cogency.
Adolf Grimme rose rapidly through the party ranks 
because he expressed a more moderate position on the issues 
of religion and individualism. As Education Minister, he 
had a forum by which he could reach the public. But like 
Oestreich, his ideas were too utopian, although for dif­
ferent reasons. Grimme wanted to realize God's Kingdom on
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Earth; this was quite a grandiose dream for a nation which 
had just suffered a major defeat. A more serious problem, 
however, is that Grimme’s statements could be misleading. 
When he wrote that "the secular is, in fact, religious", 
confusion was inevitable. While his approach might be 
valid in the course of a philosophical or theological dis­
cussion, in the political arena it could only serve to 
obscure the issues.
All three of these reformers participated actively in 
politics. Nevertheless, the examination of their ideas 
showed that, although they were more practical than "un­
political" academic critics, quite often Lowenstein, 
Oestreich, and Grimme were just as guilty of flights of 
fancy* (This generalization applies less to Lowenstein 
than the other two.) All three of them embraced socialism 
partly because they thought it provided a more concrete way 
of viewing the world than did liberalism. But quite often, 
in their attempts to justify their own beliefs, they re­
sorted to extremely abstract arguments. In short, part of 
the problem with Weimar politics was that not only its 
detractors, but even its active participants could be 
wildly impractical and unpolitical. The blue-collar 
constituency of the SPD was simply uninterested in the 
message of white-collar political theorists in the party, 
who discussed issues that seemed to have little relevance 
far the citizen's daily life.
1B2
Disgust with politics was widespread throughout the 
period. The behavior of the SPD regarding the issue of 
education provides an example of why so many turned away 
from the system. Much of the partisan debate over the 
schools was restricted to semantics. While politicians 
quibbled about terminology, nothing really changed. As 
long as politicians could argue over things that did not 
really matter, they were able to ignore the real problems 
of post-war Germany, problems that were intractable, almost 
unresolveable. It seemed to be easier to escape into petty 
squabbling than to acknowledge the enormity of the nation's 
problems. Despite the fact that the SPD's very ideology, 
Marxism, was based on "Reason", the Social Democrats were 
not immune from the emotional irrational ism that was ram­
pant at the time.
The Social Democratic Party failed to define its funda­
mental beliefs, other than a commitment to the realization 
of democracy. Its commitment to democracy forced the 
leadership of the party to ensure the loyalty of its elec­
toral base. This necessity farced the SPD to act as a 
specia1-interest party; despite this, socialist theorists 
preferred to think of the party as one above class. Its 
emphasis on social issues in the proletariat's interest 
belied its moralistic claims.
In the ma_tter of education, the party failed to define 
its position. Social Democracy could not offer a vision
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behind which the whole party, much less the entire working 
class, and even less so the entire nation, could unite.
□ur examination of the socialist theory and practice of 
educational reform demonstrates that the party could exert 
very little influence on the schools because its members 
were only loosely united by an ideology subject to a 
variety of interpretations, some of them contradictory. 
Unable to define its mission, German Social Democracy in 
the 1920s was paralyzed by its own inner contradictions.
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APPENDIX 
LIST OF SCHOOL TYPES
I. The ELEMENTARY or primary schools (Grundschu1e ) 
encompassed the first four years and could be designated by 
the following terms:
Preparatory school (Vorschule), exclusive elementary 
schools with high tuitions; they were abolished by the 1919 
Consti tution.
Special schools (Sonderschulen), usually referred to 
schools for those with handicaps, for example, schools for 
the deaf. Sometimes, however, used to refer to schools 
with a unique character, also called Meltanschauungschulen.
Most Prussian Grundschulen were denominational schools 
(Bekenntnisschulen).
A few were mixed confessional schools (Simultan- 
sc hu1en ) .
A very few were secular schools (weltliche Schulen). 
Since these were technically unconstitutional, they were 
sometimes called collective schools (Sammelschulen)—  
schools that collected students without religious 
instruction in one place, to prevent the confusion and 
disorder of mixing students.
II. Post-elementary education, by specialty:
A continuation of the elementary school (Vo1ksschu1e ), 
four more years, grades five through eight; academic 
training is now complete for these students. Vocational 
training begins.
The MIDDLE or intermediate school (Mittleschule) of six 
years, grades five through ten; these students generally 
enter lower white collar professions.
The HIGHER schools (Hohere Schulen), nine year schools, 
grades five through thirteen (Sexta through Oberprima).
Many different types:
Gymnasium, with a humanistic curriculum containing nine 
years of Latin and six years of Greek.
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Realschule, with a curriculum emphasizing the study of 
modern culture, with nine years of Latin and no Greek.
□berrealschule, concentrating on math and natural 
science, with no Latin or Greek but two modern languages.
Deutsche Dberschule, centered on German culture, with 
two foreign languages.
The Aufbauschule was considered a high school, though 
it was only a six year school, which one attended after 
seven years in the elementary school.
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